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Abstract
The Effects of Fiscal Policy on Savings and Investment
Adviser: Michael Edelstein
This dissertation contains three essays exploring the effect of fiscal policy shocks on savings and
lending behavior of the private economy. Two essays focus on World War II and one essay
focuses on the entire postwar period. Essay I looks at the response of monetary policy to fiscal
policy shocks and the effect of fiscal policy on the private sector’s balance sheet over a period
that covers 1954 and 2007. I find a minimal response of the Federal Reserve to fiscal policy
shocks. I also find the main response of the private sector to fiscal policy shocks manifests itself
in household assets. Long term assets in particular react very strongly. Essay II establishes the
important role of savings during and immediately after World War II. I show that the
unexpectedly high savings rates that persisted after the war ended was driven by the fact that
housing purchases are counted as a kind of savings. Treating housing as a durable consumption
good produces the negative savings expected. Essay III looks at the behavior of commercial
banks in the period 1940 to 1955. I find that there is a—both economic and statistically—
significant negative effect of war spending on total assets, mortgage lending, and commercial,
industrial and agricultural loans made by commercial banks throughout the war and until 1949.
The response of bank assets during the immediate postwar period is indicative of the unusual
pattern of output and the money supply between 1946 and 1950. All this is taken as evidence
that reconversion was not as smooth and robust as commonly argued.
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Preface
It is already a cliché—one I am guilty of invoking in this dissertation—to point out the
“explosion” of literature on fiscal policy since the 2008 financial crisis dramatically changed the
way economists think about policy intervention. We are still waiting for a Keynes or a Friedman
to come forward and clearly articulate the fundamental issues underlying our current crisis in a
way that can be accepted as a consensus across the profession. However, it is safe to say that
this “explosion” is just the beginning of generational preoccupation with what seems to be an
opening up of the possibilities of policy intervention out of the straight jacket of monetary
supremacy. The irony of history here is that the assumption that monetary policy is the main
vehicle of policy and fiscal policy at best is subordinate—though more likely useless—is the
mirror image of the intellectual paradigm that lead to the inflation crisis of the 70s. The
consensus for the 30 or so years after WWII ignored the potency of monetary policy and over
emphasized the role of fiscal policy. It is perhaps my own misplaced faith in equilibrium and the
ability of humanity to learn from its mistakes that leaves me optimistic history has once again
intervened to put the role of all policy levers into proper perspective, or at the very least, is
forcing us to respond to unconsidered possibilities.
In this dissertation I carve out a specific set of questions related to the effect of fiscal
policy. Specifically, this dissertation can be seen as an exploration of the role fiscal policy plays
in savings and the banking and financial sector after the end of the Great Depression. Another
way of thinking about the purpose of this dissertation is to think of it as an exploration of how
fiscal policy is both a substitute and a complement for monetary policy. The three essays of this
dissertation are unified by the question being asked rather than methodology. Broadly speaking,
two essays of this dissertation deal with the specific fiscal policy shock of World War II. The
viii
fiscal policy shock of WWII is central to understanding the effects of fiscal policy on balance
sheets as well as the economy more broadly. The key issue in the study of WWII is what the
transmission mechanism was of the fiscal policy shock of the war to the postwar, for it is only
during the postwar that the enormous increase in military spending wanes enough for the private
economy to function normally. This transmission mechanism, if there is one, must be the
massive increase in savings generated by the war. What’s more, the passive role of the Federal
Reserve meant that the fiscal policy shock of the war also translated directly into a monetary
policy shock. This, of course, is two ways of saying the same thing.
It should be noted that I do not view the war as simply a sterile fiscal policy shock. At
this point, several years later, I do not know if the chicken of my interest in the economics of the
war or the egg of my interest in the war as a historical event came first. What I can say now is
that the era continues to captivate me along countless directions. Within the context of this
dissertation, the related issues of how the early war pulled the economy out of the depression,
how the war was instrumental in forming a labor-government-business partnership that lasted a
generation, and how the war lead to the longest and largest housing boom the world has ever
seen are issues that resonate with the contemporary observer.
With that in mind, then, the third essay of this dissertation is an attempt to put the case
study of the war into a perspective that is useful to modern day policy. While the third essay
does produce results that are of historical interest, the real object of that paper is to establish
some empirical facts that may guide policy in the future. For that, one needs long stretches of
data and it is natural to look at the era WWII ushered—an era we still live—in its own context.
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11. The Effect of Fiscal Policy Shocks on the Flow of Funds
Abstract: This paper uses a selection of fiscal vector autoregression models to identify the effect
of fiscal policy shocks on the private sector’s balance sheet using the Flow of Funds during the
period 1954 to 2007. As well, I examine the response of treasury interest rates, the Federal
Funds rate, and the assets of the Federal Reserve to gauge the response of monetary policy to
fiscal policy shocks. I find that the Federal Reserve does not respond to fiscal policy shocks in
any significant way. I also find that business net liabilities decrease slightly in response to a
revenue increase fiscal policy. The household sector responds more clearly. A decrease in
revenue or increase in spending increases household holdings of currency and deposits. Long
term assets—driven largely by changing equity values—responds very strongly, though the sign
of the response varies across sub periods. Spending shocks also have a clear, positive effect on
mortgage lending. This suggests that monetary policy does not offset fiscal policy in any strong
way. It also suggests that fiscal policy can substitute—or perhaps complement—monetary
policy aimed at the financial sector under certain conditions.
21.1 Introduction
Since the financial crisis that began in 2008 there has been an explosion in the empirical
literature exploring the effects of fiscal policy shocks. The once-every-two-generations severity
of the recession led policy makers and economists back to the possibility of fiscal policy as an
effective demand management tool, a possibility reinforced by the impotence of monetary policy
at the zero lower bound. The nascent literature that has emerged has offered a number of
possible routes of research. This paper follows one potential strand of research and examines the
effect of fiscal policy shocks on sector balance sheets in the period from 1954 to 2007. Using
Flow of Funds data, it mirrors the work of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evan’s seminal “The
Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks: evidence from the Flow of Funds” (1994), loosely following
their methodology to uncover the effect of revenue and expenditure shocks on the Flow of
Funds. As well, this paper uses the Flow of Funds data to examine the response of the Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet to fiscal policy shocks. This paper explores the response of the Flow of
Funds in several alternative specifications of a fiscal vector autoregression (fiscal VAR) using
the identification schemes of Fatas and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (1999) and Perotti
(2005). As well, this paper incorporates the narrative tax shocks of Romer and Romer (2010)
and the narrative spending shocks of Valerie Ramey (2011).
The response of household balance sheets to fiscal policy shocks is of some interest.
Economists have come, in a simple way, to think of monetary policy as the management of the
economy’s assets and liabilities and fiscal policy as largely operating through changes in
consumption. This paper explores whether these roles are clearly separated.
3In the simple fiscal policy multiplier, the effect of fiscal policy on savings is thought of as
a “drain” on the effectiveness of policy. For instance, the tax rebates in 2008 pushed by then
president George W. Bush were criticized on the grounds that those rebates were largely saved.
However, it is not obvious that the increased private sector savings (or decreased debt) resulted
in no increased economic activity. The role of fiscal policy and savings takes on added
pertinence given that much attention has been paid to balance sheet pathologies and their role in
stifling real economic activity since the 2008 financial collapse. In this light, it makes sense to
try to evaluate the role of fiscal policy as a possible remedy for these pathologies. This paper
begins to establish the channels through which fiscal policy shocks can influence the assets and
liabilities of the private economy.
This paper also addresses another question brought to the fore by the financial crisis. The
modern justification for interventionist fiscal policy is predicated on the fact that it is a second
best solution when monetary policy is “out of bullets”. What’s more, theory suggests that the
Fed, when it does have control over the policy rate, is hostile—to an indeterminate degree—
towards activist fiscal policy insofar as fiscal policy interferes with the Fed’s inflation and output
targets. Fiscal VARs are particularly useful for gauging the response of variables “on average”
since by construction the shocks under consideration are unanchored from the state of the
business cycle.
This paper reaches two main conclusions. First, it establishes some empirical facts about
the response of monetary policy to fiscal shocks. In general, to the extent that one can measure a
response, the Fed accommodates fiscal policy shocks in the medium and long run. There is
mixed evidence for whether the Fed accommodates or counters fiscal policy in the short run.
Interest rates, in general, do not responded to either revenue or spending shocks.
4Second, the effect on private sector assets and liabilities is somewhat mixed. There is
evidence that particular household assets respond to fiscal policy shocks. There is a small impact
effect of fiscal policy shocks on highly liquid bank deposits after 1986. Bank deposits decline in
response to an increase in spending and increase in response to a tax increase. The response is
somewhat more sustained for spending shocks. Less liquid assets, such a pension fund assets
have a larger and more sustained response to fiscal policy shocks, though with similar signs.
Mortgage lending has a somewhat mixed response, though on balance it is reasonable to say that
there is some evidence that spending shocks have had an effect on mortgage lending during the
great moderation. There is also some evidence to suggest that revenue shocks had an effect on
mortgage lending in the period before 1986.
These results carry with them some important implications. First, the lack of strong
relationship between fiscal policy and monetary policy is important, and this emphasis is unique
in the empirical literature. This result also contradicts the theoretical arguments that the Federal
Reserve maintains tight control over the economy and tight control over the actions of fiscal
authorities. Second, to the extent that fiscal policy does have an effect on the private economy’s
balance sheet—in particular household’s balance sheet—there is a case to be made for policy
that targets household balance sheets as well as household consumption.
1.2 Method
Most of the fiscal VAR work done examining the postwar era either looks only at
investment spending as an aggregate measure, occasionally disaggregating into business
investment and housing. Often some benchmark interest rate (3 month treasury bills for instance)
is also tested. Financial variables and investment are explored because most of the earlier forays
5into fiscal VARs were primarily concerned with evaluating the efficacy of DSGE models
(Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher, 1999) However, a closer look at
the private sector’s balance sheet is useful in its own right especially given the evidence that the
Great Recession is driven by balance sheet pathologies. With this in mind, I follow the work
done by Chrstiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (CEE, 1996). CEE use flow of funds data to study
the effects of monetary policy shocks on the private sector’s balance sheet. They explore the
effect of policy shocks on net funds borrowed by the business sector, the financial sector, the
household sector, federal state and local governments, the monetary authority (the Fed) and
foreigners. Their basic technique, which involves a simple VAR system, is easily applied to
fiscal policy shocks.
I identify exogenous fiscal policy shocks in a VAR borrowing from CEE, Fatas and
Mihov (FM, 2001) as well as Blanchard and Perotti (BP, 2002) and Perotti (2005). I also use the
Romer and Romer (RR, 2010) narrative tax shocks. For symmetry I employ Ramey’s (2011)
narratively identified defense spending shocks as exogenous shocks to the VAR. Additionally, I
use Mertens and Ravn’s (MR, 2011) alternative estimate of the Perotti income elasticity of taxes.
The similarity of these approaches makes them comparable while their differences make them
useful robustness checks. As well, given that the Perotti specification is often used as a
benchmark, the relationship of the narrative shocks to the Perotti benchmark is interesting in its
own right.
First, a brief overview and explanation of the problem that must be solved to extract
exogenous shocks from a VAR model:
(1) Ȟܻ ௧ൌ ܤ(ܮ) ௧ܻ൅ ௧݁
6Equation 1 is the “structural equation” that we are interested in estimating, where Г is a matrix of 
contemporaneous coefficients and B(L) is a matrix of coefficients on lagged values of the
variables in the vector Y. The vector et are the uncorrelated, exogenous shocks. However, we
only have information to estimate the reduced form equation 2:
(2) ௧ܻൌ ߁ିଵܤ(ܮ) ௧ܻ൅ ߁ିଵ ௧݁
Or
(3) ௧ܻൌ ߁ିଵܤ(ܮ) ௧ܻ൅ ݑ௧
where the shocks of ut are likely to be correlated. We must extract the uncorrelated exogenous
shocks of the structural model, which allows us to test impulse response functions. We do so by
multiplying the matrix Γ-1 by its inverse to get an identity matrix, giving us equation 4:
(4) Ȟݑ௧ൌ ௧݁
In equation 4 there are more unknown parameters than known parameters. We can
calculate the Var/Covar matrix of the reduced form shocks ut. However, we only know the
diagonal elements of Γ, which are equal to 1; as well, we know that the covariances of the 
structural shock (et) are zero. This leaves us with only
௡మା௡
ଶ
knowns and n2 unknowns. The
elements of Γ must be restricted by at least 
௡మା௡
ଶ
conditions for the system to be identified.
Both FM and CEE use Cholesky ordering to identify shocks. FM argues that government
spending shocks are uncorrelated with all other quarterly economic variables. That is, the claim
the fiscal authorities (particularly federal authorities) do not respond to economic shocks
immediately. The ordering of government spending first is the key identifying restriction when
Cholesky ordering is used to identify exogenous shocks. To start from a CEE/FM baseline, a
Cholesky decomposition of my VAR would order variables as such: (Gt YtPt Tt, FFt Dt) where G
is the government spending variable, Y is total GDP, P is the price level as measured by the GDP
7deflator, T is revenue, FF is the Federal Funds rate, and D is the Flow of Funds variable of
interest. In matrix notation:
(5)
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
1 0 0 0 0 0
ߛ௚௬ 1 0 0 0 0
ߛ௚௣ ߛ௬௣ 1 0 0 0
ߛ௚ఛ ߛ௬ఛ ߛ௣ఛ 1 0 0
ߛ௚௙௙ ߛ௬௙௙ ߛ௣௙௙ ߛఛ௙௙ 1 0
ߛ௚ௗ ߛ௬ௗ ߛ௣ௗ ߛఛௗ ߛ௙௙ௗ 1⎠⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
ݑ௚
ݑ௬
ݑ௣
ݑఛ
ݑ௙௙
ݑௗ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞ =
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
௚݁
௬݁
௣݁
ఛ݁
௙݁௙
ௗ݁ ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
Government spending is ordered first as per the FM specification (CEE orders Y first),
with taxation ordered so that government spending, output, and the price level have a
contemporaneous effect on tax revenues.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) offer a more nuanced three variable (G, T and Y)
identification procedure that Perotti (2005) expands into a five variable system. Instead of a
simple Cholesky ordering, Perotti makes assumptions about the output, price and interest rate
elasticities of government spending and taxation. BP and Perotti use what they call “cyclically
adjusted fiscal shocks”. Perotti reasons that contemporary structural shocks to quarterly data
only capture automatic responses to fiscal policy. Adjusting for the six variable specification of
my flow of funds model the fiscal policy shocks are constructed as such:
(6) ݑ௧௧஼஺ ൌ ݑ௧௧െ ሺߙ௧௬ݑ௧
௬+ߙ௧గݑ௧గ ൅ ߙ௧௜ݑ௧
௙௙
൅ ߙ௧ௗݑ௧
ௗሻൌ ߚ௧௚ ௧݁
௚
൅ ௧݁
௧
(7) ݑ௧
௚஼஺
ൌ ݑ௧
௚
െ ሺߙ௚௬ݑ௧
௬+ߙ௚గݑ௧గ ൅ ߙ௚௜ݑ௧
௙௙
൅ ߙ௧ௗݑ௧
ௗሻൌ ߚ௚௧݁ ௧
௧൅ ௧݁
௚
The identification scheme involves a combination of making assumptions about the
coefficients ߙ௜௝ and ordering the equations accordingly. Perotti reasons there is no effect of
output or the policy interest rate on government spending. In addition there is no effect of the
Fed Funds rate on taxes. The effect of inflation on government spending works through wage
indexation of government payrolls though the actual parameter is arbitrarily assumed to be 0.5.
8Perotti (following BP) then calculates the output and price elasticity of taxation. Obviously, in
this identification scheme most of the work one needs to do is in parameterizing the effect on
taxes by contemporaneous changes to output and inflation.
Finally, for BP and Perotti, as with FM, the decision of whether to order taxation or
government spending first is essentially arbitrary. All authors rely on the fact that the VAR
residuals of government spending and taxation are not highly correlated. All authors take as
their benchmark that ߚ௚௧ = 0.
In matrix notation the identification scheme looks like this:
(8)
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
ͳ ߩ௣௚ 0 0 0 0
ߛ௚௬ ͳ Ͳ ߛఛ௬ 0 0
ߛ௚௣ ߛ௬௣ ͳ ߛఛ௣ 0 0
Ͳ ߩ௣ఛ ߩ௬ఛ 1 0 0
ߛ௚௙௙ ߛ௬௙௙ ߛ௣௙௙ ߛఛ௙௙ 1 0
ߛ௚ௗ ߛ௬ௗ ߛ௣ௗ ߛఛௗ ߛ௙௙ௗ 1⎠⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
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ݑ௬
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ݑఛ
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⎟
⎟
⎟
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⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
ߚ௚௚ 0 0 0 0 0
Ͳ ߚ௬௬ 0 0 0 0
Ͳ Ͳ ߚ௣௣ 0 0 0
ߚ௚ఛ Ͳ Ͳ ߚఛఛ 0 0
Ͳ Ͳ Ͳ Ͳ ߚ௙௙௙௙ 0
Ͳ Ͳ Ͳ Ͳ Ͳ ߚௗௗ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
௚݁
௬݁
௣݁
ఛ݁
௙݁௙
ௗ݁⎠
⎟
⎟
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⎟
⎞
where ρij are the parameters calculated, assumed or estimated by Perotti or MR. I discuss this
below. This identification scheme is very similar to the FM scheme in equation 5 with three
notable differences. First, it is the primitive shock of government spending on taxation and not
the structural shock that matters. Secondly, Perotti’s emphasis is on the recursive nature of tax
and output variables. Finally, Perroti includes a mechanism for the price level to influence the
two variables.
The VARs used to test the response of interest rates and the Federal Reserve’s balance
sheet are essentially the same as the 6 variable case above. However, the VAR contains only
five variables. The D variable (flow of funds) is dropped and the interest rates and balance sheet
variables are substituted for the Federal Fund interest rate variable. Everything else remains the
same and there is no need to repeat the exposition here for the five variable specification.
9Mortens and Ravn (2011a, 2011b) use narrative estimates of tax shocks to identify tax
shocks by using narrative identification based on the RR identification. MR, however, construct
their own more detailed measures of tax shocks. Their methodology is not employed here;
however, they offer a simple suggestion that the calculated tax multipliers of BP are the main
source of difference between their results and the results of BP. They propose that an output
elasticity of taxation (ߩ௬ఛ in equation 8) of around 3.13 gives similar impulse response results to
their proxy measure. It should be cautioned that for the purposes of this paper this is a somewhat
crude use of their alternative elasticity. First, the three variable SVAR of BP is different than the
SVAR of Perotti that is used here. Secondly, the elasticity proposed by MR is a “full sample”
elasticity, in their case from 1959q1 to2006q1. Perotti calculates output elasticities for both the
full sample and for the two subsamples proposed by Perotti. The time periods used by Perotti are
1960q1-1980q1 and 1980q1-2001q4. The baseline time period used in this paper is slightly
different. The time period in the paper spans 1954q3 to 2007q1 with a 1986q4 breakpoint.
However, I use the same elasticities as Perotti. At any rate the addition of the alternative MR
elasticity is a useful robustness check. Table 1.1 has a breakdown of the different elasticities
used in this paper.
The Romer and Romer’s (R&R) narrative approach to identifying exogenous shocks is
also used, though they only identify tax shocks. Valerie Ramey (2011) has also culled the
historical record. She has created a series of estimates of defense spending shocks building on
her work with Robert Shapiro (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998). The R&R and Ramey approaches are
broadly similar; however, the historical sources consulted are different. R&R primarily use
government sources such as the Annual Economic Report of the President, The Congressional
Budget Office’s Budget and Economic Outlook, and the Social Security Administration’s Social
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Security Bulletin. Ramey, on the other hand uses magazines and newspaper accounts, namely
Business Week, The New York Times and the Washington Post accounts, to estimate her fiscal
shocks. She employs government sources only when the press accounts are not clear, arguing
that her methodology best captures the public’s expectations because official sources were not
available ahead of time and, further, that the actual costs of spending increases were
systematically underestimated. It is not entirely clear how the Ramey methodology avoids this
problem, since the press in fact seems to rely fairly heavily on official sources for their estimates
of future spending increases. The tradeoff seems to be between timing expectations of
legislative changes and the accuracy of measuring the actual changes to the fiscal policy series.
Ramey also argues that her spending shocks capture anticipation effects1. Ramey argues that
capturing the anticipation effects is crucial since “[f]rom the standpoint of the neoclassical
model, what matters for the wealth effect are changes in the present discounted value of
government purchases, not the particular timing of the purchase.”(Ramey 2009, p 12)
Favero and Giavazzi (FG, 2009) demonstrate that narrative shocks are comparable to
the structurally identified shocks of BP, though without the need to impose other restrictions on
the matrix of unstructured residuals in order to uncover the primitive shocks.
They also outline an exogenity test for the narrative shocks. It is worth going through the
basis for their exogenity test, though one is encouraged to refer to the original paper for more
detail:
(9) ௧ܻ = ∑ ܥ௧ି ௜௅௜ୀ଴ ௧ܻି ௜+ ∑ ௧݀ି ௜௅௜ୀ଴ ௧݁ି ௜௙௣ோ ൅ ݑ௧
1 Romer and Romer also offer a measure of the present value of tax shocks. However these are not often used.
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Where Yt is defined as it was before and ௧݁
௙௣ோare the “narratively identified” shocks (fp= g or t)
from Romer and Romer or Ramey. F&G demonstrate that the narrative shocks can be
established as exogenous by transforming the structural VAR in equation 1 into a MA process.
(10)  ௧ܻൌ ܥ ௧ܻି ଵ ൅ ܤ ௧݁
And
(11) ܻ௧ൌ ȣሺܮሻ݁ ௧
Where Yt here is defined as before and Θ(ܮ) = ஺షభ஻
ூି ஺షభି஼ሺ௅ሻ
. As with an SVAR impulse response
function this equation cannot be estimated. It has to be derived from an estimate of equation 9:
(12) ௧ܻ = ∑ Θ଴௅௝ୀ଴ Θଵ ௧݁ି ௝+ Θଵ௅ାଵ ௧ܻି ሺ௅ାଵሻ
Where ߠ଴ ൌ ܣିଵܤ and ߠଵ ൌ ܣିଵܥ. Yt is then a function of the “initial condition”, the second
term on the right hand side and the path of the MA process over L periods. For illustrative
purposes FG extract a single equation (for the change in GDP) from the VAR system above:
(13)
ȟ݃݀݌ൌ
∑ ߠ௝
௬௧௅
௝ୀ଴ ∑ ߠ௝
௬௧௅
௝ୀ଴ ௧݁ି ௝
௧ + ∑ ߠ௝௬௬௅௝ୀ଴ ௧݁ି ௝௬ + ∑ ߠ௝௬௣௅௝ୀ଴ ௧݁ି ௝௣ + ∑ ߠ௝௬௙௙௅௝ୀ଴ ௧݁ି ௝௙௙ ∑ ߠ௝௬௧௅௝ୀ଴ ௧݁ି ௝௧ +
∑ ߠ௝
௬௚௅
௝ୀ଴ ௧݁ି ௝
௚ +Θଵ௅ାଵ ௧ܻି ሺ௅ାଵሻ
For the narrative shock to be considered an exogenous shock the following assumptions must
hold:
(14) ௧݁
௙௣= ௧݁
௙௣ோ
൅ ߝ௧
Given equation 14 equation 13 can be rewritten (for fp=t) as
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(15) ȟ݃݀݌ൌ ∑ ߠ௝
௬௧௅
௝ୀ଴ ௧݁ି ௝
௧ + ∑ ߠ௝௬௧௅௝ୀ଴ ߝ௧ି ௝௧
+෍ ߠ௝௬௬௅
௝ୀ଴
௧݁ି ௝
௬ + ෍ ߠ௝௬௣௅
௝ୀ଴
௧݁ି ௝
௣ + ෍ ߠ௝௬௙௙௅
௝ୀ଴
௧݁ି ௝
௙௙ ෍ ߠ௝
௬௧
௅
௝ୀ଴
௧݁ି ௝
௧ + ෍ ߠ௝௬௚௅
௝ୀ଴
௧݁ି ௝
௚
+ Θଵ
௅ାଵ
௧ܻି ሺ௅ାଵሻ
The primary testable hypothesis that stems from assumption 14 is that the narrative
shocks should be orthogonal to the lags of the variables included in the VAR. FG propose a
simple test: regress the n period (from 1 to L) ahead narrative shock on the lags of the component
of the VAR. The F-test on these regressions are then used as the basis for determining whether
the shocks are exogenous or not. For the purposes here, not being able to reject the null at the
5% level is considered to indicate the endogeneity of the narrative shocks to a particular lag of
the VAR variables
The main judgment call for the FG test is deciding how far back the lags of the
components of the VAR must go in order to qualify the shocks as exogenous. I indicate in each
impulse response whether an R&R or Ramey shock is exogenous. No star indicates that the
narrative shocks are not exogenous for between t=0 to t=(-4) lags of the VAR components. One
star indicates that up to between t=(-5) and t=(-8) of the VAR variables are exogenous. Two
stars indicated that the narrative shocks are exogenous to all lags of the VAR variables for 9 to
12 lags. Three stars indicate that the VAR variables are exogenous for more than 12 lags. This
is roughly consistent with the less formal way FG treat the results of their test.
It is not clear how much the endogeneity bias affects the estimates. Presenting the
narrative shocks alongside the other estimates of impulse shocks, one can get a sense of the
magnitude of the endogeneity bias in the fiscal VARs. The results, in general, are less
statistically significant for the narrative shocks than the FM or Perotti specifications. As well,
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more often than not, the narrative approaches offer an outlier estimate of the effect of policy
shocks.
To estimate the fiscal VARs I follow the FG methodology of constructing impulse
response functions. A bootstrap process resamples with replacement out of the residuals of the
estimated VARs detailed above. The VAR equations are then solved for the desired length of the
impulse response—here 20 quarters—with all impulses set to zero. The equations are then
calculated again for the shock of interest. In the case of the R&R and the Ramey specification,
the shock is set to 1% of GDP, the FM and both Perotti initial shocks are one standard deviation
shocks to the policy variable of interest. The all zero estimate is then subtracted from the single
shock estimate. For this paper 500 repetitions were used. As FG point out, this methodology is
equivalent to impulse response functions calculated in a standard way. The confidence intervals
are also estimated with this bootstrap procedure. For this paper I use two tiers of confidence
intervals. I calculate both the 95th and 5th quantiles as well as the 97.5th and 2.5th quantiles. I
treat variables that fall between these two confidence intervals as “marginally significant”
All of the impulse response functions reported below are estimated from VARs with six
lags. Six lags were chosen for ease of comparison though the decision to impose six lags on all
equations sacrifices depth for breadth. In general, six lags lower the prevalence of serial
correlation among the VAR residuals across equations, though any one estimate may have been
better served by a different lag specification.
1.3 Breakpoints
Since Perotti (2005) it has been customary to divide the full sample into two subperiods
with the breakpoint at 1980q1. Perotti justifies this by arguing that 1980 is consistent with the
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breakpoint in monetary policy. He also argues that the 1980 breakpoint is within the confidence
intervals of breakpoints in other series in his model. The intuition of this date and its seeming
historical consistency does have its appeal.
However, it is not obvious that a breakpoint in fiscal policy time series should be
coincident with a breakpoint in monetary policy. As discussed below and in Mountford and
Uhlig (2003) there is not a tremendously strong relationship between fiscal policy shocks and
monetary policy. When one employs the VAR breakpoint tests from Bia, Lumsdaine and Stock
(1998) a somewhat different result emerges. A breakpoint of 1986q4 makes more sense when
the focus is on fiscal policy and not monetary policy. Table 1.2 shows the results for
combinations of the five baseline variables used in this paper (federal spending, GDP, GDP
deflator, federal revenue,and the Fed Funds rate) and the full sample period (1954q3 to 2007q1).
A fairly robust breakpoint is dated at 1986q4, with a 90% confidence interval of 1981q1 to
1992q3 is shown. This is driven by the government spending variable which alone shows a
breakpoint at 1986q4. Most combinations of variables that include government spending show a
breakpoint of 1986q4. Meanwhile, the main role of the other variables seems to be in narrowing
the confidence intervals. However, one obvious and not surprising exception is the inclusion of
the Federal Funds rate. In many specifications that include both the Fed Funds rate and
government spending, breakpoints in 1981 are found, though these estimates’ confidence interval
also include 1986q4. Including five or more of the above variables converges more or less to a
breakpoint of 1986q4. The Perroti breakpoint of 1980q1 falls outside the 90% confidence
interval for the five variable breakpoint, though it should be pointed out that the Perotti
breakpoint is not that far outside of the confidence interval.
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The main issue with the 1986q4 breakpoint date is that there is no clear historical event to
mark this breakpoint unlike the Perotti breakpoint, which has a clear historical interpretation.
The intuitive appeal of using a breakpoint of 1980q1 is that this can be justified by the clear shift
in monetary policy of the Volker Fed. This shift was both aimed at ending the inflation of the
Burns era Fed but it also marked a clear shift in priorities of monetary policy to an unambiguous
subordination of full employment to price level stability. One wants to point to the fiscal year
1986 federal budget which represented the culmination of Reagan’s economic policy, but the
major change in 1986 was on the tax side and not on the spending side. Surprisingly, there is
little evidence of a structural break in revenue at any point in the time series discussed here. One
is left to conclude that, if the 1986q4 break is credible then it is measuring the confluence of
things that came together in the 1980s: low inflation, structural deficits and flattening military
spending.
So where does this discussion of break points leave us? There are two main possibilities.
First, there is no breakpoint in the model as specified. This is backed up by the fact that Bia-
Perron, multiple breakpoint tests (not shown) of government spending and government revenue
both show zero breakpoints in each series. However, there is also the possibility that the postwar
period should be divided into three periods which essentially captures the postwar period, the
post Bretton woods period and the post Burns period. What is quite clear is that the instability in
fiscal VAR models is being driven by the high inflation period that for our purposes stretches
between 1967q2 and 1986q4. This instability would have manifested itself in both government
revenues through “bracket creep”, which would have spilled over into spending through both the
inflation driven increase in in revenue and also through the lower real borrowing costs of the
government. These lower real borrowing costs would have come from both a lower real interest
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rate and in a more rapid shrinking of the debt to GDP ratio, which is often seen as a metrics of a
government’s economics health.
This paper takes a somewhat agnostic view on breakpoints, though the preference is for
the 1986q4 breakpoint. For those who do not find this breakpoint credible you can think of the
two sub periods as robustness checks on the full sample estimate. I avoid breaking the full
sample into three time periods because three time periods come at a very high cost in terms of
observations in each time period. Effectively, it means splitting the pre-Volker time period into a
13 year period (1954q3-1967q2) and the significantly longer period of inflationary instability
from 1967 to 1986. Furthermore, using only two subsamples preserves one of the appeals of the
Perotti breakpoint in which it divides the full time period in half. My time series extends later
that Perotti, so that a 1986 breakpoint more or less preserves this symmetry.
As well, the focus of this paper is on the post-1986 sample. While the pre-1986 period is
of historical interest, from a policy perspective we remain much closer to the post-Volker policy
paradigm, ignoring of course, what will someday become known as the 2008q3 breakpoint.
Finally, the choice of shifting the subperiod midpoint from 1980q1 to 1986q4 does not
have a significant effect on results in most cases. An important exception is the results of the
R&R shocks discussed above. Shifting the breakpoint to 1986q4 causes a dramatic change in the
response of the R&R shocks in certain instances. However, the relationship between revenue
shocks and a breakpoint justified largely by the spending time series remains unclear, especially
given that this breakpoint in part marks a point in time in which revenue and spending were
largely decoupled. This may be simply be further evidence that a new regime had clearly
emerged by 1986q4. At any rate, I also consider the Perotti 1980q1 breakpoint and discuss it
when it points to a different result than the 1986q4 breakpoint.
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Where of interest, I will also discuss results from a truncated period of 1986q4 to 1999q1.
Some estimates do change notably when one ends the period at the end of the 20th century. The
date 1999q1 is justified in part by the Bia-Lumsdaine-Stock tests that show a breakpoint in the
VAR specified above that uses the government spending and taxation series used in Mertens and
Ravn (2011).
1.4 Data
GDP, the GDP deflator, and the fiscal variables are all taken from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis’s website. The Federal Funds rate is taken from the FF series of the St Louis
Fed’s F.R.E.D. database as are the 3-month Treasury bill rate and 10 year Treasury bond rate.
All three of these rates are quarterly averages. The Favero and Giavazzi interest rate is
calculated from BEA data. It is interest payments on debt divided by the previous quarter’s
primary debt. All other variables, generically indicated as D in the equations above, are taken
from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds database. All variables, aside from the interest rates
series, are deflated by the GDP deflator and in log levels. The exact composition of the fiscal
variables is somewhat arbitrary, with BP, Perotti, FG, RR and MR all using slightly different
expenditure and revenue definitions and FG and MR more or less suggesting that their choices
are variants of the Perotti specification and compatible with the RR shocks. The measures of tax
shocks are roughly similar between FG and MR. I use the same revenue variable as MR2
because it is close to the Perotti specification and the alternative output elasticity of revenue
measure proposed by MR is based on their definition of federal revenue. As well the MR
definition is meant to be compatible with the RR tax shocks. However, the MR expenditure
definition is too narrow. It follows Perotti in only including government consumption and
2 The definition of government revenue used in this paper is: BEA Tables 3.2: Line 2 + Line 11 – Line 8
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investment as government spending, excluding transfer payments. In only including transfer
payments as taxes on the revenue side an asymmetry is created in which transfers are only
treated as a tax. Including transfers in government spending, within the VAR helps establish the
“net” effect of transfer payments on the economy. As well, Oh and Reis (2011), demonstrate
that transfer payments play a crucial role in thinking about the effect of government spending on
the economy. The spending variable I use includes transfer payments in the definition of
government expenditures. This is similar to the definition of government spending used by FG
net transfers to foreigners3.
Finally, the RR narrative tax shocks are from the data set provided by Romer and Romer
(2009a 2009b) on Christina Romer’s webtsite. The Ramey (2009b) shocks are from a data set
available on the authors website. The narrative fiscal shocks are as a percent of GDP since the
preponderance of zero values precludes transforming the series into logs. As mentioned earlier,
the Ramey shocks are calculated as the net present value shocks at the time they are expected
while the R&R shocks are timed to the quarter that they actually take effect.
1.5 Results
A few words should be said about the method for sifting through the reams of data.
Wading through such large swaths of data is bound to rely on subjective judgment calls, the
remedy is transparency and some a priori standard for evaluating the results. In general, I focus
on significant result unless a statistically insignificant result is of interest, as is the case with the
response of the interest rate
The 50 years of quarterly data is a relatively small sample and dividing the sample into
two subsamples compound the problem further. Furthermore, in the six variable specifications
3 The definition of government expenditures used in this paper is Table 3.2: Line 40 - (Line 25 + Line 28 + Line31)
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each VAR contains 37 independent variables. The low power of these regressions is bound to
result in type I errors. With that in mind, the focus on statistically significant results inherently
means a focus on the strongest and clearest results. To try to avoid type II errors—which I have
some measure of control over—I have chosen to define statistical significance somewhat more
stridently than is often found in VAR papers. Confidence intervals of the 97.5th or 2.5th percentile
are used. However, I also indicate when zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th percentile. As
mentioned above, I treat values that fall in between these confidence intervals as “marginally
significant” and in general only consider them in contexts in which there is also some evidence
of a strongly significant result.
The relevance of the results also has another criterion. In general, for the non-narrative
spending shocks both the FM and Perotti shocks must show a statistically significant effect. For
revenue shocks all three non-narrative specifications must be statically significant. This rule is
occasionally broken when there is significance across specifications but not for the same time
period.
Those who prefer the narrative shocks will—for the most part—come away from this
paper with the impression there is little to no effect of fiscal policy shocks on the variables under
discussion here, even more so than with the VAR identification schemes. Credibility is lent to
this position when the variables are indicated as being exogenous by the FG exogeniety test.
However, the issue of low power is compounded by the narrative shocks, where there are
relatively few nonzero observations.
The FG test only gets us halfway toward establishing the validity of the narrative shocks
since the test only establishes that a variable is exogenous or not. It does not give one a sense
the variables relevance to the question at hand. For instance a variable that records the number
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of meteors hitting Jupiter will certainly “pass” the FG test, but it will not explain anything about
the effect of fiscal policy4 on the variables. With that in mind, a narrative shock that both tests as
exogenous and shows a statistically significant impulse response is a rare bird and worthy of
attention. I treat statistically significant narrative shocks that are also judged to be exogenous by
the FG test as a standalone result.
I take as the baseline sub period breakpoint 1986q4. As the discussion above indicates, it
has the most clear statistical justification. However, I also look at the Perotti 1980q1 breakpoint
and discuss the effect when that breakpoint is used if they are significantly different than the
baseline. For the most part the breakpoint does not make much difference but one important
exception is the effect on mortgage activity as well as—to a lesser extent—household assets. I
also look at a truncated sample at 1999q1. Beyond the indication that this may be a breakpoint
(discussed above) from a historical vantage point it is worth considering what the role of the
housing bubble was in the response of these variables. Again, when this produces an interesting
result it is discussed.
Finally, I break down the impulse response functions into three periods: short run,
medium run and long run5. I heavily discount the reliability of the impulse response functions
the further out they are. If a response shows a response only after 12 quarters (three years) I tend
to ignore it as predictions that far away from impact are hard to justify, especially if they are not
in line with the shorter run responses.
4 Someone reading this will no doubt try to justify this variable in terms of its effect on fiscal policy. In which case I
concede you can argue NASA funding depends in part on activity in the solar system and/or interest in that activity.
But, seriously, come on.
5 For the sake of clarity, “short run” means 4 quarters or less, “medium run” means 4 to 13 quarters and long run
means 12 to 20 quarters. The categories obviously overlap, but that is a function of the way the accumulated
impulse response functions are reported as to make them intelligible.
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1.5a NIPA Responses
Table 1.3 shows the impulse response functions of various components of GDP to
government spending shocks. The components of investment seem relatively unaffected by
government spending shocks over the whole period. The effects seem to be more pronounced in
the post-1986 period than in pre-1986 period. However, the effects are statically insignificant
across all sub periods. There is some evidence that PCE changes fairly significantly in the pre-
1986 period. The FM and Perotti effects suggest about a 6 cent increase in PCE after 8 quarters
for a dollar of spending and an increase of about 12.5 cents in PCE spending after 12 quarters.
The effect is much smaller, statically insignificant, and of the opposite sign after 19866. These
results hold more or less whether one truncates the post-1986 period at 1999q1 or one uses the
Perotti breakpoint with the exception that with a 1980q1 breakpoint the non-narrative
specifications seem to show a larger and statistically significant impact response of total
investment to a government spending shock. There is also a consistent negative response of
exports in the medium run to a government spending shock. Twelve quarters out, exports fall by
a total of about 2.5 cents for every dollar of government spending under the non-narrative
specifications. The main effect of removing transfers from the definition of government
spending is to increase the significance and impact of government spending shocks on imports,
which also decrease in response to a government spending shock.
Table 1.4 shows the response of GDP components to a revenue shocks. The responses
are similar, but stronger, particularly in the case of personal consumption expenditures. An
6 The sign shifts between the two periods is striking and holds across many different variables discussed here. The
predominance of the sign shifts between the pre-1986 and post 1986 period is so striking it warrants being
highlighted in an aside.
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expansionary tax shock—that is—a decline in revenue will increase PCE during the pre-1986
period, though somewhat more than a similar increase in government spending. The evidence
for the effect of a revenue shock on investment is somewhat more mixed. The Perotti
specification with the larger elasticity (P-313) shows a significant effect of spending across the
three sub periods, though only on impact for the post-1986 period. The other Perotti
specification corroborates for the medium and long run of the pre-1986 period. The F&M
specification shows a significant effect in the short run and medium run for the post-1986 period.
The effect is roughly the same across sub periods, though the R&R shock is smaller and never
statistically significant. It is also clear that the investment effect is driven primarily by
nonresidential investment, which shows roughly the same pattern of significance. Changing the
sub period by either truncating at 1999q1 or using the Perotti 1980q1 breakpoint does not have
much of an effect. Truncating the second sub period at 1999q1 and removing transfers boosts
the significance of revenue shocks on nonresidential investment, making the response from
impact strongly significant through to about 17 quarters. The R&R response however, remains
insignificant.
In summary, there is reasonable evidence that fiscal policy shocks have an effect
on household economic activity, at least in the pre-1986 period (though, the narrative shocks—as
always—beg to differ). The non-narrative shocks suggest a response of PCE, after 8 quarters, of
about 6 cents for every dollar of spending shock and a decline of about 8 cents for every dollar
increase in revenue during the pre-1986 period. This increases to about 24 cents per dollar of
spending after 20 quarters. Investment responds less strongly, with essentially no response of
residential investment and a modest, though mixed response of business investment. The
strongest effect, taken from truncating the sample at 1999q1 and removing transfers shows, after
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8 quarters, an increase of about 3 cents for every dollar increase in revenue for the post-1986
period. This increases to about 5.8 cents after 17 quarters. When considering the size of the
investment and consumption sectors this seems like a large effect on investment. However, this
is the largest significant effect found and the evidence less strongly supports a significant effect
on investment in the post-1986 period than is does an effect on PCE in the pre-1986 period.
1.5b Interest Rate Responses
Table 1.5 shows the response of selected interest rates to government spending shocks
that are the equivalent of one percent of GDP7. The most striking thing is lack of response
across interest rates. The one exception is the response of the Favero and Giavazzi interest rate,
which is measured as interest payments on federal debt as a ratio of the previous period’s total
treasury debt. That interest rate declines by about a quarter of a percent on impact and then
decreases to about a third of a percent before wavering around zero for the remaining periods.
This is clearly driven by the interest rate response in the pre-1986 period. The Ramey shock—
which is not exogenous for the post-1986 period—shows no effect even on the FG interest rate.
The Ramey shock also offers some evidence of no response of interest rates—at least on
impact—for the full sample and the pre-1986 period. The zero effect of spending shocks on 3-
month and 10-year treasuries is of marginal statistical significance.
Truncating the sample at 1999q1 has a small effect on the response of Treasury bond
rates in the short to medium run for the non-narrative specifications. The effect is a pretty small
decline of around 4 basis points at nine quarters out for 3 month T-bills, but it is statistically
significant.
7 One percent of GDP was chosen to make the estimates more or less comparable across specifications. For the non-
narrative shocks 1% of GDP is 1% of the median GDP of each time period. For the 1954-1986 period that is a
shock of $43.86 billion dollars. For 1986 to 2007 a shock of 1% of GDP is $96.18bil. For the full period it is
$58.33bil.
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Table 1.6 shows the effect of truncating the sample at 1999q1 as well as removing
transfers from the definition of government spending. This causes a much stronger and sustained
response of all the interest rate definitions to government spending shocks in the post-1986q4
period. However, the effect is not very large in the short and medium run and the Fed Funds
response remains statistically insignificant in the short run. One final thing of note is that, if you
shift the breakpoint of the sample to the Perotti’s 1980q1 and remove transfers the non-Ramey
impulse responses by the FG interest rate to spending shocks are huge and significant. The
accumulated response falls by over a percentage point after 10 periods. However, no other
interest rate is affected by changing the breakpoint.
Table 1.7 shows the response of the various interest rates to an increase in federal
revenue. The same basic pattern applies, but with different implications. The negative response
of the interest rate to an increase in government spending in Table 1.4 is the opposite of the
assumed response, suggesting a counter-response of the interest rate to government spending
shocks. A negative response of the interest rates to an increase in revenue is consistent with a
decline in a deficit or a decline in debt. The revenue response is much stronger—about 125 basis
points after 6 quarters. However, given the lack of response by market rates shown in the graph,
it seems as though the strong response in the pre-1986q4 period of the FG interest rate is driven
by the construction of the variable more than anything else.
There is some indication that there is a slightly stronger response of the Federal Funds
rate in the pre-1986 period to revenue shocks. Importantly, contrary to the FG interest rate, the
Fed Funds rate looks to be “accommodating” or “coordinated”. That is, an increase (decrease) in
taxes is accompanied by an increase (decrease) in the Fed funds rate. Both policy actions are
expected to have the same effect on output. However, given the size of the shock under
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consideration the response is quite small. At most, the Fed Funds rate increases by ten basis
points in response to a tax shock equal to 1% of GDP.
Truncating the sample at 1999q1 does not have much of an effect on the response to
revenue shocks. Removing transfers increases the significance, and somewhat the size of some
of the responses to an increase in the Federal Funds rate in the pre-1986 period. As well, for the
F&M and the baseline Perotti specifications the response of 3-month Treasury bills in slightly
larger and becomes more statistically significant in the short and medium run when removing
transfers.
In summary, it would appear that neither short nor long term treasury interest rates are
very responsive to fiscal policy shocks. The main exception is the medium run response of the
FG interest rate. Certainly, their measure has implications for changes in the burden of debt
financing for given shock, though it is curious that an increase in spending lowers this measure
of the interest rate. Beyond the public finance implications, however, it is not clear what
significance this interest rate has as it is not a measure of the capacity of fiscal policy to crowd
out (or crowd in) private spending through changes in market interest rates. For changes in the
actual market rate of public debt, one can argue that there is either no effect of fiscal policy
shocks on the interest rate, or a very small, economically insignificant, effect.
This result is consistent when looking at the Fed’s policy rate as well. It is unnecessary
to speculate on how tightly controlled the other interest rates relative to the Fed Funds rate, but
the co-movement of short term treasury rates and the Fed Funds is clear from the results in the
above tables. The next section expands on the reaction of the Fed to fiscal policy shocks, the
results largely collaborate the results found here. The Federal Reserve is either nonresponsive or
slightly accommodating of fiscal policy shocks.
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1.5c Federal Reserve Asset Responses
Table 1.8 shows the effect of government spending shocks on various components of the
Fed’s assets. With respect to total assets, which include foreign reserves, the full sample
suggests a somewhat lagged response, ignoring the Ramey shock, which does not qualify as
significantly exogenous. It is important to bear in mind that in a “multiplier” sense this response
is not very large. Even at 20 quarters the full sample response is only about 2.5 cents per dollar
of spending shock. However, if one assumes these asset changes also translate directly into
money supply changes one should multiply the effect by a factor of 8 to get an estimate of the
total effect on M28. In which case, one could argue that the government spending shocks are
accommodated fairly dramatically in the medium to long run. The fact that these government
spending shocks appear to be accommodated is of considerable interest. However, the evidence
for the direction of Federal Reserve total assets is not without contradictions. First of all, as
usual, the Ramey narrative shock is of a much smaller magnitude than the model identified
shocks. It is also of the opposite sign for both the full sample and the pre-1986 period, which
seems to be dominating the full sample effect. Where the Ramey shock is both clearly
exogenous and statistically significant—the pre-1986 period— it is significant on impact and not
in the medium and long run. The similar magnitude of the impact shock for both Ramey and the
other shocks lend the Ramey estimate some credibility, though it should be pointed out that the
response is quite small.
The results do not change very much when one looks at treasury holdings by the Fed or
the broader measure of Federal Funds Assets that include repurchase agreements by the Fed.
8 This does not appear to be what actually happens, however. I am not including a discussion of the response of the
measured money supply in this paper. I feel the response of the Fed Funds rate and the response of the Fed’s
Balance sheet is an adequate measure of the response of monetary policy to fiscal policy shocks. It should be noted,
though that, for all intents and purposes, there is no response of M1 or M2 to fiscal policy shocks. On the other
hand, as detailed below, there is a response of note of household’s holding of money assets.
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One major difference is that the Fed Funds asset effect is more similar in the post-1986 period
than the treasury security effect. This reflects the fact that repurchase agreements become
increasingly important to Federal Reserve monetary management in the 1970s.
As with the interest rate response, truncating the sample at 1999q1 produces a much
stronger and more significant response of Fed assets to spending shocks, particularly in the
medium and long run. Removing transfers from the definition of government spending does not
change estimates very much. The estimates of the impact are in general smaller and less
significant but they are comparable to the impulse responses to shocks to total government
spending. Of particular note is that in the truncated sample without transfers there is a small
decline in discount lending by the Fed in the medium and long run for the non-narrative shocks.
Table 1.9 shows the impulse response of Fed balance sheet items to a revenue shock of
one percent of GDP. The most striking thing about this table is the strong accommodative
response of the Fed to revenue shocks during the pre-1986 period. Increases in revenue are met
with declines in domestic assets held by the Fed, which suggests a tightening of monetary policy.
It is important to bear in mind again that this effect is somewhat small. The maximum response
of Federal Funds Assets to a positive revenue shock is about -$0.05 cents for every dollar of
revenue, with the R&R shocks being smaller and mostly not significant. If these changes were to
translate directly into an increase in M2, on the other had the impact would be large. However,
the response of the Fed Funds rate suggests that these shocks do not translate into large increases
in the money supply. This is corroborated by estimates of changes in M2 not shown. The
impact is smaller and not statistically significant for the post-1986 period. Of note is that the
sign is also reversed for the medium and long run as well as some specifications of the short run.
Truncating the sample at 1999q1 or using the Perotti 1980 breakpoint do not change results that
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much, though they do obfuscate the response of Federal Funds assets to revenue shocks.
Truncating the sample at 1999 shows a positive and for both Perotti based specifications a
statically significant impact response to a revenue increase in the post-1986 period, However,
the medium run shows a net negative response, with the R&R specification showing a relatively
large negative response of marginal statistical significance.
Table 1.10 shows impulse responses of Federal Reserve assets when removing transfers
from the definition of revenue and truncating the sample. Here we can make a fairly clear
distinction between the two periods. The response to revenue shocks in the pre-1986 period is
the same as it is in the full sample with the complete definition of government revenue. In the
post-1986 period there is a clear and statistically significant counter response of the Fed to tax
increases. The R&R shocks do add some ambiguity, but for the Federal Funds assets the sign of
the response is the same even if the shocks are not statistically significant.
1.5d Sector Balance Sheet Responses
Table 1.11 shows the response of balance sheets for difference sectors to spending shocks
for the baseline period. There is not much to report from the baseline specification. However, it
is somewhat striking how large the effect is on household assets, though the response is not
statistically significant. Table 1.12 shows the net response of various sectors when one excludes
transfers. Of note, for the non-narrative specifications the medium and long run responses are
significant, and much larger in the long run than the more comprehensive definition for the pre-
1986 period. For the baseline specification detailed in Table 1.11 there is about a 37 cent
increases in household net assets for every dollar of spending after 8 quarters. The response
increases to about 50 cents for the non-narrative shocks after 20 quarters. Removing transfers
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increases this response to 56 cents after 8 quarters and to over a $1 for every dollar of spending
after 20 quarters.
Looking at Table 1.13 we see that for the baseline specification the pre-1986 period
responses to revenue increases are quite similar to those of spending increases. However for the
post-1986 period the response to revenue increases is much larger and significant. The largest
effect is around a 95 cent increase in household net assets for a dollar increase in revenue after 8
quarters, with the effect peaking at almost $1.20 after 13 periods. However, the Perroti
specification with the MR elasticities is of marginal significance only in the short run. The R&R
shocks are not very helpful, since they are not exogenous, but even their effect is fairly large.
Table 1.14 shows the effect of revenue shocks on household net assets in the post-1986
period disappears when one truncates the sample at 1999q1. The response becomes insignificant
and the magnitude of effect falls substantially. There is also disagreement between the
identification strategies about what sign the effect is. Though, now that the R&R shock can be
treated as exogenous, it shows a very large, but statistically insignificant, negative response of
business liabilities.
There is also some evidence from the baseline specification of an effect of revenues
shocks on business net liabilities, though the evidence is mixed. What is of note is that it appears
that the response of business net liabilities does not change signs across sub periods but that
business net borrowing falls in response to a revenue increase across periods. The response is
also much smaller than the effect on household net assets. Truncating the sample at 1999q1
changes the sign of the response of business net borrowing to revenue shocks, but the same
mixed evidence for an effect is there, leading one to remain agnostic about the effect there.
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Removing transfers from the definition of revenue shocks does not change results in any
significant way.
It should also be noted that the R&R shock shows a decline in financial assets in response
to a revenue increase in the post-1986 period. The R&R shock is exogenous, and the impact
effect holds when one truncates the sample at 1999q1.
1.5e Household Asset and Liability Responses
A more detailed look at the balance sheet response of households to fiscal policy shocks
is of some interest. First, the narrative shocks often show at least an impact response of
household assets to fiscal policy shocks. Secondly, establishing patterns of responses to fiscal
policy shocks by various household assets is useful in determining the efficacy of fiscal policy’s
influence on household balance sheets.
Table 1.15 shows the response of household assets to a federal spending shock. The most
consistent and clear response across specifications is the response of currency and deposits. The
non-narrative shocks show a fairly strong positive response of currency and deposits held by
households to a government spending shock. However, the Ramey shock, which is exogenous,
shows a small but statistically significant negative impact response of household holdings of M1
to a spending shock.
Truncating the sample at 1999 also produces a small impact effect for the Ramey shock
on life insurance assets, a slightly larger response of mutual fund shares and an even larger
impact response of pension fund assets. The responses are all negative. The non-narrative
shocks in these instances show essentially no impact effect and no effect in later time periods.
Removing transfers produces a strong medium and long run positive responses of household
holdings of credit market instruments and corporate equities in the pre-1986 period. The
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truncated period also produces a strong negative change in the equity of non-corporate
businesses in the post-1986 period.
Table 1.16 shows results from truncating the sample at 1999 and removing transfers.
This specification produces a strong short run decline in household equity holdings in response
to a Ramey shock. Most interesting about the truncated sample with transfers removed is the
unambiguous short and medium run decline in pension fund entitlements in the post-1986 period.
This is the only response of all the variables considered here that shows a significant response
across all three specifications and the narrative Ramey shock is clearly exogenous. This result is
somewhat confusing and important in putting other results into perspective.
The response of household assets to revenue shocks is somewhat similar, though as a
whole stronger. Table 1.17 shows the response of assets in the baseline specification. There is a
significant impact response of currency and deposits in the pre-1986 period. The R&R narrative
shock is exogenous in the post-1986 period and indicates a clear, significant, impact response to
changes in various deposits. The R&R shock also produces a significant change in corporate and
foreign bond holding in the pre-1986 period.
Truncating the sample at 1999 also produces a significant response in the post-1986
period. The non-narrative shocks show a strong and significant positive response of corporate
equities and mutual fund shares to an increase in revenue in the post-1986 period, this effect is
significant for the R&R shock in the medium run.
Truncating the sample at 1999 produces a significant negative impact response of mutual
fund shares and pension fund assets to R&R shocks. As well, savings and time deposits show a
significant response in the medium run across all three specifications. However, the non-
narrative shocks show a strong and universally significant positive change in mutual fund shares
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up to 16 quarters out if one uses the Perotti 1980q1breakpoint. A similar pattern is observed for
pension fund assets using the Perotti break point. This is show on Table 1.18
Finally, if one truncates the sample at 1999 and removes transfers from the revenue
shocks the non-narrative shocks show a short run positive effect of revenue shocks on mutual
fund shares. However, the R&R shock, which is exogenous, shows a negative response over the
same 4 quarter horizon.
1.5f Mortgage Responses
Some discussion of the effect of fiscal policy shocks on mortgages is also warranted.
Table 1.19 shows the change in total mortgage assets and total home mortgage assets across all
sectors. For the full sample there is an effect of government spending on both net mortgage
liabilities of business in the medium and long run. Net mortgage liabilities of household show a
modest short run effect of spending shocks during the pre-1986 period under the Ramey
narrative shock, though this is of marginal significance.
It is with total mortgage and home mortgage assets that we see an important difference
between the Perotti 1980q1 break point and the benchmark breakpoint used in this paper. As
Table 1.20 shows, both categories of mortgage assets show a statistically significant response
when using the Perotti breakpoint. The effect is fairly strong, relative to the response of other
balance sheet responses and is positive. However, for the effect to stand the entire 1980q1 to
2007q1 period must be included. Truncating the sample at 1999q1 kills both the statistical
significance and the magnitude of the response of home mortgage assets and total mortgage
assets in the post-1980 period.
As Table 1.21 shows, the response of mortgages to tax shocks is different. It is during
the earlier sub period where the response of mortgages is most pronounced. However, like
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government spending shocks, the responses to revenue shocks that are significant tend to be in
the medium to long run. Truncating the sample at 1999q1, however, does not have the same
effect as spending shocks. The response to revenue shocks remains fairly consistent when
truncating the sample or shifting the sub period breakpoint.
1.6 Discussion
This paper can be seen as having two main purposes. First, it examines the effect of fiscal
policy shocks on the balance sheet of the private sector. Second, it examines the response of
monetary policy to fiscal policy shocks.
This paper provides reasonably strong evidence that household net assets increase in
response to a revenue increase in the 1986q4 to 2007q1 period. Alternatively one can think of
this as a decline in household assets when there is decline in government revenue over that
period. The net effect on household assets to a government spending shock is less clear.
However, both spending and revenue shocks have a clear effect on components of the household
balance sheet. There is fairly strong evidence for a modest impact effect of both spending and
revenue shocks on household liquid assets such as bank deposits. There is also fairly strong
evidence that in the medium and long run there is an effect of both shocks on less liquid assets.
There is also some evidence, though it is period dependent, that spending shocks have a
modest effect on mortgage lending after 1980. Mortgages also show a response to fiscal policy
shocks, though the effect of fiscal policy shocks is mixed and heavily dependent on the sub
period being discussed. The mortgage response dissipates if one cuts out the post-1999 period
even though household assets in general are more responsive if one excludes the post-1999
period. The mortgage question deserves more study, both in light of the inconclusive results
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here, the special role of housing in the 2008 crisis, and the role of housing as both a driver of the
economy (Leamer, 2007) and as a primary store of wealth for households.
The response of pension funds in Table 1.16 is worth spending a moment on as we turn to
a discussion about what the results of this paper say about fiscal VARs in general. It is hard to
see how the response of pension fund assets can be seen as a behavioral response to spending
shocks in the same way that the change in short run liquid assets can be. The implication of this
change in highly illiquid pension fund assets—after all households only have access to them
when they retire—is that this is capturing the change in the business cycle and the effect of that
change in the business cycle on assets as well as a correlated (counter-cyclical) change in
government spending. The responses of mutual fund shares and life insurance assets corroborate
the idea that these changes are driven by a decline in the assets’ value, rather than a behavioral
response to fiscal policy shocks. There are hints here of an endogeneity problem. It may be that
the non-narrative shocks are not producing cleanly identified structural shocks. The response to
revenue changes is similar. Riera-Carton, Vegh and Vuletin (2012) argue that in the case of tax
shocks, non-narrative identification strategies that rely on revenue measures are too endogenous
to be relied on. This criticism can also—to a less extent—be leveled at spending shocks.
However, in the case of spending shocks and pension funds, the Ramey narrative shock
corroborates the findings of the non-narrative shocks, though the effect is smaller, so bias of the
non-narrative specifications cannot be ruled out entirely. But it does suggest that the exogeneity
of the non-narrative shocks is not simple, nor can one dismiss the non-narrative shocks or the
definition of spending and revenue used in this paper and others out of hand. A broader indicator
of the exogeneity of non-narrative shocks, akin to the FG test used in this paper to test the
exogeneity of the narrative shocks would be useful.
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Secondarily, there is also some evidence for a negative response of business liabilities to
both spending and revenue shocks. A decline in business net liabilities to an increase in
government spending suggests a “pro-cyclical” effect of spending on business liabilities.
However, the revenue response is the opposite. Expansionary tax cuts increase business net
liabilities. As a rough approximation, during the pre-1986 period it would seem that a revenue
increase is accompanied by both a decline in business financial assets and in business liabilities.
After 1986 the decline in net liabilities by businesses is driven by the accumulation of assets with
a relatively small change in liabilities.
The response of the Federal Reserve and interest rates seem to indicate either a neutral
monetary policy, or perhaps monetary policy with a slight accommodative bias. The stance of
the Fed towards fiscal policy has some implications for the New Keynesian predictions about the
response of the Fed to fiscal policy shocks. The consensus New Keynesian framework makes
very strong predictions about the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy shocks (Woodford
2011). In a nutshell, in a New Keynesian framework with monopolistically competitive firms
the central bank controls the risk free interest rate directly with a central bank reaction function.
Woodford examines potential multipliers given various central bank reaction functions. In
particular, he looks at multipliers assuming various policy stances of a central bank. If the Fed
holds the real interest rate constant in a model with sticky prices (which gives the central bank
the ability to control the real interest rate) government spending multipliers should be equal to
one9. This is because savings and consumption decisions do not change since there is no
rebalancing of future and current consumption in response to interest rate incentives. Woodford
acknowledges that this is a policy likely to be pursued in times of economic slack. A second
possibility is that a central bank pursues strict inflation targeting. In this case, the central bank
9 Woodford only considers temporary shocks.
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will move to offset any increase in government spending, leading to a multiplier of less than one,
which mirrors the flexible price result since firms are not trying to anticipate price changes and
so remain on the optimal pricing path. Finally, and most plausibly, the central bank can follow a
Taylor rule type response function that balances the interest rate response according to the
central bank’s tolerance for changes in inflation and output. In the Taylor rule instance, the
output multiplier depends on the parameters of that Taylor rule chosen by the Fed as well as the
extent to which the shocks increase output and change the price level. In this case, the response
of output is somewhere between the response given strict inflation targeting and the response
with string real interest rate targeting. Importantly, the multiplier in the Taylor rule case is a
direct function of the choices a central bank makes vis-a-vis the Taylor rule. The result for the
Taylor rule specification, when a central bank is at the zero lower bound is as expected, the
inability of the central bank to change the nominal rate means that the real interest rate will
change to the degree that government purchases are inflationary.
Insofar as fiscal policy shocks are not so small that they can be ignored by the Fed, there
does not appear to be any evidence that the two stronger behavioral functions are applicable.
The evidence for this accommodative stance is stronger in the pre-1986 period. There is a fair
amount of noise there, since the pre-1986 period by definition includes the Burns era Fed, which
was both intentionally and unintentionally overly accommodative. However, stepping outside of
the evidence presented here it may make sense to think of post-1986 monetary policy as more
broadly accommodating by opening up the space for fiscal policy to remain noninflationary. Of
course, it is not quite clear how much the Fed deserves credit for the low inflation regime of the
great moderation and how much natural dynamics kept inflation down. But to the extent that the
Fed remained credibly anti-inflationary and that kept inflation expectations low, it makes sense
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to think of policy coordination in a more broad sense than as simply complementary business
cycle responses. There is also an implication in the results of this paper for the notion that fiscal
policy can only be effective when the Fed is constrained by the zero lower bound. It does not
appear from balance sheet changes that the Fed has been—historically speaking—necessarily
hostile to changes in fiscal policy and must be neutered by catastrophe for fiscal policy to be
permitted to influence the economy. This is true in practice at least, if not in theory.
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1.7 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1 Elasticities used in Perotti (2005)
based SVAR specifications.
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Table 1.2: Breakpoint Tests for VAR variables.
Variables Sup-Wald Stat. Breakpiont Lower Upper
dgdp 2.768 1966Q2 1954Q4 1990Q3
(0.108)
dg 6.300 1986Q4 1971Q4 2001Q4
(0.018)
dpl 5.384 1981Q2 1964Q3 1998Q1
(0.046)
dt 2.296 1969Q2 1954Q4 2003Q3
(0.153)
dff 4.056 1981Q4 1958Q1 2005Q3
(0.038)
dgdp dg 7.872 1968Q3 1958Q4 1978Q2
(0.025)
dgdp dpl 8.362 1981Q2 1970Q3 1992Q1
(0.026)
dgdp dt 3.441 1966Q2 1954Q4 1985Q4
(0.185)
dgdp dff 5.266 1981Q4 1963Q4 1999Q4
(0.077)
dg dpl 8.204 1968Q3 1960Q3 1976Q3
(0.029)
dg dt 7.434 1969Q1 1958Q3 1979Q3
(0.040)
dg dff 8.726 1981Q3 1970Q2 1992Q4
(0.008)
dpl dt 6.061 1981Q2 1966Q3 1996Q1
(0.092)
dpl dff 6.525 1981Q1 1967Q1 1995Q1
(0.048)
dt dff 3.043 1981Q4 1954Q4 2007Q1
(0.234)
dgdp dg dpl 12.660 1986Q4 1980Q2 1993Q2
(0.011)
dgdp dg dt 7.863 1968Q3 1959Q1 1978Q1
(0.067)
dgdp dg dff 8.758 1981Q4 1970Q4 1992Q4
(0.035)
dgdp dpl dt 9.040 1990Q2 1982Q1 1998Q3
(0.047)
dgdp dpl dff 9.301 1990Q2 1982Q2 1998Q2
(0.032)
dgdp dt dff 3.547 1966Q2 1954Q4 1985Q1
(0.343)
dg dpl dt 10.073 1968Q4 1962Q1 1975Q3
(0.033)
dg dpl dff 13.288 1968Q3 1963Q3 1973Q3
(0.007)
dg dt dff 8.631 1981Q3 1970Q2 1992Q4
(0.034)
dpl dt dff 6.111 1981Q2 1966Q3 1996Q1
(0.129)
dgdp dg dpl dt 13.314 1986Q4 1980Q4 1992Q4
(0.014)
dgdp dg dpl dff 13.359 1968Q3 1963Q3 1973Q3
(0.019)
Confidence Interval (90%)
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Table 1.2 Continued…
dgdp dg dt dff 8.704 1981Q4 1970Q4 1992Q4
(0.074)
dgdp dpl dt dff 10.151 1990Q2 1983Q1 1997Q3
(0.053)
dg dpl dt dff 13.247 1968Q3 1963Q3 1973Q3
(0.020)
dgdp dg dpl dt dff 13.717 1986Q4 1981Q1 1992Q3
(0.031)
by bootstrap with 1000 repetitions. See Bia Lumsdaine and Stock (1998)
Values in parentheses are p-vals for the corresponding Sup-Wal Statstic. Calculated
Varible Definition: dgdp= GDP, dg=Gov Spending, dt=Gov Revenue, dpl=GDP Deflator,
dff=Federal Funds Rate
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Table 1.3 Response of NIPA components to Government Spending Shocks. 1954q3 to 2007q1
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.004 -0.002  0.012  0.027  0.054 0.054 (20) -0.006 (2)
Perotti -0.004 -0.003  0.008  0.023  0.047 0.047 (20) -0.006 (2)
Ramey ***  0.017  0.063  0.086  0.108  0.173 0.173 (20) 0.017 (1)
54-86 F&M -0.005 -0.004  0.002  0.010  0.022 0.022 (20) -0.006 (2)
Perotti -0.004 -0.003  0.003  0.008  0.016 0.016 (20) -0.006 (2)
Ramey ***  0.003  0.025  0.008 -0.013  0.020 0.031 (5) -0.016 (14)
86-07 F&M -0.001 -0.011 -0.019 -0.025 -0.016 -0.001 (1) -0.025 (12)
Perotti -0.002 -0.013 -0.024 -0.031 -0.022 -0.002 (1) -0.031 (13)
Ramey -0.062 -0.224 -0.425 -0.542 -0.473 -0.062 (1) -0.563 (13)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M 0.000 -0.002 -0.001  0.008  0.033 0.033 (20) -0.002 (6)
Perotti 0.000 -0.002 -0.002  0.007  0.029 0.029 (20) -0.003 (6)
Ramey ***  0.013  0.050  0.081  0.093  0.128 0.128 (20) 0.013 (1)
54-86 F&M -0.001 -0.002 -0.001  0.002  0.014 0.014 (20) -0.002 (3)
Perotti -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  0.002  0.013 0.013 (20) -0.002 (3)
Ramey ***  0.007  0.034  0.057  0.053  0.058 0.059 (9) 0.007 (1)
86-07 F&M 0.000 -0.003 -0.010 -0.012 -0.006 -0.000 (1) -0.012 (12)
Perotti 0.000 -0.004 -0.011 -0.014 -0.009 -0.000 (1) -0.014 (13)
Ramey *** -0.001 -0.060 -0.163 -0.211 -0.137 -0.001 (1) -0.212 (11)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M 0.000  0.004  0.006  0.005  0.002 0.006 (7) -0.000 (1)
Perotti 0.000  0.003  0.005  0.003 -0.001 0.005 (8) -0.001 (19)
Ramey *** -0.002 -0.021 -0.062 -0.079 -0.070 -0.002 (1) -0.081 (14)
54-86 F&M -0.001  0.001  0.003  0.007  0.015 0.015 (20) -0.001 (2)
Perotti 0.000  0.001  0.002  0.006  0.013 0.013 (20) -0.001 (2)
Ramey ***  0.002 -0.008 -0.043 -0.061 -0.020 0.002 (1) -0.061 (12)
86-07 F&M 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001  0.005 0.005 (20) -0.003 (5)
Perotti 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003  0.003 0.003 (20) -0.004 (8)
Ramey ***  0.001 -0.015 -0.057 -0.084 -0.095 0.001 (1) -0.095 (20)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.002  0.019  0.043  0.069  0.126 0.126 (20) 0.002 (1)
Perotti  0.002  0.017  0.034  0.054  0.098 0.098 (20) 0.002 (1)
Ramey *** -0.001 -0.004 -0.050 -0.058 -0.002 -0.001 (1) -0.058 (12)
54-86 F&M  0.001  0.021  0.062  0.132  0.246 0.246 (20) 0.001 (1)
Perotti  0.001  0.019  0.056  0.121  0.232 0.232 (20) 0.001 (1)
Ramey  0.016  0.030  0.010  0.083  0.440 0.440 (20) 0.010 (9)
86-07 F&M  0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 (2) -0.005 (11)
Perotti 0.000 -0.004 -0.009 -0.014 -0.018 -0.000 (1) -0.018 (20)
Ramey -0.009 -0.070 -0.186 -0.298 -0.478 -0.009 (1) -0.478 (20)
Nonresidential Investment
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definiton of spending includes transfers.
Total investment
Residential Investment
PCE and Residential Investment
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1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.002  0.017  0.041  0.071  0.131 0.131 (20) 0.002 (1)
Perotti  0.002  0.015  0.034  0.059  0.110 0.110 (20) 0.002 (1)
Ramey ***  0.002  0.013 -0.001  0.006  0.051 0.051 (20) -0.001 (9)
54-86 F&M  0.002  0.023  0.063  0.114  0.196 0.196 (20) 0.002 (1)
Perotti  0.002  0.022  0.058  0.105  0.181 0.181 (20) 0.002 (1)
Ramey  0.018  0.041  0.056  0.127  0.403 0.403 (20) 0.018 (1)
86-07 F&M 0.000 -0.002 -0.009 -0.014 -0.024 -0.000 (2) -0.024 (20)
Perotti 0.000 -0.004 -0.012 -0.021 -0.038 -0.000 (1) -0.038 (20)
Ramey -0.004 -0.037 -0.163 -0.308 -0.504 -0.004 (1) -0.504 (20)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.002 -0.011 -0.024 -0.024 -0.012 -0.002 (1) -0.025 (9)
Perotti -0.001 -0.010 -0.022 -0.021 -0.010 -0.001 (1) -0.023 (9)
Ramey ***  0.003  0.003 -0.008 -0.017  0.007 0.007 (20) -0.017 (13)
54-86 F&M -0.001 -0.010 -0.021 -0.023 -0.012 -0.001 (1) -0.024 (11)
Perotti -0.001 -0.009 -0.019 -0.021 -0.011 -0.001 (1) -0.022 (11)
Ramey ***  0.002  0.005 -0.009 -0.031 -0.043 0.006 (3) -0.045 (18)
86-07 F&M -0.002 -0.010 -0.018 -0.018 -0.021 -0.002 (1) -0.021 (20)
Perotti -0.002 -0.010 -0.017 -0.018 -0.020 -0.002 (1) -0.020 (20)
Ramey -0.022 -0.073 -0.098 -0.116 -0.011 -0.011 (20) -0.116 (12)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.001 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006  0.006 0.006 (20) -0.010 (6)
Perotti -0.001 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003  0.007 0.007 (20) -0.008 (6)
Ramey ***  0.003  0.005  0.026  0.045  0.096 0.096 (20) 0.003 (1)
54-86 F&M -0.001 -0.008 -0.010 -0.012 -0.004 -0.001 (1) -0.012 (13)
Perotti 0.000 -0.006 -0.009 -0.010 -0.004 -0.000 (1) -0.010 (13)
Ramey ***  0.008  0.007  0.006  0.009  0.029 0.029 (20) 0.005 (7)
86-07 F&M  0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005  0.000 0.000 (20) -0.006 (10)
Perotti  0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 0.000 (1) -0.008 (10)
Ramey * -0.041 -0.118 -0.188 -0.332 -0.430 -0.041 (1) -0.430 (20)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Table 1.3 continued…
Personal Consumption Expenditures
Exports
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of spending includes transfers.
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
Imports
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
43
Table 1.4 Response of NIPA components to Government Revenue Shocks 1954q3 to 1999q1.
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.002  0.268 -0.447 -1.210 -2.391 0.402 (3) -2.391 (20)
54-07 Perotti -0.060 -0.018 -1.051 -2.008 -3.487 0.199 (3) -3.487 (20)
P-313 -0.743 -2.928 -4.960 -5.779 -7.292 -0.743 (1) -7.292 (20)
R&R -0.166 -0.424 -0.631 -0.819 -1.042 -0.166 (1) -1.042 (20)
F&M  0.076 -0.134 -1.715 -2.454 -2.729 0.240 (2) -2.729 (20)
54-86 Perotti  0.021 -0.286 -1.976 -2.973 -3.905 0.157 (2) -3.905 (20)
P-313 -0.541 -2.120 -3.232 -3.500 -4.610 -0.541 (1) -4.610 (20)
R&R *** -0.080 -0.165 -0.068 -0.039  0.122 0.122 (20) -0.183 (3)
F&M -0.024  1.231  3.038  3.938  3.177 4.144 (15) -0.024 (1)
86-07 Perotti -0.183  0.661  2.582  4.022  3.957 4.492 (15) -0.183 (1)
P-313 -0.433 -0.608  0.636  2.080  2.530 2.782 (16) -0.645 (3)
R&R * -0.175 -0.141  0.776  1.725  2.528 2.638 (19) -0.233 (3)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.047  0.465  0.739  0.752  0.102 0.786 (13) 0.047 (1)
54-07 Perotti  0.019  0.285  0.340  0.153 -0.588 0.363 (7) -0.588 (20)
P-313 -0.158 -0.972 -2.075 -2.673 -3.721 -0.158 (1) -3.721 (20)
R&R -0.039 -0.082 -0.181 -0.286 -0.532 -0.039 (1) -0.532 (20)
F&M -0.007 -0.059 -0.668 -1.332 -1.999 -0.001 (2) -1.999 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.023 -0.172 -0.805 -1.533 -2.238 -0.023 (1) -2.238 (20)
P-313 -0.156 -1.031 -2.106 -2.487 -2.963 -0.156 (1) -2.963 (20)
R&R *** -0.006  0.009 -0.005 -0.021 -0.010 0.016 (5) -0.034 (15)
F&M  0.112  0.823  2.205  2.976  2.269 3.022 (14) 0.112 (1)
86-07 Perotti  0.120  0.709  2.058  2.993  2.456 3.142 (15) 0.120 (1)
P-313  0.003  0.113  0.664  1.154  0.825 1.218 (15) 0.003 (1)
R&R * -0.047 -0.208 -0.351 -0.303 -0.109 -0.047 (1) -0.362 (6)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.035  0.034 -0.177 -0.664 -0.738 0.067 (3) -0.894 (17)
54-07 Perotti  0.030 -0.027 -0.338 -0.826 -0.981 0.038 (2) -1.074 (15)
P-313 -0.045 -0.189 -0.090 -0.246 -0.774 -0.045 (1) -0.774 (20)
R&R  0.020  0.142  0.254  0.249  0.220 0.265 (10) 0.020 (1)
F&M  0.032 -0.097 -0.517 -0.794 -0.873 0.032 (1) -0.894 (16)
54-86 Perotti  0.034 -0.114 -0.566 -0.913 -1.138 0.034 (1) -1.138 (20)
P-313 -0.018 -0.125 -0.007 -0.108 -0.670 -0.007 (8) -0.670 (20)
R&R ***  0.015  0.051  0.025 -0.035 -0.079 0.051 (4) -0.079 (20)
F&M  0.045  0.318  0.585  0.375  0.519 0.585 (8) 0.045 (1)
86-07 Perotti  0.016  0.345  0.871  0.983  1.249 1.249 (20) 0.016 (1)
P-313 -0.019  0.217  0.647  0.748  1.049 1.049 (20) -0.019 (1)
R&R * -0.033  0.116  0.551  0.802  1.212 1.212 (20) -0.034 (2)
Response to a government revenue shock equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
Nonresidential Investment
Total investment
Residential Investment
44
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.068 -0.055 -0.851 -1.838 -1.143 0.068 (1) -1.915 (13)
54-07 Perotti  0.040 -0.331 -1.594 -2.907 -3.120 0.040 (1) -3.303 (16)
P-313 -0.299 -1.741 -3.426 -5.152 -7.454 -0.299 (1) -7.454 (20)
R&R -0.002  0.063  0.248  0.295  0.399 0.418 (19) -0.002 (1)
F&M -0.017 -0.996 -3.693 -6.535 -9.345 -0.017 (1) -9.345 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.040 -1.274 -4.571 -8.011 -12.201 -0.040 (1) -12.201 (20)
P-313 -0.341 -2.110 -4.319 -7.109 -12.145 -0.341 (1) -12.145 (20)
R&R ***  0.050  0.171  0.156 -0.014 -0.356 0.187 (5) -0.356 (20)
F&M  0.318  1.171  1.897  2.013  2.765 2.765 (20) 0.318 (1)
86-07 Perotti  0.165  0.824  1.869  2.447  3.537 3.537 (20) 0.165 (1)
P-313 -0.081 -0.329 -0.214 -0.414 -0.613 -0.081 (1) -0.677 (18)
R&R *** -0.220 -0.504 -0.076  0.576  1.199 1.199 (20) -0.542 (3)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.022 -0.137 -0.263 -0.155  1.515 1.515 (20) -0.306 (10)
54-07 Perotti -0.008 -0.370 -0.904 -1.133  0.026 0.026 (20) -1.133 (12)
P-313 -0.285 -1.673 -3.011 -3.799 -3.767 -0.285 (1) -3.807 (14)
R&R -0.028 -0.063  0.080  0.192  0.243 0.243 (20) -0.069 (3)
F&M -0.079 -0.987 -2.965 -4.847 -7.316 -0.079 (1) -7.316 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.106 -1.308 -3.786 -6.181 -9.745 -0.106 (1) -9.745 (20)
P-313 -0.324 -2.045 -4.153 -6.181 -10.269 -0.324 (1) -10.269 (20)
R&R  0.083  0.193  0.191  0.158  0.108 0.209 (5) 0.083 (1)
F&M  0.235  0.706  1.969  3.222  5.249 5.249 (20) 0.235 (1)
86-07 Perotti  0.084  0.281  1.506  3.069  5.722 5.722 (20) 0.052 (2)
P-313 -0.118 -0.671 -0.244  0.495  1.755 1.755 (20) -0.766 (5)
R&R *** -0.221 -0.540  0.115  1.303  3.497 3.497 (20) -0.577 (3)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.014  0.247  0.729  0.612 -1.069 0.735 (9) -1.069 (20)
54-07 Perotti  0.015  0.265  0.747  0.666 -0.959 0.770 (9) -0.959 (20)
P-313 -0.082 -0.366 -0.431 -0.719 -2.025 -0.082 (1) -2.025 (20)
R&R  0.031  0.080  0.172  0.232  0.142 0.249 (13) 0.031 (1)
F&M  0.004  0.114  0.102 -0.259 -1.286 0.132 (5) -1.286 (20)
54-86 Perotti  0.012  0.197  0.271 -0.031 -1.275 0.293 (7) -1.275 (20)
P-313 -0.063 -0.242 -0.404 -0.680 -1.577 -0.063 (1) -1.577 (20)
R&R  0.038  0.111  0.177  0.250  0.403 0.403 (20) 0.038 (1)
F&M  0.030  0.500  1.548  1.773  0.029 1.793 (10) 0.029 (20)
86-07 Perotti -0.113 -0.320  0.133 -0.032 -1.705 0.191 (9) -1.705 (20)
P-313 -0.240 -0.967 -0.968 -1.272 -2.712 -0.240 (1) -2.712 (20)
R&R *** -0.136 -0.905 -1.417 -1.855 -2.841 -0.136 (1) -2.841 (20)
PCE and Residential Investment
Personal Consumption Expenditures
Exports
Government revenue revenue equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of spending includes transfers.
Table 1.4 continued…
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.103  0.251 -0.372 -1.155 -2.950 0.278 (3) -2.950 (20)
54-07 Perotti  0.126  0.318 -0.318 -1.117 -3.091 0.324 (3) -3.091 (20)
P-313  0.063 -0.251 -1.258 -2.027 -4.156 0.063 (1) -4.156 (20)
R&R -0.053 -0.194 -0.428 -0.660 -1.091 -0.053 (1) -1.091 (20)
F&M -0.021 -0.157 -0.637 -1.013 -1.744 -0.021 (1) -1.744 (20)
54-86 Perotti  0.052  0.093 -0.324 -0.737 -1.684 0.120 (3) -1.684 (20)
P-313  0.033 -0.056 -0.504 -0.769 -1.679 0.033 (1) -1.679 (20)
R&R *** -0.012 -0.007 -0.032 -0.064 -0.114 -0.006 (3) -0.114 (20)
F&M  0.197  1.373  2.811  2.513  1.673 2.842 (9) 0.197 (1)
86-07 Perotti  0.123  0.885  2.257  2.286  1.945 2.387 (9) 0.123 (1)
P-313  0.091  0.262  0.979  0.848  0.784 0.994 (9) 0.091 (1)
R&R * -0.098 -0.866 -0.769 -0.691  0.025 0.025 (20) -0.931 (6)
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
Imports
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Table 1.4 continued…
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
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1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.248 -0.186  0.135 -0.113 -0.255 0.189 (7) -0.351 (2)
Perotti -0.249 -0.210  0.119 -0.127 -0.297 0.161 (7) -0.368 (2)
Ramey ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (6) -0.000 (2)
54-86 F&M -0.304  0.143  0.176 -0.135  0.054 0.574 (6) -0.304 (1)
Perotti -0.309  0.131  0.161 -0.131  0.050 0.548 (6) -0.309 (1)
Ramey ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 (15) -0.000 (2)
86-07 F&M  0.000  0.004  0.014  0.018  0.006 0.018 (13) 0.000 (1)
Perotti 0.000  0.004  0.012  0.016  0.002 0.016 (13) -0.000 (2)
Ramey 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 (1) -0.000 (20)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.000  0.000 -0.003 -0.013 -0.019 0.001 (2) -0.019 (18)
Perotti  0.000  0.002  0.002 -0.004 -0.005 0.003 (7) -0.007 (17)
Ramey ***  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 (20) 0.000 (1)
54-86 F&M  0.000  0.001 -0.006 -0.024 -0.043 0.001 (3) -0.044 (19)
Perotti  0.001  0.003 -0.001 -0.015 -0.036 0.004 (6) -0.036 (20)
Ramey ***  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 (7) 0.000 (1)
86-07 F&M -0.002 -0.010 -0.011 -0.014 -0.007 -0.002 (1) -0.015 (11)
Perotti -0.002 -0.008 -0.009 -0.013 -0.007 -0.002 (1) -0.014 (11)
Ramey ***  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 (4) 0.000 (1)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.001 -0.005 -0.001  0.001  0.017 0.017 (20) -0.005 (4)
Perotti -0.001 -0.001  0.006  0.012  0.031 0.031 (20) -0.001 (4)
Ramey ***  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 (20) 0.000 (1)
54-86 F&M -0.002 -0.013 -0.022 -0.033 -0.044 -0.002 (1) -0.047 (17)
Perotti -0.002 -0.010 -0.017 -0.028 -0.036 -0.002 (1) -0.039 (17)
Ramey ***  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 (7) 0.000 (20)
86-07 F&M -0.001 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007  0.000 0.000 (20) -0.009 (10)
Perotti 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.002 -0.000 (1) -0.009 (11)
Ramey  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (4) -0.000 (14)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.006 -0.022 -0.024 -0.013  0.021 0.021 (20) -0.024 (8)
Perotti -0.005 -0.018 -0.014  0.000  0.038 0.038 (20) -0.018 (4)
Ramey  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 (20) 0.000 (1)
54-86 F&M -0.009 -0.038 -0.051 -0.055 -0.049 -0.009 (1) -0.055 (9)
Perotti -0.008 -0.033 -0.044 -0.046 -0.041 -0.008 (1) -0.046 (9)
Ramey ***  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 (6) -0.000 (18)
86-07 F&M -0.001 -0.006 -0.010 -0.011  0.007 0.007 (20) -0.012 (10)
Perotti -0.001 -0.005 -0.010 -0.012  0.004 0.004 (20) -0.012 (10)
Ramey  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (5) -0.000 (15)
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
F&G interest rate: Interest Payments/Treasury Debt
10-year Treasury Bond Yeild
3-month Treasury Bill Yeild
Federal Funds Rate
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of spending includes transfers.
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Table 1.5 Response of Various Interest Rates to Government Spending Shocks. 1954q3 to 2007q1
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1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-99 F&M -0.301 -0.241 -0.010 -0.141 -0.321 0.039 (9) -0.411 (2)
Perotti -0.310 -0.259 -0.036 -0.162 -0.356 0.014 (9) -0.426 (2)
Ramey ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 (8) -0.000 (2)
54-86 F&M -0.311  0.112  0.084 -0.106 -0.080 0.370 (5) -0.311 (1)
Perotti -0.317  0.106  0.073 -0.105 -0.077 0.371 (5) -0.317 (10)
Ramey ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 (6) -0.000 (2)
86-99 F&M -0.001  0.004  0.029  0.061  0.140 0.140 (20) -0.002 (2)
Perotti -0.001  0.003  0.028  0.058  0.133 0.133 (20) -0.002 (2)
Ramey 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 (18) -0.000 (2)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-99 F&M  0.001  0.003  0.003 -0.011 -0.037 0.005 (7) -0.037 (20)
Perotti  0.001  0.005  0.007 -0.004 -0.025 0.008 (7) -0.025 (20)
Ramey **  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 (20) 0.000 (1)
54-86 F&M  0.001  0.004 0.000 -0.024 -0.060 0.005 (6) -0.060 (20)
Perotti  0.001  0.005  0.003 -0.018 -0.055 0.007 (6) -0.055 (20)
Ramey ***  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 (6) -0.000 (20)
86-99 F&M -0.003 -0.014 -0.039 -0.082 -0.379 -0.003 (1) -0.379 (20)
Perotti -0.003 -0.013 -0.038 -0.081 -0.368 -0.003 (1) -0.368 (20)
Ramey  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (3) -0.000 (20)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-99 F&M 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.011 -0.023 0.004 (6) -0.023 (20)
Perotti  0.000 -0.001  0.005 -0.004 -0.013 0.008 (7) -0.014 (16)
Ramey ***  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 (20) 0.000 (1)
54-86 F&M -0.002 -0.013 -0.017 -0.029 -0.044 -0.002 (1) -0.044 (18)
Perotti -0.001 -0.010 -0.012 -0.024 -0.041 -0.001 (1) -0.041 (20)
Ramey ***  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 (6) -0.000 (20)
86-99 F&M -0.005 -0.023 -0.056 -0.113 -0.376 -0.005 (1) -0.376 (20)
Perotti -0.004 -0.023 -0.055 -0.112 -0.375 -0.004 (1) -0.375 (20)
Ramey  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (5) -0.000 (18)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-99 F&M -0.004 -0.017 -0.018 -0.023 -0.038 -0.004 (1) -0.038 (19)
Perotti -0.003 -0.013 -0.009 -0.014 -0.028 -0.003 (1) -0.028 (20)
Ramey ***  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 (7) 0.000 (1)
54-86 F&M -0.005 -0.033 -0.045 -0.050 -0.043 -0.005 (1) -0.050 (12)
Perotti -0.005 -0.030 -0.038 -0.041 -0.039 -0.005 (1) -0.042 (11)
Ramey ***  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (2) -0.000 (20)
86-99 F&M -0.002 -0.017 -0.052 -0.114 -0.313 -0.002 (1) -0.313 (20)
Perotti -0.002 -0.015 -0.050 -0.112 -0.299 -0.002 (1) -0.299 (20)
Ramey  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (4) -0.000 (19)
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of spending excludes transfers.
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
F&G interest rate: Interest Payments/Treasury Debt
10-year Treasury Bond Yeild
3-month Treasury Bill Yeild
Federal Funds Rate
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
Table 1.6 Response of Various Interest Rates to Government Spending Shocks 1954q3 to 1999q1.
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.043  0.348 -0.321  0.075  0.290 0.398 (5) -0.667 (6)
54-07 Perotti  0.043  0.328 -0.331  0.028  0.206 0.379 (5) -0.696 (6)
P-313  0.102  0.340 -0.210  0.000  0.057 0.345 (5) -0.540 (6)
R&R ***  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001 0.001 (5) -0.000 (6)
F&M -0.045  0.079 -0.425  0.168 -0.135 0.251 (5) -1.252 (6)
54-86 Perotti -0.036  0.059 -0.452  0.186 -0.169 0.253 (5) -1.334 (6)
P-313  0.062  0.162 -0.403  0.043 -0.158 0.268 (5) -1.106 (6)
R&R ***  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 0.001 (1) 0.000 (6)
F&M -0.002 -0.010 -0.016 -0.018  0.007 0.007 (20) -0.018 (10)
86-07 Perotti -0.002 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007  0.018 0.018 (20) -0.009 (9)
P-313 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001  0.013 0.013 (20) -0.005 (4)
R&R 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 (19) -0.000 (4)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.001  0.004  0.028  0.035  0.010 0.035 (11) 0.001 (1)
54-07 Perotti  0.001  0.007  0.034  0.049  0.034 0.050 (13) 0.001 (1)
P-313 -0.002 -0.007  0.007  0.014 -0.007 0.014 (11) -0.007 (4)
R&R 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 (1) -0.000 (20)
F&M  0.002  0.010  0.035  0.053  0.032 0.053 (12) 0.002 (1)
54-86 Perotti  0.003  0.016  0.054  0.082  0.070 0.085 (13) 0.003 (1)
P-313 -0.001 -0.005  0.016  0.039  0.036 0.042 (15) -0.005 (3)
R&R 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 (20) -0.000 (6)
F&M  0.001 -0.004  0.011  0.008 -0.001 0.012 (9) -0.004 (4)
86-07 Perotti 0.000 -0.009  0.005  0.001 -0.003 0.005 (8) -0.009 (4)
P-313 -0.001 -0.009  0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 (8) -0.009 (4)
R&R *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 (1) -0.000 (4)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.004  0.019  0.045  0.044 -0.005 0.050 (9) -0.005 (20)
54-07 Perotti  0.004  0.020  0.047  0.054  0.009 0.057 (11) 0.004 (1)
P-313 0.000 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.054 -0.000 (1) -0.054 (20)
R&R 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 (1) -0.000 (20)
F&M  0.008  0.026  0.057  0.062  0.026 0.066 (10) 0.008 (1)
54-86 Perotti  0.008  0.033  0.072  0.087  0.045 0.087 (12) 0.008 (1)
P-313  0.000 -0.009  0.009  0.027  0.008 0.029 (13) -0.009 (4)
R&R 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 (20) -0.000 (7)
F&M 0.000  0.003  0.024  0.043  0.014 0.044 (13) -0.000 (1)
86-07 Perotti -0.002 -0.012 -0.005  0.017  0.006 0.021 (15) -0.013 (6)
P-313 -0.002 -0.018 -0.023 -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 (17) -0.026 (7)
R&R 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (15) -0.000 (6)
F&G interest rate: Interest Payments/Treasury Debt
10-year Treasury Bond Yeild
3-month Treasury Bill Yeild
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
Table 1.7 Response of Various Interest Rates to Government Revenue Shocks 1954q3 to 2007q1.
49
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.005  0.029  0.058  0.060 -0.004 0.063 (11) -0.004 (20)
54-07 Perotti  0.006  0.034  0.065  0.072  0.014 0.075 (10) 0.006 (1)
P-313  0.001 -0.007 -0.013 -0.012 -0.053 0.001 (1) -0.053 (20)
R&R 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 (1) -0.000 (20)
F&M  0.010  0.043  0.078  0.082  0.031 0.088 (10) 0.010 (1)
54-86 Perotti  0.010  0.054  0.101  0.111  0.055 0.115 (11) 0.010 (1)
P-313  0.002 0.000  0.021  0.040  0.012 0.042 (13) -0.000 (4)
R&R 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 (20) -0.000 (6)
F&M  0.001  0.009  0.033  0.061  0.030 0.061 (13) 0.001 (1)
86-07 Perotti  0.000 -0.004  0.006  0.032  0.022 0.038 (14) -0.005 (5)
P-313 0.000 -0.012 -0.015  0.003  0.004 0.010 (16) -0.019 (6)
R&R 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 (1) -0.000 (9)
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Federal Funds Rate
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
Table 1.7 continued…
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
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1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.001  0.143  0.450  0.815  1.458 1.458 (20) 0.001 (1)
Perotti 0.000  0.125  0.391  0.701  1.185 1.185 (20) -0.000 (1)
Ramey * -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 (20) -0.007 (9)
54-86 F&M -0.012  0.121  0.382  0.704  1.169 1.169 (20) -0.012 (1)
Perotti -0.015  0.101  0.323  0.599  0.996 0.996 (20) -0.015 (1)
Ramey *** -0.012 -0.020 -0.039 -0.053 -0.056 -0.012 (1) -0.059 (17)
86-07 F&M  0.034  0.265  0.461  0.560  0.416 0.560 (12) 0.034 (1)
Perotti  0.029  0.228  0.352  0.428  0.278 0.428 (12) 0.029 (1)
Ramey -0.002  0.008  0.004 -0.008 -0.028 0.008 (4) -0.028 (20)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.003  0.058  0.378  0.787  1.542 1.542 (20) 0.003 (1)
Perotti -0.002  0.036  0.309  0.661  1.273 1.273 (20) -0.002 (1)
Ramey -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  0.001  0.009 0.009 (20) -0.002 (3)
54-86 F&M  0.013  0.091  0.498  1.001  1.987 1.987 (20) 0.013 (1)
Perotti  0.010  0.077  0.450  0.920  1.864 1.864 (20) 0.010 (1)
Ramey * -0.011 -0.013 -0.015 -0.004  0.032 0.032 (20) -0.018 (7)
86-07 F&M -0.106 -0.152  0.014  0.178  0.258 0.297 (16) -0.174 (3)
Perotti -0.113 -0.177 -0.060  0.074  0.154 0.192 (18) -0.199 (5)
Ramey -0.007 -0.019 -0.053 -0.073 -0.050 -0.007 (1) -0.074 (13)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.020  0.123  0.450  0.818  1.510 1.510 (20) 0.020 (1)
Perotti  0.017  0.101  0.387  0.708  1.269 1.269 (20) 0.017 (1)
Ramey * -0.003 -0.004 0.000  0.007  0.023 0.023 (20) -0.005 (3)
54-86 F&M -0.001  0.077  0.381  0.795  1.632 1.632 (20) -0.001 (1)
Perotti -0.004  0.059  0.338  0.721  1.519 1.519 (20) -0.004 (1)
Ramey *** -0.013 -0.019 -0.025 -0.017  0.021 0.021 (20) -0.027 (7)
86-07 F&M  0.044  0.296  0.587  0.713  0.543 0.713 (12) 0.044 (1)
Perotti  0.035  0.260  0.470  0.579  0.418 0.579 (12) 0.035 (1)
Ramey -0.002  0.004 -0.021 -0.043 -0.056 0.006 (2) -0.060 (17)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.002 -0.001  0.009  0.020  0.037 0.037 (20) -0.003 (2)
Perotti -0.002  0.001  0.012  0.023  0.041 0.041 (20) -0.003 (2)
Ramey *** -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 (20) -0.001 (2)
54-86 F&M -0.011 -0.023 -0.036 -0.028 -0.012 -0.011 (1) -0.036 (8)
Perotti -0.010 -0.021 -0.033 -0.025 -0.010 -0.009 (19) -0.033 (8)
Ramey *** -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 (18) -0.004 (5)
86-07 F&M 0.000  0.001 -0.002  0.001  0.004 0.005 (18) -0.002 (8)
Perotti 0.000  0.001 -0.002  0.000  0.003 0.004 (18) -0.002 (8)
Ramey ***  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 (2) -0.000 (8)
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of spending includes transfers.
Federal Reserve: Total Assets
Federal Reserve: Treasury Securities
Federal Reserve: Federal Funds Assets
Federal Reserve: Loans to Domestic Banks
Table 1.8 Response of the Federal Reserve to Government Spending Shocks. 1954q3 to 2007q1
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.010 -0.140 -0.469 -0.688 -0.697 -0.010 (1) -0.734 (15)
54-99 Perotti -0.009 -0.184 -0.612 -0.952 -1.300 -0.009 (1) -1.300 (20)
P-313  0.008 -0.154 -0.453 -0.684 -0.967 0.008 (1) -0.967 (20)
R&R *** -0.005 -0.024 -0.079 -0.143 -0.247 -0.005 (1) -0.247 (20)
F&M -0.027 -0.125 -0.471 -0.803 -1.208 -0.027 (1) -1.208 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.031 -0.213 -0.708 -1.196 -1.817 -0.031 (1) -1.817 (20)
P-313 -0.013 -0.166 -0.523 -0.850 -1.268 -0.013 (1) -1.268 (20)
R&R *** -0.009 -0.038 -0.123 -0.206 -0.294 -0.009 (1) -0.294 (20)
F&M  0.026 -0.127 -0.064 -0.019  0.062 0.062 (20) -0.127 (4)
86-99 Perotti  0.074 -0.098  0.073  0.232  0.366 0.366 (20) -0.098 (4)
P-313  0.113 -0.092  0.072  0.205  0.259 0.259 (20) -0.092 (4)
R&R ***  0.063 -0.023 -0.312 -0.641 -0.884 0.063 (1) -0.884 (20)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.031 -0.221 -0.522 -0.688 -0.806 -0.031 (1) -0.806 (20)
54-99 Perotti -0.046 -0.283 -0.687 -1.000 -1.432 -0.046 (1) -1.432 (20)
P-313 -0.050 -0.249 -0.528 -0.789 -1.313 -0.050 (1) -1.313 (20)
R&R ***  0.001 -0.015 -0.084 -0.164 -0.309 0.001 (1) -0.309 (20)
F&M -0.054 -0.334 -0.737 -0.992 -1.478 -0.054 (1) -1.478 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.066 -0.386 -0.918 -1.311 -2.045 -0.066 (1) -2.045 (20)
P-313 -0.067 -0.336 -0.773 -1.126 -1.888 -0.067 (1) -1.888 (20)
R&R *** -0.020 -0.057 -0.163 -0.262 -0.396 -0.020 (1) -0.396 (20)
F&M  0.028  0.009 -0.108 -0.272 -0.035 0.040 (3) -0.309 (14)
86-99 Perotti  0.043  0.061 -0.012 -0.053  0.348 0.348 (20) -0.060 (14)
P-313  0.043  0.072 -0.015 -0.098  0.119 0.119 (20) -0.140 (14)
R&R *** -0.068 -0.232 -0.477 -0.564 -0.518 -0.068 (1) -0.608 (13)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.034 -0.243 -0.628 -0.845 -0.945 -0.034 (1) -0.945 (20)
54-99 Perotti -0.040 -0.285 -0.765 -1.117 -1.634 -0.040 (1) -1.634 (20)
P-313 -0.025 -0.211 -0.567 -0.895 -1.473 -0.025 (1) -1.473 (20)
R&R *** -0.005 -0.031 -0.093 -0.148 -0.219 -0.005 (1) -0.219 (20)
F&M -0.071 -0.332 -0.868 -1.224 -1.823 -0.071 (1) -1.823 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.078 -0.392 -1.017 -1.505 -2.352 -0.078 (1) -2.352 (20)
P-313 -0.061 -0.301 -0.816 -1.275 -2.192 -0.061 (1) -2.192 (20)
R&R *** -0.017 -0.057 -0.144 -0.222 -0.330 -0.017 (1) -0.330 (20)
F&M  0.058 -0.097 -0.040 -0.109  0.195 0.195 (20) -0.109 (12)
86-99 Perotti  0.144 -0.052  0.186  0.269  0.634 0.634 (20) -0.052 (4)
P-313  0.183 -0.017  0.225  0.300  0.521 0.521 (20) -0.017 (4)
R&R *** -0.009 -0.160 -0.497 -0.672 -0.660 -0.009 (1) -0.672 (12)
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
Federal Reserve: Total Assets
Federal Reserve: Treasury Securities
Federal Reserve: Federal Funds Assets
Table 1.9 Response of the Federal Reserve to Government Revenue Shocks 1954q3 to 1999q1.
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.008  0.019  0.015  0.008 -0.012 0.019 (4) -0.012 (20)
54-99 Perotti  0.009  0.021  0.018  0.013  0.001 0.021 (4) 0.001 (20)
P-313  0.000 -0.002 -0.011 -0.009 -0.018 0.002 (2) -0.018 (20)
R&R *** -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.014 -0.005 (2) -0.014 (20)
F&M  0.018  0.034  0.033  0.024  0.023 0.034 (4) 0.018 (1)
54-86 Perotti  0.019  0.039  0.033  0.029  0.025 0.039 (4) 0.019 (1)
P-313  0.007  0.008 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.010 (2) -0.007 (7)
R&R *** -0.009 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 (8) -0.009 (1)
F&M  0.005  0.014  0.016  0.008  0.005 0.017 (9) -0.001 (16)
86-99 Perotti  0.004  0.012  0.016  0.009  0.004 0.017 (9) -0.001 (16)
P-313  0.002  0.007  0.013  0.008  0.002 0.014 (9) -0.002 (16)
R&R ***  0.014  0.004 -0.009 -0.005  0.001 0.014 (1) -0.009 (8)
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
Federal Reserve: Loans to Domestic Banks
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Table 1.9 continued…
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.018 -0.126 -0.422 -0.617 -0.462 0.018 (1) -0.628 (14)
54-99 Perotti  0.011 -0.179 -0.627 -0.976 -1.189 0.011 (1) -1.213 (19)
P-313  0.023 -0.174 -0.545 -0.846 -1.001 0.023 (1) -1.006 (19)
R&R ***  0.001 -0.021 -0.076 -0.137 -0.244 0.001 (1) -0.244 (20)
F&M -0.003 -0.132 -0.538 -0.976 -1.506 -0.003 (1) -1.506 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.017 -0.231 -0.779 -1.350 -2.022 -0.017 (1) -2.022 (20)
P-313  0.000 -0.206 -0.646 -1.080 -1.596 0.000 (1) -1.596 (20)
R&R *** -0.004 -0.040 -0.124 -0.215 -0.321 -0.004 (1) -0.321 (19)
F&M  0.098  0.116  0.464  1.000  2.703 2.703 (20) 0.073 (2)
86-99 Perotti  0.148  0.167  0.634  1.262  3.080 3.080 (20) 0.124 (2)
P-313  0.180  0.180  0.656  1.302  3.287 3.287 (20) 0.157 (2)
R&R ***  0.143  0.079  0.244  0.699  3.531 3.531 (20) 0.079 (4)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.009 -0.168 -0.438 -0.545 -0.452 -0.009 (1) -0.555 (15)
54-99 Perotti -0.030 -0.244 -0.659 -0.973 -1.242 -0.030 (1) -1.242 (20)
P-313 -0.034 -0.241 -0.610 -0.905 -1.244 -0.034 (1) -1.244 (20)
R&R ***  0.007 -0.001 -0.055 -0.129 -0.268 0.008 (2) -0.268 (20)
F&M -0.036 -0.304 -0.749 -1.063 -1.669 -0.036 (1) -1.669 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.056 -0.389 -0.980 -1.461 -2.376 -0.056 (1) -2.376 (20)
P-313 -0.065 -0.400 -0.961 -1.471 -2.441 -0.065 (1) -2.441 (20)
R&R *** -0.017 -0.062 -0.184 -0.307 -0.519 -0.017 (1) -0.519 (20)
F&M  0.040  0.164  0.500  0.872  1.122 1.279 (17) 0.040 (1)
86-99 Perotti  0.058  0.239  0.735  1.206  0.929 1.418 (15) 0.058 (1)
P-313  0.059  0.256  0.773  1.294  1.275 1.607 (17) 0.059 (1)
R&R *** -0.028 -0.169 -0.212 -0.052 -0.190 0.021 (14) -0.266 (7)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.009 -0.218 -0.605 -0.819 -0.792 -0.009 (1) -0.876 (15)
54-99 Perotti -0.020 -0.280 -0.795 -1.166 -1.511 -0.020 (1) -1.511 (20)
P-313 -0.014 -0.243 -0.679 -1.078 -1.564 -0.014 (1) -1.564 (20)
R&R *** -0.002 -0.023 -0.076 -0.114 -0.173 -0.002 (1) -0.173 (20)
F&M -0.033 -0.262 -0.795 -1.194 -1.831 -0.033 (1) -1.831 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.055 -0.376 -1.052 -1.604 -2.476 -0.055 (1) -2.476 (20)
P-313 -0.050 -0.344 -0.970 -1.538 -2.548 -0.050 (1) -2.548 (20)
R&R *** -0.013 -0.057 -0.151 -0.247 -0.438 -0.013 (1) -0.438 (20)
F&M  0.148  0.299  0.911  1.704  3.405 3.405 (20) 0.148 (1)
86-99 Perotti  0.180  0.342  1.085  1.962  3.422 3.449 (19) 0.180 (1)
P-313  0.211  0.372  1.136  1.999  3.764 3.764 (20) 0.211 (1)
R&R ***  0.027 -0.064  0.028  0.440  1.741 1.741 (20) -0.064 (4)
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue excludes transfers.
Federal Reserve: Total Assets
Federal Reserve: Treasury Securities
Federal Reserve: Federal Funds Assets
Table 1.10 Response of the Federal Reserve to Government Revenue Shocks 1954q3 to 1999q1.
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.007  0.013  0.009 -0.001 -0.027 0.013 (4) -0.027 (20)
54-99 Perotti  0.008  0.018  0.018  0.011 -0.016 0.018 (8) -0.016 (20)
P-313  0.002 -0.001 -0.011 -0.016 -0.042 0.002 (1) -0.042 (20)
R&R *** -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.014 -0.004 (2) -0.014 (20)
F&M  0.011  0.022  0.028  0.026  0.020 0.028 (9) 0.002 (3)
54-86 Perotti  0.017  0.036  0.041  0.040  0.030 0.041 (8) 0.015 (3)
P-313  0.008  0.012  0.017  0.016  0.008 0.017 (8) -0.004 (3)
R&R *** -0.007 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.006 -0.000 (8) -0.007 (1)
F&M  0.003  0.017  0.032  0.042  0.085 0.085 (20) 0.003 (1)
86-99 Perotti  0.003  0.018  0.033  0.044  0.100 0.100 (20) 0.003 (1)
P-313  0.001  0.014  0.033  0.049  0.114 0.114 (20) 0.001 (1)
R&R ***  0.012  0.007  0.017  0.042  0.139 0.139 (20) 0.006 (3)
Table 1.10 continued…
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Federal Reserve: Loans to Domestic Banks
Government revenue shock equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue excludes transfers.
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
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Table 1.11 Response of Net Liabilites and Assets to Government Spending Shocks. 1954q3 to 2007q1
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -1.213  1.241  2.113  2.774 -2.748 2.774 (12) -2.748 (20)
Perotti -1.481 -0.488 -1.488 -2.062 -9.072 -0.488 (4) -9.072 (20)
Ramey *** -0.123 -0.440 -0.817 -0.813 -1.062 -0.123 (1) -1.062 (20)
54-86 F&M -0.880  5.614  17.203  23.285  24.753 24.753 (20) -0.880 (1)
Perotti -1.049  4.366  14.701  19.930  20.498 20.498 (20) -1.225 (2)
Ramey *** -0.060  0.120  0.697  1.009  1.477 1.477 (20) -0.123 (2)
86-07 F&M -3.958 -12.135 -40.808 -45.795 -23.377 -3.958 (1) -45.795 (12)
Perotti -4.662 -15.032 -45.839 -53.512 -30.547 -4.662 (1) -53.593 (13)
Ramey *** -0.397 -2.283 -6.755 -9.309 -7.642 -0.397 (1) -9.704 (15)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.253  0.730  1.308  2.180  4.666 4.666 (20) 0.239 (2)
Perotti  0.246  0.705  1.247  2.168  4.707 4.707 (20) 0.224 (2)
Ramey ***  0.031  0.112  0.197  0.280  0.510 0.510 (20) 0.031 (1)
54-86 F&M  0.115  0.169  0.087  0.068  0.906 0.906 (20) -0.038 (11)
Perotti  0.094  0.098  0.060  0.054  0.777 0.777 (20) -0.068 (11)
Ramey ***  0.067  0.104  0.146  0.195  0.282 0.282 (20) 0.067 (1)
86-07 F&M -0.045 -1.855 -4.865 -4.918 -8.084 -0.045 (1) -8.084 (20)
Perotti -0.021 -1.774 -4.557 -4.256 -6.983 -0.021 (1) -6.983 (20)
Ramey *** -0.012  0.012  0.008 -0.037 -0.227 0.025 (9) -0.227 (20)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.033  0.155  0.308  0.515  0.693 0.792 (18) -0.033 (1)
Perotti -0.046  0.140  0.247  0.366  0.309 0.476 (14) -0.056 (2)
Ramey ***  0.016  0.034  0.031  0.013  0.001 0.042 (5) 0.001 (20)
54-86 F&M -0.064  0.107  0.362  0.859  1.497 1.497 (20) -0.064 (1)
Perotti -0.075  0.119  0.329  0.706  1.273 1.273 (20) -0.075 (1)
Ramey ***  0.031  0.059  0.063  0.062  0.116 0.116 (20) 0.031 (1)
86-07 F&M  0.292  0.254 -0.721 -0.893 -1.139 0.414 (3) -1.139 (20)
Perotti  0.268  0.251 -0.697 -0.911 -1.167 0.393 (3) -1.167 (20)
Ramey ***  0.064  0.141  0.136  0.089  0.037 0.172 (6) 0.036 (19)
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Households: Net Assets
Business: Net Liabilities
Financial Business: Net Assets
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definiton of spending includes transfers.
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
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1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -1.166  1.383  5.533  10.336  12.422 12.949 (18) -1.486 (2)
Perotti -1.355  0.327  2.900  6.291  7.763 8.542 (17) -1.959 (2)
Ramey *** -0.134 -0.456 -0.775 -0.828 -1.004 -0.134 (1) -1.004 (20)
54-86 F&M -0.71  6.439  25.219  39.244  46.686 46.686 (20) -0.710 (1)
Perotti -0.876  5.653  23.948  37.471  44.030 44.030 (20) -0.876 (1)
Ramey ***  0.030  0.354  1.251  1.946  3.089 3.089 (20) 0.008 (2)
86-07 F&M -1.511 -1.587 -34.824 -48.227 -39.898 2.978 (3) -51.969 (14)
Perotti -1.949 -3.893 -36.931 -50.875 -44.073 1.760 (3) -55.510 (14)
Ramey *** -0.227 -1.988 -5.166 -7.48 -6.536 -0.227 (1) -7.879 (15)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.234  0.552  0.472  0.889  2.236 2.236 (20) 0.185 (2)
Perotti  0.227  0.532  0.441  0.827  2.414 2.414 (20) 0.173 (2)
Ramey ***  0.043  0.145  0.241  0.330  0.564 0.564 (20) 0.043 (1)
54-86 F&M  0.183  0.430  0.468  0.266  0.839 0.839 (20) 0.103 (2)
Perotti  0.163  0.376  0.427  0.143  0.685 0.685 (20) 0.082 (2)
Ramey ***  0.064  0.125  0.188  0.248  0.391 0.391 (20) 0.064 (1)
86-07 F&M  0.385 -0.383 -2.945 -2.356 -1.584 0.385 (1) -3.069 (7)
Perotti  0.407 -0.278 -2.684 -1.938 -0.824 0.407 (1) -2.808 (7)
Ramey *** -0.085 -0.052 -0.136 -0.306 -0.398 -0.052 (4) -0.439 (18)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.039  0.109  0.476  0.862  1.426 1.426 (20) -0.039 (1)
Perotti -0.045  0.103  0.444  0.758  1.156 1.156 (20) -0.045 (1)
Ramey ***  0.019  0.035  0.039  0.031  0.042 0.045 (5) 0.019 (1)
54-86 F&M -0.063  0.034  0.448  0.990  1.649 1.649 (20) -0.063 (1)
Perotti -0.071  0.036  0.427  0.909  1.517 1.517 (20) -0.071 (1)
Ramey ***  0.036  0.059  0.083  0.111  0.205 0.205 (20) 0.036 (1)
86-07 F&M  0.394  0.769  0.281 -0.065 -0.621 0.825 (5) -0.621 (20)
Perotti  0.377  0.752  0.297 -0.062 -0.627 0.816 (5) -0.627 (20)
Ramey  0.076  0.185  0.244  0.226  0.147 0.260 (7) 0.076 (1)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definiton of spending excludes transfers.
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
Households: Net Assets
Business: Net Liabilities
Financial Business: Net Assets
Table 1.12 Response of Net Liabilities and Assets to Government Spending Shocks. 1954q3 to 20071
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  1.688  12.680  21.969  13.756 -2.341 22.046 (7) -2.341 (20)
54-07 Perotti  1.052  9.838  17.756  7.625 -10.297 18.534 (7) -10.297 (20)
P-313  0.320  8.459  18.611  12.363  1.795 18.611 (8) 0.320 (1)
R&R  0.436  2.710  5.188  4.648  3.792 5.188 (8) 0.436 (1)
F&M -0.786  0.305 -4.209 -14.465 -18.199 0.305 (4) -18.785 (18)
54-86 Perotti -1.747 -3.747 -12.139 -25.348 -32.952 -1.747 (1) -32.952 (20)
P-313 -2.072 -3.910 -10.327 -22.803 -29.674 -2.072 (1) -29.674 (20)
R&R -0.136 -1.208 -2.210 -2.706 -3.171 -0.136 (1) -3.171 (20)
F&M  14.313  55.755  91.488  112.937  103.457 115.189 (13) 14.313 (1)
86-07 Perotti  14.411  54.601  89.947  110.489  103.024 113.809 (14) 14.411 (1)
P-313  10.739  38.302  59.560  72.637  66.592 74.612 (17) 10.739 (1)
R&R  2.437  13.157  33.511  47.848  50.115 55.816 (17) 2.437 (1)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.066 -1.354 -1.037  0.400  2.873 2.873 (20) -1.513 (5)
54-07 Perotti -0.053 -1.441 -1.380  0.024  2.325 2.325 (20) -1.633 (5)
P-313  0.082 -1.611 -2.737 -3.036 -3.142 0.082 (1) -3.185 (18)
R&R  0.232  0.451  1.052  1.660  2.919 2.919 (20) 0.232 (1)
F&M  0.064 -0.575 -1.185 -2.226 -4.316 0.064 (1) -4.316 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.006 -0.835 -1.436 -2.654 -5.014 -0.006 (1) -5.014 (20)
P-313 -0.016 -1.426 -2.967 -4.668 -8.092 -0.016 (1) -8.092 (20)
R&R  0.069  0.232  0.419  0.547  0.734 0.734 (20) 0.069 (1)
F&M  0.191 -1.872 -4.754 -1.919  4.951 4.951 (20) -4.754 (8)
86-07 Perotti -0.107 -2.233 -3.981 -1.856  1.951 2.039 (19) -3.981 (8)
P-313 -0.287 -2.149 -2.320  0.566  2.555 2.834 (17) -2.529 (6)
R&R  0.161 -0.841 -1.104  1.411  3.639 3.908 (18) -1.104 (8)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.062  0.028  0.017 -0.576 -1.141 0.163 (6) -1.276 (18)
54-07 Perotti -0.085 -0.017 -0.039 -0.804 -1.653 0.126 (6) -1.746 (19)
P-313 -0.157 -0.170  0.095 -0.171 -0.557 0.101 (9) -0.678 (18)
R&R -0.043 -0.012  0.143  0.306  0.529 0.529 (20) -0.043 (1)
F&M -0.143 -0.368 -0.639 -1.277 -2.323 -0.108 (2) -2.323 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.181 -0.379 -0.690 -1.496 -2.967 -0.173 (2) -2.967 (20)
P-313 -0.240 -0.443 -0.282 -0.622 -1.783 -0.221 (9) -1.783 (20)
R&R -0.055 -0.069  0.085  0.266  0.108 0.283 (15) -0.103 (5)
F&M  0.125  0.753  1.098  0.744 -0.468 1.126 (10) -0.468 (20)
86-07 Perotti  0.068  0.092 -0.236 -0.591 -1.410 0.262 (2) -1.421 (19)
P-313 -0.020 -0.289 -0.856 -1.192 -1.816 0.098 (2) -1.885 (19)
R&R *** -0.547 -1.548 -2.250 -2.411 -2.449 -0.547 (1) -2.563 (17)
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
Households: Net Assets
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Business: Net Liabilities
Financial Business: Net Assets
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Table 1.13 Response of Net Liabilities and Assets to Government Revenue Shocks 1954q3 to 2007q1.
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.604  7.511  12.820  13.178  26.560 26.560 (20) 0.604 (1)
54-99 Perotti -0.407  2.873  3.627 -0.187  7.050 7.050 (20) -0.691 (14)
P-313 -1.163  0.797  2.540 -1.531  6.207 6.207 (20) -2.103 (14)
R&R -0.207 -1.184 -1.994 -2.415 -3.123 -0.207 (1) -3.123 (20)
F&M -0.788  0.307 -4.204 -14.471 -18.199 0.307 (4) -18.782 (18)
54-86 Perotti -1.747 -3.750 -12.143 -25.353 -32.948 -1.747 (1) -32.948 (20)
P-313 -2.071 -3.909 -10.328 -22.815 -29.681 -2.071 (1) -29.681 (20)
R&R -0.136 -1.209 -2.210 -2.705 -3.169 -0.136 (1) -3.169 (20)
F&M  1.808 -5.522 -3.704 -0.958  9.399 9.399 (20) -7.438 (5)
86-99 Perotti  5.364  2.682  9.434  17.252  30.183 31.072 (19) 1.753 (5)
P-313  2.835 -3.383  1.398  4.475  8.515 8.520 (19) -4.761 (5)
R&R *** -7.535 -19.710 -33.527 -44.150 -70.926 -7.360 (2) -70.926 (20)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.024 -1.039 -1.916 -3.599 -5.766 0.024 (1) -5.766 (20)
54-99 Perotti -0.002 -1.261 -2.396 -4.372 -6.947 -0.002 (1) -6.947 (20)
P-313  0.081 -1.774 -4.534 -7.425 -12.345 0.081 (1) -12.345 (20)
R&R  0.200  0.560  0.971  1.356  2.142 2.142 (20) 0.200 (1)
F&M  0.064 -0.576 -1.185 -2.226 -4.316 0.064 (1) -4.316 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.006 -0.835 -1.436 -2.654 -5.012 -0.006 (1) -5.012 (20)
P-313 -0.016 -1.426 -2.967 -4.667 -8.091 -0.016 (1) -8.091 (20)
R&R  0.069  0.232  0.419  0.548  0.733 0.733 (20) 0.069 (1)
F&M -0.132  1.468  2.950  3.288  6.974 6.974 (20) -0.132 (1)
86-99 Perotti  0.149  2.695  2.892  2.952  6.899 7.060 (18) 0.149 (1)
P-313  0.132  2.722  2.402  2.062  5.943 7.163 (17) 0.132 (1)
R&R *** -0.269  0.781  6.381 -3.692  10.527 10.591 (19) -6.534 (14)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.110 -0.235 -0.448 -0.840 -1.037 -0.026 (3) -1.232 (17)
54-99 Perotti -0.143 -0.274 -0.503 -1.086 -1.932 -0.091 (3) -1.996 (19)
P-313 -0.199 -0.365 -0.265 -0.406 -0.776 -0.199 (1) -0.911 (18)
R&R -0.046 -0.056  0.081  0.311  0.477 0.489 (18) -0.078 (5)
F&M -0.143 -0.368 -0.639 -1.277 -2.323 -0.108 (2) -2.323 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.181 -0.379 -0.690 -1.496 -2.967 -0.173 (2) -2.967 (20)
P-313 -0.240 -0.443 -0.282 -0.622 -1.783 -0.221 (9) -1.783 (20)
R&R -0.055 -0.069  0.085  0.266  0.108 0.283 (15) -0.103 (5)
F&M -0.079 -0.483 -0.386 -0.459  0.026 0.026 (20) -0.696 (5)
86-99 Perotti -0.052 -0.523 -0.367 -0.412  0.099 0.099 (20) -0.750 (15)
P-313 -0.122 -0.529 -0.176 -0.423 -0.551 -0.119 (2) -0.875 (15)
R&R *** -1.089 -1.636 -1.626 -2.515 -4.090 -1.089 (1) -4.090 (20)
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Households: Net Assets
Business: Net Liabilities
Financial Business: Net Assets
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Table 1.14 Response of Net Liabilities and Assets to Government Revenue Shocks 1954q3 to 1999q1.
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1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.136  1.479  4.548  8.201  15.239 15.239 (20) 0.136 (1)
Perotti  0.108  1.271  3.986  7.531  14.392 14.392 (20) 0.108 (1)
Ramey *** -0.014 -0.019  0.034  0.142  0.456 0.456 (20) -0.024 (3)
54-86 F&M  0.179  1.503  3.850  6.360  10.903 10.903 (20) 0.179 (1)
Perotti  0.160  1.351  3.469  5.637  9.973 9.973 (20) 0.160 (1)
Ramey ***  0.010  0.089  0.231  0.373  0.831 0.831 (20) 0.010 (1)
86-07 F&M  0.088  1.266  4.002  6.422  11.676 11.676 (20) 0.088 (1)
Perotti  0.060  1.151  3.878  6.025  10.488 10.488 (20) 0.060 (1)
Ramey -0.044  0.028 0.000 -0.214 -0.451 0.028 (4) -0.453 (18)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.067  0.512  1.284  2.177  3.973 3.973 (20) 0.067 (1)
Perotti  0.057  0.454  1.147  1.964  3.733 3.733 (20) 0.057 (1)
Ramey *** -0.026 -0.078 -0.154 -0.210 -0.286 -0.026 (1) -0.286 (20)
54-86 F&M  0.005  0.053  0.142  0.473  1.123 1.123 (20) -0.021 (3)
Perotti -0.003 -0.005  0.003  0.237  0.850 0.850 (20) -0.063 (3)
Ramey *** -0.034 -0.085 -0.131 -0.130 -0.035 -0.034 (1) -0.139 (9)
86-07 F&M -0.224 -0.708 -1.365 -1.892 -2.563 -0.224 (1) -2.694 (19)
Perotti -0.232 -0.719 -1.354 -1.692 -2.141 -0.232 (1) -2.280 (15)
Ramey *** -0.047 -0.035 -0.032 -0.055 -0.143 -0.032 (8) -0.147 (19)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.048  0.840  2.993  5.974  12.472 12.472 (20) 0.048 (1)
Perotti  0.028  0.710  2.599  5.298  11.770 11.770 (20) 0.028 (1)
Ramey ***  0.023  0.132  0.383  0.693  1.385 1.385 (20) 0.023 (1)
54-86 F&M  0.001  0.900  2.499  4.165  6.627 6.627 (20) 0.001 (1)
Perotti -0.011  0.817  2.252  3.711  6.101 6.101 (20) -0.011 (1)
Ramey ***  0.040  0.214  0.472  0.752  1.557 1.557 (20) 0.040 (1)
86-07 F&M  0.234  0.726  2.893  5.226  10.358 10.358 (20) 0.196 (2)
Perotti  0.232  0.677  2.815  5.073  9.495 9.495 (20) 0.182 (2)
Ramey -0.039 -0.097 -0.163 -0.227 -0.185 -0.039 (1) -0.253 (15)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.131 -0.436 -0.499 -0.029 -0.096 0.148 (15) -0.499 (8)
Perotti -0.128 -0.417 -0.545 -0.195 -0.403 -0.047 (14) -0.545 (8)
Ramey ***  0.011  0.053  0.125  0.218  0.347 0.347 (20) 0.011 (1)
54-86 F&M -0.039  0.162  0.899  1.895  2.452 2.506 (17) -0.039 (1)
Perotti -0.035  0.159  0.867  1.780  2.297 2.379 (18) -0.035 (1)
Ramey *** -0.005 -0.011  0.029  0.086  0.148 0.148 (20) -0.012 (3)
86-07 F&M -0.394 -1.282 -2.579 -1.154  0.848 0.848 (20) -2.822 (7)
Perotti -0.360 -1.169 -2.548 -0.886  1.833 1.833 (20) -2.770 (7)
Ramey ***  0.033  0.190  0.311  0.580  0.867 0.867 (20) 0.033 (1)
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definiton of spending includes transfers.
Households: Total Currency and Deposits
Households: Total Checkable Deposits and Currency
Households: Total Savings and Time Deposits
Households: Credit Market Insturments, Assets
Table 1.15 Response of Household Assets to Government Spending Shocks. 1954q3 to 2007q1
60
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -1.005  0.175  1.162  2.465 -2.667 2.465 (12) -2.667 (20)
Perotti -1.193 -0.842 -0.601 -0.572 -7.201 -0.525 (11) -7.201 (20)
Ramey -0.175 -0.633 -1.062 -1.236 -1.783 -0.175 (1) -1.783 (20)
54-86 F&M -0.939  2.620  10.176  14.007  14.665 14.665 (20) -1.114 (2)
Perotti -1.056  1.881  8.692  11.950  12.116 12.116 (20) -1.378 (2)
Ramey *** -0.084 -0.054  0.279  0.532  0.701 0.701 (20) -0.169 (2)
86-07 F&M -1.031 -4.056 -20.547 -22.235 -13.860 -0.963 (2) -22.338 (10)
Perotti -1.483 -5.344 -23.066 -25.238 -16.016 -1.483 (1) -25.780 (10)
Ramey *** -0.317 -1.477 -3.564 -4.650 -3.915 -0.317 (1) -4.721 (13)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.045  0.132  0.308  0.541 -0.047 0.541 (12) -0.047 (20)
Perotti -0.059  0.061  0.130  0.261 -0.497 0.261 (12) -0.497 (20)
Ramey *** -0.012 -0.037 -0.051 -0.045 -0.052 -0.012 (1) -0.052 (7)
54-86 F&M -0.059  0.042  0.028 -0.302 -1.649 0.042 (4) -1.649 (20)
Perotti -0.067 -0.003 -0.066 -0.457 -1.905 -0.003 (4) -1.905 (20)
Ramey *** -0.007 -0.015 -0.025 -0.045 -0.119 -0.007 (1) -0.119 (20)
86-07 F&M -0.489 -2.587 -6.423 -7.172 -4.832 -0.489 (1) -7.172 (12)
Perotti -0.549 -2.926 -7.118 -7.969 -5.161 -0.549 (1) -7.969 (12)
Ramey ***  0.012 -0.235 -0.761 -0.974 -0.811 0.012 (1) -0.983 (13)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.009  0.056  0.222  0.456  0.829 0.829 (20) -0.009 (1)
Perotti -0.015  0.020  0.122  0.280  0.500 0.500 (20) -0.015 (2)
Ramey -0.003 -0.011 -0.024 -0.038 -0.063 -0.003 (1) -0.063 (20)
54-86 F&M  0.004  0.076  0.325  0.649  1.085 1.085 (20) 0.004 (1)
Perotti -0.001  0.048  0.250  0.533  0.907 0.907 (20) -0.001 (1)
Ramey ***  0.001  0.005  0.013  0.024  0.054 0.054 (20) 0.001 (1)
86-07 F&M -0.064 -0.164 -0.344 -0.425 -0.677 -0.064 (1) -0.677 (20)
Perotti -0.072 -0.201 -0.404 -0.498 -0.805 -0.072 (1) -0.805 (20)
Ramey -0.005 -0.011 -0.017 -0.027 -0.069 -0.005 (1) -0.069 (20)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.222  0.432  0.751  0.928  0.696 0.969 (14) -0.222 (1)
Perotti -0.272  0.143  0.098  0.087 -0.359 0.177 (5) -0.359 (20)
Ramey -0.018 -0.059 -0.099 -0.095 -0.070 -0.018 (1) -0.099 (8)
54-86 F&M -0.138  0.351  0.678  0.759  0.413 0.759 (12) -0.138 (1)
Perotti -0.166  0.201  0.417  0.315 -0.147 0.455 (9) -0.192 (2)
Ramey ***  0.002 -0.003 -0.017 -0.007  0.010 0.010 (20) -0.018 (7)
86-07 F&M -1.431 -0.987 -5.077 -4.989 -2.310 -0.714 (3) -5.121 (9)
Perotti -1.732 -2.064 -7.023 -7.062 -4.144 -1.458 (3) -7.273 (13)
Ramey ***  0.036 -0.219 -0.574 -0.621 -0.220 0.036 (1) -0.631 (13)
Households: Corporate Equities
Households: Mutual Fund Shares
Households: Life Insurance Assets
Households: Pension Fund Assets
Table 1.15 continued
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definiton of spending includes transfers.
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1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M -0.177 -0.734 -1.763 -3.260 -6.191 -0.177 (1) -6.191 (20)
Perotti -0.189 -0.784 -1.917 -3.502 -6.865 -0.189 (1) -6.865 (20)
Ramey *** -0.004 -0.028 -0.097 -0.154 -0.232 -0.004 (1) -0.232 (20)
54-86 F&M -0.084 -0.431 -0.984 -2.195 -3.840 -0.084 (1) -3.917 (19)
Perotti -0.082 -0.452 -1.021 -2.324 -3.941 -0.082 (1) -3.941 (20)
Ramey *** -0.009 -0.060 -0.176 -0.326 -0.604 -0.009 (1) -0.604 (20)
86-07 F&M -0.395 -1.326 -1.889 -0.977  5.341 5.341 (20) -1.937 (7)
Perotti -0.452 -1.542 -2.527 -2.135  3.608 3.608 (20) -2.539 (11)
Ramey *** -0.024 -0.137 -0.304 -0.463 -0.355 -0.024 (1) -0.478 (13)
Table 1.15 continued….
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definiton of spending includes transfers.
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Households: Proprietors Equity in Noncorporate Business
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
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1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-99 F&M  0.117  1.178  3.756  6.496  11.360 11.360 (20) 0.117 (1)
Perotti  0.098  1.029  3.354  5.887  10.388 10.388 (20) 0.098 (1)
Ramey *** -0.020 -0.058 -0.069 -0.045  0.083 0.083 (20) -0.072 (7)
54-86 F&M  0.054  0.646  2.481  4.392  7.985 7.985 (20) 0.054 (1)
Perotti  0.034  0.506  2.099  3.932  7.319 7.319 (20) 0.034 (1)
Ramey *** -0.003  0.040  0.155  0.339  0.721 0.721 (20) -0.003 (1)
86-99 F&M  0.025  0.903  1.330  0.628  0.156 1.330 (8) 0.025 (1)
Perotti -0.011  0.752  1.092  0.156 -1.072 1.114 (7) -1.072 (20)
Ramey -0.139 -0.241 -0.376 -0.961 -2.634 -0.138 (6) -2.660 (19)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-99 F&M -0.011  0.085  0.473  1.378  2.840 2.840 (20) -0.011 (1)
Perotti -0.014  0.054  0.413  1.268  2.758 2.758 (20) -0.014 (1)
Ramey ** -0.024 -0.062 -0.103 -0.096 -0.005 -0.005 (20) -0.108 (9)
54-86 F&M -0.028 -0.039  0.280  1.257  2.822 2.822 (20) -0.104 (3)
Perotti -0.031 -0.069  0.208  1.161  2.686 2.686 (20) -0.123 (3)
Ramey *** -0.024 -0.053 -0.064 -0.029  0.089 0.089 (20) -0.071 (7)
86-99 F&M  0.043  0.711  1.310  1.307  0.942 1.342 (10) 0.043 (1)
Perotti  0.052  0.739  1.366  1.377  1.060 1.421 (10) 0.052 (1)
Ramey  0.052  0.055  0.129  0.121  0.143 0.391 (19) 0.011 (2)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-99 F&M -0.015  0.510  1.910  3.406  6.333 6.333 (20) -0.015 (1)
Perotti -0.030  0.398  1.583  2.842  5.736 5.736 (20) -0.030 (1)
Ramey ***  0.014  0.084  0.218  0.380  0.791 0.791 (20) 0.014 (1)
54-86 F&M -0.049  0.353  1.255  2.111  2.843 2.843 (20) -0.049 (1)
Perotti -0.060  0.260  1.061  1.772  2.321 2.321 (20) -0.060 (1)
Ramey ***  0.033  0.174  0.401  0.685  1.409 1.409 (20) 0.033 (1)
86-99 F&M  0.135  0.486  0.740  0.341  0.237 0.771 (7) 0.135 (1)
Perotti  0.112  0.396  0.557  0.080 -0.447 0.668 (7) -0.450 (19)
Ramey *** -0.073 -0.211 -0.267 -0.702 -2.136 -0.073 (1) -2.136 (20)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-99 F&M  0.031  0.302  0.908  2.179  3.878 3.878 (20) 0.031 (1)
Perotti  0.033  0.317  0.891  2.135  3.870 3.870 (20) 0.033 (1)
Ramey ***  0.015  0.054  0.098  0.146  0.265 0.265 (20) 0.015 (1)
54-86 F&M  0.062  0.602  1.822  3.539  4.718 4.729 (18) 0.062 (1)
Perotti  0.068  0.627  1.825  3.518  4.727 4.800 (18) 0.068 (1)
Ramey ***  0.012  0.050  0.138  0.218  0.378 0.378 (20) 0.012 (1)
86-99 F&M  0.226  0.716  1.048  2.725  0.926 3.004 (14) 0.226 (1)
Perotti  0.250  0.885  1.302  3.021  1.072 3.300 (14) 0.250 (1)
Ramey  0.162  0.475  0.418  0.814  0.559 1.054 (15) 0.162 (1)
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definiton of spending excludes transfers.
Households: Total Currency and Deposits
Households: Total Checkable Deposits and Currency
Households: Total Savings and Time Deposits
Households: Credit Market Insturments, Assets
Table 1.16 Response of Household Assets to Government Spending Shocks. 1954q3 to 1999q1
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1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-99 F&M -0.853  1.199  8.159  12.406  15.671 15.671 (20) -1.162 (2)
Perotti -0.980  0.558  6.799  10.433  12.957 12.970 (19) -1.428 (2)
Ramey *** -0.080 -0.256 -0.348 -0.505 -0.903 -0.080 (1) -0.903 (20)
54-86 F&M -0.997  2.486  14.195  23.692  31.001 31.001 (20) -1.248 (2)
Perotti -1.103  2.037  13.357  22.731  29.664 29.664 (20) -1.448 (2)
Ramey *** -0.056  0.024  0.657  1.087  1.677 1.677 (20) -0.136 (2)
86-99 F&M -1.806 -0.759  14.431  37.701  243.375 243.375 (20) -3.368 (2)
Perotti -2.167 -1.924  13.322  34.488  228.321 228.321 (20) -4.299 (2)
Ramey *** -1.522 -3.215 -2.060 -0.599  22.078 22.078 (20) -3.530 (3)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-99 F&M -0.024  0.251  0.825  1.430  1.713 1.713 (20) -0.024 (1)
Perotti -0.032  0.201  0.709  1.254  1.503 1.503 (20) -0.032 (1)
Ramey *** -0.005 -0.008 -0.001  0.010  0.027 0.029 (19) -0.009 (2)
54-86 F&M -0.018  0.290  0.898  1.622  2.312 2.312 (20) -0.018 (1)
Perotti -0.025  0.263  0.842  1.545  2.227 2.227 (20) -0.025 (1)
Ramey ***  0.002  0.016  0.050  0.088  0.156 0.156 (20) 0.002 (1)
86-99 F&M -0.094 -0.306  1.621  3.107  4.912 4.912 (20) -0.339 (3)
Perotti -0.124 -0.415  1.400  2.688  4.236 4.236 (20) -0.415 (4)
Ramey -0.338 -1.110 -1.852 -2.984 -4.321 -0.338 (1) -4.321 (20)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-99 F&M  0.007  0.107  0.367  0.739  1.662 1.662 (20) 0.007 (1)
Perotti  0.004  0.086  0.319  0.657  1.536 1.536 (20) 0.004 (1)
Ramey *** -0.003 -0.014 -0.030 -0.044 -0.070 -0.003 (1) -0.070 (20)
54-86 F&M  0.004  0.089  0.382  0.813  1.498 1.498 (20) 0.004 (1)
Perotti  0.001  0.070  0.336  0.735  1.378 1.378 (20) 0.001 (1)
Ramey ***  0.001  0.008  0.025  0.050  0.107 0.107 (20) 0.001 (1)
86-99 F&M  0.006  0.040  0.062  0.226  0.669 0.669 (20) 0.006 (1)
Perotti  0.004  0.036  0.049  0.190  0.577 0.577 (20) 0.004 (1)
Ramey -0.016 -0.051 -0.065 -0.124 -0.202 -0.016 (1) -0.202 (20)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-99 F&M -0.160  0.582  1.406  1.489  0.712 1.489 (12) -0.160 (1)
Perotti -0.195  0.414  1.036  0.918  0.021 1.036 (8) -0.195 (1)
Ramey *** -0.008 -0.026 -0.056 -0.088 -0.175 -0.008 (1) -0.175 (20)
54-86 F&M -0.153  0.649  1.806  2.701  3.686 3.686 (20) -0.153 (1)
Perotti -0.173  0.538  1.633  2.462  3.393 3.393 (20) -0.173 (1)
Ramey ***  0.007  0.035  0.091  0.164  0.265 0.265 (20) 0.007 (1)
86-99 F&M -2.234 -8.913 -21.114 -38.088 -42.594 -2.234 (1) -50.331 (18)
Perotti -2.361 -9.272 -21.734 -38.309 -41.165 -2.361 (1) -49.255 (16)
Ramey *** -0.816 -2.894 -5.622 -8.442 -4.731 -0.816 (1) -9.192 (16)
Households: Corporate Equities
Households: Mutual Fund Shares
Households: Life Insurance Assets
Households: Pension Fund Assets
Table 1.16 continued
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definiton of spending excludes transfers.
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1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-99 F&M -0.110 -0.468 -1.523 -3.928 -11.994 -0.110 (1) -11.994 (20)
Perotti -0.117 -0.509 -1.627 -4.213 -12.762 -0.117 (1) -12.762 (20)
Ramey *** -0.014 -0.081 -0.236 -0.439 -0.888 -0.014 (1) -0.888 (20)
54-86 F&M -0.079 -0.570 -1.470 -3.861 -9.217 -0.079 (1) -9.217 (20)
Perotti -0.080 -0.584 -1.554 -3.983 -9.467 -0.080 (1) -9.467 (20)
Ramey *** -0.012 -0.074 -0.212 -0.411 -0.737 -0.012 (1) -0.737 (20)
86-99 F&M -0.206 -1.782 -6.717 -14.976 -33.620 -0.206 (1) -33.620 (20)
Perotti -0.229 -1.905 -7.057 -15.632 -34.157 -0.229 (1) -34.157 (20)
Ramey -0.048 -0.301 -1.167 -1.912 -1.480 -0.048 (1) -2.159 (14)
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Households: Proprietors Equity in Noncorporate Business
Table 1.16 continued….
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definiton of spending excludes transfers.
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.124 -1.070 -4.134 -7.496 -11.804 -0.124 (1) -11.804 (20)
54-07 Perotti -0.176 -1.491 -5.149 -9.272 -14.298 -0.176 (1) -14.298 (20)
P-313 -0.209 -1.599 -5.264 -9.668 -16.594 -0.209 (1) -16.594 (20)
R&R  0.220  0.767  1.434  1.922  2.122 2.159 (19) 0.220 (1)
F&M -0.270 -1.843 -4.916 -6.874 -9.812 -0.270 (1) -9.812 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.340 -2.373 -6.263 -9.060 -13.289 -0.340 (1) -13.289 (20)
P-313 -0.341 -2.136 -5.183 -7.327 -11.800 -0.341 (1) -11.800 (20)
R&R -0.032 -0.135 -0.290 -0.407 -0.646 -0.032 (1) -0.657 (19)
F&M -0.108 -0.877 -0.875  1.216  4.431 4.431 (20) -1.329 (6)
86-07 Perotti -0.016 -0.408 -0.478  1.505  6.548 6.548 (20) -0.911 (6)
P-313 -0.028 -0.234 -0.791  0.094  2.438 2.438 (20) -0.791 (8)
R&R ***  0.575  0.745  0.576  1.346  3.424 3.424 (20) 0.575 (1)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.033 -0.216 -0.556 -0.264  1.406 1.406 (20) -0.556 (8)
54-07 Perotti  0.017 -0.305 -0.754 -0.598  0.910 0.910 (20) -0.757 (10)
P-313  0.012 -0.173 -0.372 -0.156  0.765 0.765 (20) -0.421 (7)
R&R  0.188  0.586  1.198  1.737  2.667 2.667 (20) 0.188 (1)
F&M -0.042 -0.143 -0.465 -0.776 -1.281 -0.042 (1) -1.301 (18)
54-86 Perotti -0.068 -0.305 -0.862 -1.440 -2.273 -0.068 (1) -2.273 (20)
P-313 -0.060 -0.092 -0.291 -0.707 -1.813 -0.060 (1) -1.813 (20)
R&R  0.104  0.286  0.499  0.571  0.310 0.579 (11) 0.104 (1)
F&M  0.093 -0.967 -2.322 -2.446 -0.832 0.093 (1) -2.545 (11)
86-07 Perotti  0.156 -0.573 -1.543 -1.378 -0.450 0.156 (1) -1.543 (8)
P-313  0.188 -0.079 -0.293  0.430  1.319 1.436 (19) -0.323 (7)
R&R ***  0.338  0.719  1.408  2.729  3.549 3.736 (17) 0.338 (1)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.047 -0.647 -2.805 -6.003 -10.545 -0.047 (1) -10.545 (20)
54-07 Perotti -0.080 -0.865 -3.586 -7.215 -12.166 -0.080 (1) -12.166 (20)
P-313 -0.108 -0.750 -2.877 -5.816 -12.626 -0.108 (1) -12.626 (20)
R&R -0.033 -0.189 -0.654 -1.405 -3.012 -0.033 (1) -3.012 (20)
F&M -0.043 -0.875 -2.682 -3.724 -3.081 -0.043 (1) -3.921 (15)
54-86 Perotti -0.092 -1.273 -3.796 -5.696 -5.145 -0.092 (1) -5.899 (14)
P-313 -0.096 -0.917 -2.497 -3.427 -3.129 -0.096 (1) -3.697 (15)
R&R -0.071 -0.426 -0.923 -1.332 -2.445 -0.071 (1) -2.445 (20)
F&M -0.256 -1.364 -2.394 -2.019 -0.742 -0.256 (1) -2.394 (8)
86-07 Perotti -0.284 -1.369 -2.680 -2.275  0.870 0.870 (20) -2.680 (8)
P-313 -0.327 -1.464 -3.210 -3.278 -0.656 -0.327 (1) -3.344 (10)
R&R *** -0.071 -0.564 -1.608 -2.168 -0.846 -0.071 (1) -2.168 (12)
Households: Total Currency and Deposits
Households: Total Checkable Deposits and Currency
Households: Total Savings and Time Deposits
Response to a government revenue shock equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
Table 1.17 Response of Household Assets to Government Revenue Shocks 1954q3 to 2007q1.
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.075 -0.112 -0.735 -2.831 -7.220 0.175 (2) -7.220 (20)
54-07 Perotti  0.083 -0.084 -0.876 -3.223 -7.890 0.198 (2) -7.890 (20)
P-313  0.058 -0.238 -0.990 -2.734 -5.925 0.125 (2) -5.925 (20)
R&R -0.040 -0.228 -0.608 -1.116 -2.141 -0.040 (1) -2.141 (20)
F&M  0.176  0.763  1.474  1.628  1.935 1.935 (20) 0.176 (1)
54-86 Perotti  0.171  0.731  1.141  0.973  1.190 1.190 (20) 0.171 (1)
P-313  0.095  0.274  0.069 -0.194 -0.199 0.296 (3) -0.313 (17)
R&R  0.035  0.138  0.118  0.016  0.026 0.157 (5) -0.035 (15)
F&M -0.032  0.010 -0.845 -4.813 -10.795 0.464 (5) -10.795 (20)
86-07 Perotti -0.268 -1.962 -4.423 -9.504 -15.524 -0.268 (1) -15.524 (20)
P-313 -0.313 -2.774 -6.098 -11.107 -15.214 -0.313 (1) -15.214 (20)
R&R ***  0.018 -1.815 -4.772 -7.864 -9.591 0.018 (1) -9.591 (20)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.976  10.292  18.184  14.861  11.606 18.184 (8) 0.976 (1)
54-07 Perotti  0.532  8.424  15.623  11.053  5.750 15.623 (8) 0.532 (1)
P-313  0.126  7.985  18.213  17.676  18.867 18.867 (20) 0.126 (1)
R&R  0.807  3.764  6.557  7.255  9.817 9.817 (20) 0.807 (1)
F&M -0.732  0.857 -0.844 -4.913 -5.151 0.857 (4) -6.495 (16)
54-86 Perotti -1.405 -2.009 -6.040 -12.388 -15.107 -1.405 (1) -15.415 (18)
P-313 -1.537 -1.943 -4.201 -10.444 -11.871 -1.537 (1) -12.132 (19)
R&R  0.420  0.615  0.185  0.228  0.787 0.979 (18) 0.065 (10)
F&M  8.236  31.969  48.750  58.950  59.075 62.554 (16) 8.236 (1)
86-07 Perotti  8.903  33.377  51.662  61.926  62.629 67.314 (15) 8.903 (1)
P-313  7.177  27.483  41.113  49.039  49.174 52.688 (14) 7.177 (1)
R&R ***  1.991  13.023  27.746  36.893  35.706 39.655 (15) 1.991 (1)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.016  0.311  0.183 -0.669 -2.121 0.409 (6) -2.121 (20)
54-07 Perotti -0.014  0.164 -0.153 -1.179 -2.723 0.194 (5) -2.723 (20)
P-313 -0.027  0.284  0.454 -0.235 -1.214 0.534 (7) -1.214 (20)
R&R  0.065  0.253  0.346  0.283  0.265 0.352 (7) 0.065 (1)
F&M -0.058 -0.097 -0.288 -0.499 -0.232 -0.058 (1) -0.545 (13)
54-86 Perotti -0.098 -0.257 -0.549 -0.878 -0.749 -0.098 (1) -0.961 (15)
P-313 -0.094 -0.064  0.047 -0.074  0.663 0.663 (20) -0.114 (2)
R&R ***  0.026  0.040  0.064  0.125  0.285 0.285 (20) 0.026 (1)
F&M  1.846  8.753  15.014  18.399  17.565 18.820 (16) 1.846 (1)
86-07 Perotti  1.901  8.914  15.452  18.928  17.024 19.314 (13) 1.901 (1)
P-313  1.473  7.574  12.782  15.745  13.681 16.057 (13) 1.473 (1)
R&R ***  0.267  4.023  9.516  12.192  10.670 12.417 (13) 0.267 (1)
Households: Corporate Equities
Households: Mutual Fund Shares
Households: Credit Market Insturments, Assets
Table 17 continued…
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.015  0.078  0.291  0.611  1.500 1.500 (20) 0.015 (1)
54-07 Perotti  0.007  0.024  0.152  0.361  1.084 1.084 (20) 0.001 (2)
P-313  0.002  0.024  0.257  0.602  1.603 1.603 (20) -0.009 (2)
R&R  0.006  0.035  0.117  0.220  0.436 0.436 (20) 0.006 (1)
F&M -0.003 -0.020 -0.104 -0.283 -0.432 -0.003 (1) -0.442 (19)
54-86 Perotti -0.015 -0.095 -0.302 -0.614 -1.006 -0.015 (1) -1.006 (20)
P-313 -0.013 -0.046 -0.111 -0.306 -0.734 -0.013 (1) -0.734 (20)
R&R -0.001 -0.003 -0.018 -0.055 -0.164 -0.001 (1) -0.164 (20)
F&M  0.037 -0.013 -0.066  0.098  0.548 0.548 (20) -0.080 (6)
86-07 Perotti  0.041  0.028  0.071  0.386  1.030 1.030 (20) 0.010 (6)
P-313  0.020 -0.012  0.042  0.355  1.000 1.000 (20) -0.041 (6)
R&R ** -0.007 -0.055 -0.002  0.187  0.563 0.563 (20) -0.062 (3)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.064  1.250  1.143 -0.842 -2.871 1.567 (6) -2.871 (20)
54-07 Perotti -0.033  0.772  0.263 -1.799 -4.290 0.967 (6) -4.290 (20)
P-313 -0.112  0.567  0.699 -0.896 -3.692 0.930 (7) -3.692 (20)
R&R  0.029  0.271  0.422  0.310 -0.107 0.434 (7) -0.107 (20)
F&M -0.188 -0.230 -0.873 -1.757 -1.479 -0.188 (1) -1.814 (15)
54-86 Perotti -0.272 -0.651 -1.701 -2.857 -2.827 -0.272 (1) -3.078 (16)
P-313 -0.273 -0.472 -0.914 -2.038 -2.081 -0.273 (1) -2.217 (14)
R&R ***  0.029 -0.026 -0.065 -0.066 -0.014 0.038 (2) -0.069 (9)
F&M  4.049  13.390  15.118  16.704  14.806 16.788 (13) 4.049 (1)
86-07 Perotti  3.900  12.722  14.259  15.295  14.567 15.910 (18) 3.900 (1)
P-313  2.785  8.290  6.763  5.876  5.530 8.703 (5) 2.785 (1)
R&R -1.140 -1.897 -4.716 -6.352 -10.107 -1.140 (1) -10.107 (20)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.062  0.196 -0.739 -4.065 -14.100 0.196 (4) -14.100 (20)
54-07 Perotti  0.050  0.156 -0.844 -4.185 -14.372 0.156 (4) -14.372 (20)
P-313  0.015  0.030 -0.624 -2.774 -10.764 0.030 (4) -10.764 (20)
R&R -0.144 -0.631 -1.277 -1.995 -3.183 -0.144 (1) -3.183 (20)
F&M  0.013 -0.172 -0.749 -2.077 -5.356 0.013 (1) -5.356 (20)
54-86 Perotti  0.010 -0.202 -0.813 -2.224 -5.358 0.010 (1) -5.358 (20)
P-313  0.059  0.147  0.168 -0.566 -2.845 0.189 (7) -2.845 (20)
R&R *** -0.107 -0.457 -0.798 -0.858 -0.352 -0.107 (1) -0.881 (11)
F&M -0.113  1.094  3.217  3.269 -1.865 3.635 (10) -1.865 (20)
86-07 Perotti -0.031  1.226  3.394  4.393  1.148 4.397 (11) -0.031 (1)
P-313 -0.049  0.740  1.951  2.527 -0.031 2.527 (12) -0.049 (1)
R&R *** -0.087 -0.063  0.019  0.285 -1.049 0.352 (13) -1.049 (20)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Table 1.17 continued…
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
Households: Life Insurance Assets
Households: Pension Fund Assets
Households: Proprietors Equity in Noncorporate Business
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.235 -1.786 -5.572 -8.258 -11.653 -0.235 (1) -11.653 (20)
54-99 Perotti -0.307 -2.314 -6.815 -10.487 -14.677 -0.307 (1) -14.677 (20)
P-313 -0.322 -2.267 -6.713 -10.524 -16.734 -0.322 (1) -16.734 (20)
R&R  0.072  0.225  0.362  0.368  0.028 0.371 (9) 0.028 (20)
F&M -0.260 -1.397 -3.062 -3.552 -4.240 -0.260 (1) -4.240 (20)
54-80 Perotti -0.339 -2.050 -4.717 -6.294 -8.820 -0.339 (1) -8.820 (20)
P-313 -0.318 -1.585 -3.168 -3.940 -6.352 -0.318 (1) -6.352 (20)
R&R *** -0.058 -0.200 -0.236 -0.223 -0.334 -0.058 (1) -0.359 (18)
F&M -0.128  0.897  3.888  8.265  12.844 13.014 (18) -0.140 (2)
80-99 Perotti -0.076  1.157  4.567  8.998  14.088 14.088 (20) -0.076 (1)
P-313 -0.220  0.307  2.298  5.815  9.697 9.767 (19) -0.306 (2)
R&R  0.559  1.247  2.419  2.703  1.902 2.742 (10) 0.559 (1)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.049 -0.432 -1.356 -2.203 -2.616 -0.049 (1) -2.682 (17)
54-99 Perotti -0.053 -0.468 -1.403 -2.303 -2.903 -0.053 (1) -2.908 (19)
P-313 -0.035 -0.178 -0.523 -0.972 -1.604 -0.035 (1) -1.604 (20)
R&R  0.152  0.437  0.883  1.110  0.952 1.146 (13) 0.152 (1)
F&M -0.111 -0.325 -0.688 -0.923 -0.953 -0.111 (1) -0.993 (14)
54-80 Perotti -0.113 -0.384 -0.787 -1.075 -1.192 -0.113 (1) -1.210 (18)
P-313 -0.111 -0.294 -0.577 -0.813 -1.142 -0.111 (1) -1.142 (20)
R&R ***  0.076  0.173  0.284  0.298  0.223 0.320 (10) 0.076 (1)
F&M  0.030 -0.435 -2.067 -3.593 -3.489 0.030 (1) -4.196 (16)
80-99 Perotti  0.043 -0.459 -2.217 -3.808 -3.628 0.043 (1) -4.465 (16)
P-313  0.002 -0.396 -1.823 -3.174 -3.193 0.002 (1) -3.786 (15)
R&R  0.345  0.709  1.038  0.927  0.206 1.075 (9) 0.206 (20)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.067 -0.887 -3.090 -4.872 -5.782 -0.067 (1) -5.782 (20)
54-99 Perotti -0.127 -1.280 -4.067 -6.440 -8.297 -0.127 (1) -8.297 (20)
P-313 -0.143 -1.144 -3.463 -5.624 -8.862 -0.143 (1) -8.862 (20)
R&R -0.085 -0.543 -1.401 -2.218 -3.819 -0.085 (1) -3.819 (20)
F&M -0.026 -0.446 -1.199 -1.367 -0.501 -0.026 (1) -1.367 (12)
54-80 Perotti -0.123 -1.150 -2.816 -3.544 -3.920 -0.123 (1) -3.920 (20)
P-313 -0.127 -0.806 -1.432 -1.167 -0.775 -0.127 (1) -1.432 (8)
R&R *** -0.017 -0.176 -0.364 -0.579 -0.738 -0.017 (1) -0.750 (17)
F&M -0.257 -0.178  1.664  4.947  6.353 6.960 (18) -0.375 (3)
80-99 Perotti -0.241 -0.175  1.524  4.897  6.510 7.011 (17) -0.400 (3)
P-313 -0.271 -0.029  2.212  5.698  7.460 7.841 (17) -0.318 (2)
R&R  0.065  0.034 -0.524 -1.350 -2.894 0.065 (1) -2.894 (20)
Households: Total Currency and Deposits
Households: Total Checkable Deposits and Currency
Households: Total Savings and Time Deposits
Response to a government revenue shock equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
Table 1.18 Response of Household Assets to Government Revenue Shocks 1954q3 to 1999q1. 1980q1
Breakpoint
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.147  0.650  1.412  1.987  2.665 2.665 (20) 0.147 (1)
54-99 Perotti  0.145  0.659  1.267  1.600  2.086 2.086 (20) 0.145 (1)
P-313  0.086  0.313  0.426  0.556  0.945 0.945 (20) 0.086 (1)
R&R -0.060 -0.205 -0.373 -0.596 -1.037 -0.060 (1) -1.037 (20)
F&M  0.225  0.942  2.137  2.591  2.385 2.591 (12) 0.225 (1)
54-80 Perotti  0.189  0.826  1.755  2.191  1.788 2.207 (13) 0.189 (1)
P-313  0.107  0.265  0.580  0.795  0.414 0.831 (11) 0.107 (1)
R&R *** -0.056 -0.156 -0.159 -0.223 -0.365 -0.056 (1) -0.365 (20)
F&M -0.454 -1.468 -1.305 -1.767 -3.056 -0.454 (1) -3.056 (20)
80-99 Perotti -0.498 -1.721 -1.711 -2.206 -3.520 -0.498 (1) -3.520 (20)
P-313 -0.582 -1.999 -2.434 -2.787 -3.989 -0.582 (1) -3.989 (20)
R&R -0.034  0.307  0.486  0.398  0.210 0.610 (10) -0.034 (1)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.146  3.887  6.854  7.433  14.785 14.785 (20) -0.146 (1)
54-99 Perotti -0.772  1.459  2.428 -0.479  4.280 4.280 (20) -1.224 (14)
P-313 -0.995  1.506  5.920  3.924  11.885 11.885 (20) -0.995 (1)
R&R  0.419  1.114  1.606  2.451  4.787 4.787 (20) 0.419 (1)
F&M -0.913  0.159 -0.338 -3.381 -0.444 0.919 (5) -3.384 (13)
54-80 Perotti -1.855 -4.053 -8.091 -12.570 -14.915 -1.855 (1) -14.915 (20)
P-313 -2.153 -4.684 -8.036 -12.070 -14.067 -2.153 (1) -14.280 (19)
R&R *** -0.814 -1.609 -1.271 -1.855 -3.271 -0.814 (1) -3.271 (20)
F&M  3.352  6.521  5.165  11.701  20.897 20.897 (20) 3.352 (1)
80-99 Perotti  3.469  7.048  5.699  13.150  23.723 23.723 (20) 3.469 (1)
P-313  2.498  5.778  6.540  8.042  15.066 15.066 (20) 2.498 (1)
R&R  0.739  0.583 -2.306  3.039  3.920 4.273 (15) -2.513 (7)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.045 -0.029 -0.306 -0.673 -0.704 -0.028 (2) -0.875 (17)
54-99 Perotti -0.084 -0.192 -0.614 -1.218 -1.467 -0.084 (1) -1.586 (18)
P-313 -0.081  0.019  0.046 -0.396 -0.370 0.123 (6) -0.577 (16)
R&R  0.058  0.147  0.169  0.197  0.300 0.300 (20) 0.058 (1)
F&M -0.040 -0.026 -0.068 -0.227 -0.119 -0.023 (5) -0.227 (12)
54-80 Perotti -0.103 -0.293 -0.560 -0.834 -1.036 -0.103 (1) -1.036 (20)
P-313 -0.125 -0.318 -0.490 -0.744 -1.042 -0.125 (1) -1.042 (20)
R&R *** -0.032 -0.100 -0.167 -0.232 -0.271 -0.032 (1) -0.271 (20)
F&M  0.387  1.403  1.244  1.760  3.981 3.981 (20) 0.387 (1)
80-99 Perotti  0.368  1.378  1.188  1.836  4.027 4.027 (20) 0.368 (1)
P-313  0.258  1.214  0.808 -0.013  1.800 1.800 (20) -0.113 (14)
R&R  0.443  0.970  0.808  2.518  3.017 3.356 (16) 0.443 (1)
R&R ***  0.267  4.023  9.516  12.192  10.670 12.417 (13) 0.267 (1)
Households: Credit Market Insturments, Assets
Households: Corporate Equities
Households: Mutual Fund Shares
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
Table 1.18 continued…
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1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.001  0.019  0.057  0.096  0.505 0.505 (20) -0.001 (1)
54-99 Perotti -0.014 -0.049 -0.132 -0.240 -0.178 -0.014 (1) -0.311 (16)
P-313 -0.013 -0.020  0.059  0.183  0.726 0.726 (20) -0.028 (3)
R&R  0.007  0.033  0.075  0.126  0.254 0.254 (20) 0.007 (1)
F&M -0.005 -0.037 -0.064 -0.065  0.237 0.237 (20) -0.078 (10)
54-80 Perotti -0.018 -0.103 -0.191 -0.233 -0.005 -0.005 (20) -0.233 (12)
P-313 -0.021 -0.100 -0.052  0.094  0.485 0.485 (20) -0.100 (4)
R&R *** -0.002 -0.002  0.012  0.020  0.045 0.045 (20) -0.003 (3)
F&M  0.012  0.156  0.403  0.678  1.049 1.049 (20) 0.012 (1)
80-99 Perotti  0.012  0.157  0.417  0.713  1.164 1.164 (20) 0.012 (1)
P-313  0.013  0.158  0.380  0.610  0.954 0.954 (20) 0.013 (1)
R&R  0.002 -0.002 -0.001  0.007  0.009 0.017 (14) -0.005 (3)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.141  0.161 -0.073 -0.237  1.995 1.995 (20) -0.237 (12)
54-99 Perotti -0.249 -0.379 -1.108 -1.737 -0.484 -0.204 (2) -1.808 (13)
P-313 -0.285 -0.489 -0.834 -1.580 -1.143 -0.285 (1) -1.854 (14)
R&R -0.046 -0.157 -0.198 -0.182 -0.183 -0.046 (1) -0.210 (7)
F&M -0.234 -0.448 -0.717 -1.223 -1.138 -0.234 (1) -1.364 (15)
54-80 Perotti -0.384 -1.164 -1.963 -2.815 -3.344 -0.384 (1) -3.344 (20)
P-313 -0.410 -1.306 -1.983 -2.793 -3.551 -0.410 (1) -3.551 (20)
R&R *** -0.120 -0.400 -0.581 -0.722 -1.157 -0.120 (1) -1.157 (20)
F&M  1.847  6.222  9.820  14.364  23.317 23.317 (20) 1.847 (1)
80-99 Perotti  1.935  6.774  10.470  15.759  24.633 24.633 (20) 1.935 (1)
P-313  1.581  5.619  7.843  11.105  19.202 19.202 (20) 1.581 (1)
R&R -0.562 -1.417  0.184  2.498  1.303 2.498 (12) -1.417 (4)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.005 -0.360 -1.555 -3.552 -5.997 0.005 (1) -5.997 (20)
54-99 Perotti  0.005 -0.382 -1.580 -3.425 -6.381 0.005 (1) -6.381 (20)
P-313  0.031 -0.084 -0.531 -1.371 -4.519 0.031 (1) -4.519 (20)
R&R -0.089 -0.447 -0.803 -1.040 -1.286 -0.089 (1) -1.286 (20)
F&M -0.030 -0.411 -1.142 -2.471 -4.398 -0.030 (1) -4.398 (20)
54-80 Perotti -0.005 -0.251 -0.819 -2.294 -4.520 -0.005 (1) -4.520 (20)
P-313  0.008 -0.075 -0.688 -2.061 -4.587 0.017 (2) -4.587 (20)
R&R ***  0.033  0.080  0.080 -0.010 -0.124 0.080 (4) -0.142 (18)
F&M  0.245  2.399  7.120  11.411  17.215 17.215 (20) 0.245 (1)
80-99 Perotti  0.386  3.083  8.999  14.403  20.940 20.940 (20) 0.386 (1)
P-313  0.372  2.471  7.111  11.499  15.900 15.900 (20) 0.372 (1)
R&R -0.017  0.221  0.619  1.205  2.652 2.652 (20) -0.017 (1)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Households: Life Insurance Assets
Table 1.18 continued…
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
Households: Pension Fund Assets
Households: Proprietors Equity in Noncorporate Business
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
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Table 1.19 Response of Mortgages Assets to Government Spending Shocks. 1954q3 to 2007q1
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.078  0.859  3.155  5.686  9.051 9.051 (20) 0.078 (1)
Perotti  0.056  0.690  2.633  4.678  6.921 6.921 (20) 0.056 (1)
Ramey  0.005  0.030  0.079  0.150  0.219 0.219 (20) 0.005 (1)
54-86 F&M  0.028  0.386  1.402  2.785  5.078 5.078 (20) 0.028 (1)
Perotti  0.015  0.313  1.115  2.339  4.211 4.211 (20) 0.015 (1)
Ramey ***  0.010  0.045  0.112  0.181  0.317 0.317 (20) 0.010 (1)
86-07 F&M  0.172  1.037  3.175  6.202  12.578 12.578 (20) 0.172 (1)
Perotti  0.128  0.866  2.692  5.400  10.679 10.679 (20) 0.128 (1)
Ramey * -0.031 -0.101 -0.190 -0.256 -0.409 -0.031 (1) -0.409 (20)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.054  0.553  1.889  3.040  3.646 3.728 (17) 0.054 (1)
Perotti  0.040  0.448  1.566  2.437  2.574 2.770 (17) 0.040 (1)
Ramey ***  0.001  0.007  0.010  0.004 -0.057 0.014 (7) -0.057 (20)
54-86 F&M  0.008  0.193  0.800  1.745  3.114 3.114 (20) 0.008 (1)
Perotti  0.002  0.137  0.655  1.475  2.629 2.629 (20) 0.002 (1)
Ramey ***  0.004  0.008  0.015  0.019  0.045 0.045 (20) 0.004 (1)
86-07 F&M  0.114  0.469  1.441  3.048  6.188 6.188 (20) 0.114 (1)
Perotti  0.077  0.320  1.083  2.467  4.889 4.889 (20) 0.077 (1)
Ramey * -0.034 -0.086 -0.167 -0.228 -0.419 -0.034 (1) -0.419 (20)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Total Mortgages
Home Mortgage 
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definiton of spending includes transfers.
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
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Table 1.20 Response of Mortgages Assets to Government Spending Shocks. 1954q3 to 2007q1. 1980q1 BP.
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.078  0.859  3.155  5.686  9.051 9.051 (20) 0.078 (1)
Perotti  0.056  0.690  2.633  4.678  6.921 6.921 (20) 0.056 (1)
Ramey  0.005  0.030  0.079  0.150  0.219 0.219 (20) 0.005 (1)
54-80 F&M  0.004  0.111  0.182  0.342  0.499 0.518 (18) 0.004 (1)
Perotti -0.008  0.031 -0.013  0.083  0.174 0.244 (18) -0.020 (9)
Ramey  0.007  0.039  0.094  0.139  0.232 0.232 (20) 0.007 (1)
80-07 F&M  0.245  1.951  6.660  13.246  25.115 25.115 (20) 0.245 (1)
Perotti  0.201  1.701  6.032  12.129  23.020 23.020 (20) 0.201 (1)
Ramey * -0.009 -0.034 -0.016  0.093  0.433 0.433 (20) -0.038 (5)
1 qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
54-07 F&M  0.054  0.553  1.889  3.040  3.646 3.728 (17) 0.054 (1)
Perotti  0.040  0.448  1.566  2.437  2.574 2.770 (17) 0.040 (1)
Ramey ***  0.001  0.007  0.010  0.004 -0.057 0.014 (7) -0.057 (20)
54-80 F&M -0.008 -0.037 -0.110  0.006 -0.181 0.021 (14) -0.181 (20)
Perotti -0.015 -0.077 -0.214 -0.176 -0.317 -0.015 (1) -0.317 (20)
Ramey  0.005  0.017  0.012  0.001  0.018 0.022 (6) 0.001 (12)
80-07 F&M  0.208  1.580  4.798  8.970  15.416 15.416 (20) 0.208 (1)
Perotti  0.184  1.419  4.356  8.174  14.149 14.149 (20) 0.184 (1)
Ramey *  0.000  0.016  0.086  0.223  0.497 0.497 (20) 0.000 (1)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Government spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definiton of spending includes transfers.
Total Mortgages
Home Mortgages
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
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Table 1.21 Response of Mortgage Assets to Government Revenue Shocks 1954q3 to 2007q1.
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.027 -0.253 -1.395 -2.878 -3.859 -0.027 (1) -3.932 (17)
54-07 Perotti -0.062 -0.545 -2.290 -4.496 -6.819 -0.062 (1) -6.859 (19)
P-313 -0.138 -0.923 -2.683 -4.545 -7.531 -0.138 (1) -7.531 (20)
R&R  0.014  0.078  0.095  0.109  0.354 0.354 (20) 0.014 (1)
F&M  0.002 -0.345 -1.619 -3.113 -4.304 0.002 (1) -4.329 (19)
54-86 Perotti -0.048 -0.676 -2.509 -4.688 -7.489 -0.048 (1) -7.489 (20)
P-313 -0.087 -0.708 -1.656 -2.521 -3.526 -0.087 (1) -3.537 (19)
R&R *** -0.017 -0.071 -0.198 -0.340 -0.582 -0.017 (1) -0.582 (20)
F&M  0.066  0.041 -0.503 -1.603 -3.799 0.164 (3) -3.799 (20)
86-07 Perotti  0.101  0.375  0.290 -0.315 -1.114 0.515 (7) -1.114 (20)
P-313 -0.005  0.200 -0.226 -1.110 -3.491 0.244 (3) -3.491 (20)
R&R *  0.309  1.651  3.286  4.745  6.511 6.511 (20) 0.309 (1)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.008 -0.137 -0.944 -2.146 -3.362 0.008 (1) -3.362 (20)
54-07 Perotti -0.022 -0.340 -1.586 -3.319 -5.472 -0.022 (1) -5.472 (20)
P-313 -0.086 -0.694 -1.941 -3.340 -5.347 -0.086 (1) -5.347 (20)
R&R  0.023  0.096  0.206  0.273  0.699 0.699 (20) 0.023 (1)
F&M  0.003 -0.216 -1.134 -2.267 -3.547 0.003 (1) -3.547 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.025 -0.405 -1.619 -3.246 -5.333 -0.025 (1) -5.333 (20)
P-313 -0.049 -0.398 -0.886 -1.395 -2.242 -0.049 (1) -2.242 (20)
R&R ***  0.010  0.026 -0.016 -0.117 -0.159 0.026 (4) -0.195 (18)
F&M  0.043 -0.064 -0.742 -1.485 -2.647 0.110 (2) -2.647 (20)
86-07 Perotti  0.084  0.239  0.058 -0.196 -0.087 0.289 (5) -0.196 (12)
P-313 -0.035 -0.048 -0.554 -1.106 -2.315 0.030 (3) -2.315 (20)
R&R *  0.082  0.319  0.480  0.586  1.003 1.003 (20) 0.082 (1)
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Total Mortgage Assets
Home Mortgage Assets
* Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
*** Indicates the narrative shock is exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
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Table 1.22 Response of Mortgage Assets to Government Revenue Shocks 1954q3 to 2007q1. 1980q1 BP.
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M -0.027 -0.253 -1.395 -2.878 -3.859 -0.027 (1) -3.932 (17)
54-07 Perotti -0.062 -0.545 -2.290 -4.496 -6.819 -0.062 (1) -6.859 (19)
P-313 -0.138 -0.923 -2.683 -4.545 -7.531 -0.138 (1) -7.531 (20)
R&R  0.014  0.078  0.095  0.109  0.354 0.354 (20) 0.014 (1)
F&M  0.002 -0.345 -1.619 -3.113 -4.304 0.002 (1) -4.329 (19)
54-86 Perotti -0.048 -0.676 -2.509 -4.688 -7.489 -0.048 (1) -7.489 (20)
P-313 -0.087 -0.708 -1.656 -2.521 -3.526 -0.087 (1) -3.537 (19)
R&R *** -0.017 -0.071 -0.198 -0.340 -0.582 -0.017 (1) -0.582 (20)
F&M  0.066  0.041 -0.503 -1.603 -3.799 0.164 (3) -3.799 (20)
86-07 Perotti  0.101  0.375  0.290 -0.315 -1.114 0.515 (7) -1.114 (20)
P-313 -0.005  0.200 -0.226 -1.110 -3.491 0.244 (3) -3.491 (20)
R&R *  0.309  1.651  3.286  4.745  6.511 6.511 (20) 0.309 (1)
1qrt 4 qrt 8 qrt 12 qrt 20 qrt max min
F&M  0.008 -0.137 -0.944 -2.146 -3.362 0.008 (1) -3.362 (20)
54-07 Perotti -0.022 -0.340 -1.586 -3.319 -5.472 -0.022 (1) -5.472 (20)
P-313 -0.086 -0.694 -1.941 -3.340 -5.347 -0.086 (1) -5.347 (20)
R&R  0.023  0.096  0.206  0.273  0.699 0.699 (20) 0.023 (1)
F&M  0.003 -0.216 -1.134 -2.267 -3.547 0.003 (1) -3.547 (20)
54-86 Perotti -0.025 -0.405 -1.619 -3.246 -5.333 -0.025 (1) -5.333 (20)
P-313 -0.049 -0.398 -0.886 -1.395 -2.242 -0.049 (1) -2.242 (20)
R&R ***  0.010  0.026 -0.016 -0.117 -0.159 0.026 (4) -0.195 (18)
F&M  0.043 -0.064 -0.742 -1.485 -2.647 0.110 (2) -2.647 (20)
86-07 Perotti  0.084  0.239  0.058 -0.196 -0.087 0.289 (5) -0.196 (12)
P-313 -0.035 -0.048 -0.554 -1.106 -2.315 0.030 (3) -2.315 (20)
R&R *  0.082  0.319  0.480  0.586  1.003 1.003 (20) 0.082 (1)
*** Indicates the Narrative Shock is Exogenous for at least 12 Quarters (see text)
Underlined values indicate that zero falls outside of the 95th and 5th quantile
Bolded values indicate that zero lies outside of the 97.5th and 2.5th quantile
Government revenue shocks equal to 1% of GDP. Definition of revenue includes transfers.
Total Mortgage Assets
Home Mortgage Assets
* Indicates the Narrative Shock is Exogenous for at least 4 quarters (see text)
** Indicates the Narrative Shock is Exogenous for at least 8 quarters (see text)
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2. Rethinking the World War II Economy: The Welfare Effects of
World War II and the Role of Household Demand in the Postwar
Boom
Abstract: This essay emphasizes the importance of savings during World War II and during the
immediate postwar “reconversion”. The unprecedented shock to savings, ultimately, is where
most of the wartime and postwar boom manifested. There has been a debate among economic
historians about how the savings shock of the war revealed itself during reconversion. In
particular, savings rates reverted back to historical averages and were not negative after the war
as one would expect if reconversion was driven by “pent up demand”. This paper demonstrates
that national product accounting conventions obscure the role of housing in the postwar boom. If
one treats housing as a consumer durable good instead of an investment good, negative savings
rates appear as early as 1947. This demonstrates that there was no need to “spend down” savings
to satisfy pent-up demand. Instead, the postwar housing boom meant that households acquired
long term assets and liabilities that did not necessitate the immediate drawdown of the liquid
assets accumulated during the war.
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2.1 Introduction
For several decades after the end of WWII it was taken for granted that the war itself
produced a prosperity never before seen and that the postwar conversion from a military to a
civilian economy also produced a boom. The wartime boom was driven by the massive
government demand for munitions and other war supplies and the postwar boom was driven by
the “pent-up” demand for civilian goods, driven by a bloated stock of liquid assets acquired
during the war. The war prosperity and the postwar success were taken as triumphs of
Keynesian economics and as validation of the role of an interventionist government. This
triumph carried Keynesian economics forward for several decades.
The postwar story went largely unexamined and unchallenged for several decades. Then
in the 1990s, two alternate explanations for the post war boom emerged. Robert Higgs published
a series of papers—later published as a book—challenging what he called the “orthodox view”
of the 1940s. Richard K. Vedder and Lowell E. Gallaway also challenged the popular narrative
of a postwar boom fueled by consumption in their book Out of Work. This “revisionist view”
challenged the orthodox view on a number of fronts. Vedder and Gallaway (V&G) for instance
challenged the Keynesian explanation of the postwar boom by pointing out that aggregate
demand fell by $20 billion in 1946. They then argue that there was no increase in aggregate
demand until after the reconversion process had been largely completed10. Robert Higgs focused
on measurement errors of GNP and provided alternate estimations of consumption to make the
case that welfare declined during the war, contrary to the orthodox story of a wartime boom. As
10 This paper focuses almost exclusively on chapter 8 of Vedder Richard K. and Gallaway, Lowell E. Out of
Work. New York University Press, 1993.
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well, Higgs points to the fact that there was no major draw-down of “liquid assets” such as
treasury bonds and bank deposits after the war11.
While the revisionists make important contributions to the understanding of the 1940s
economy, their explanations of the causes of the postwar boom run into a number of problems.
First, the analysis of welfare during the war focuses on a very narrow measure of welfare.
Second, they provide no real credible alternative explanations nor do they fully assess the pent-
up demand argument. V&G posit a decline in real wages as the driving force behind the postwar
success but do not frame this decline in wages in broader historical context. Higgs suggests that
it was the return of “regime certainty” of a more business friendly Truman administration.
Unfortunately, political confidence arguments are essentially impossible to test. To the extent
that Higgs’s arguments can be assessed, he does not consider some of the nuances associated
with national income and product accounting and this leads him to draw some errant
conclusions.
This paper challenges many of the revisionist views and largely resurrects the basics of
the orthodox view. Disposable income rises unambiguously during the war even if consumption
does not. My interpretation of the data leaves the theory that consumption drove the postwar
reconversion remains largely intact. However, I also revise the orthodox story. The “pool” of
savings (more accurately, the stock of wealth) did not need to be “spent down” after the war.
11 Higgs, Robert Depression, War and Cold War. Oxford University press, New York 2006 p106-108.
Depression… is a collection of revised essays; the citation for the original articles are as follows: Higgs, Robert
From Central Planning to the Market: The American Transition, 1945-1947 Journal of Economic History 59(3) page
607-609. Higgs, Robert. “Wartime Socialization of Investment: A Reassessment of U.S. Capital Formation in the
1940s” The Journal of Economic History 64.2 (June 2004): 500-519. Higgs, Robert. “Wartime Prosperity? A
Reassessment of the U.S. Economy in the 1409s” The Journal of Economic History 52.1 (Mar. 1992) 41-60
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Instead households were able to hold onto their liquid savings while taking on longer term
liabilities to finance many of their purchases. In particular, housing offers a striking example of
what savings would have been like after the war if households were not able to take advantage of
financing options.
2.2 National Accounting and Welfare
Higgs’s “Wartime Prosperity” seeks to dispel the myth that the war years themselves
were boom years. The thrust of his argument is that, even though there was a significant
increase in real consumption12 between 1939 and 1941, the subsequent slight decline over the
years 1943-1945 from its 1941 peak represents a net welfare loss over the war. However, Higgs
does not give himself a strong enough foundation with consumption figures to make welfare
arguments. Yes, people were worse off on average in 1944 than they were in 1941, but what
about compared to 1938? Is continuous growth of consumption an unambiguous predicate for
increased welfare over such a short period? This section will explore some other objections to
the attempt to use NIPA when making welfare statements. After roundly suggesting NIPA is not
solid ground from which to make welfare statements, I will commit the same sin as Higgs and
present an alternative view of NIPA accounting that suggests welfare did increase—on the home
front—throughout the war.
First, however, it should be noted that Higgs’ work serves as an important reminder of
aspects of the second world war that have largely been buried. As we drift further away from the
actual lived reality of the war we are in danger of the mythology of our “justified” and “good”
war permanently replacing the ambiguity of the war as it was experienced.
12 The complexity of what “real” means during the war will be discussed below.
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The first episode of the three part documentary “The Living Dead” by the documentarian
Adam Curtis traces the process by which both the Germans and Americans dealt with the
aftermath of the war. The Germans repressed their memory of the war while the Americans,
through the trials at Nuremberg, wrote the narrative of the “just war” America had fought13. Yet,
for the soldiers actually fighting it the war was simply one of survival. William O'Neill in his
book A Democracy at War describes American Soldiers:
Nearly all accepted that having been attacked the United States must defend itself and
that they owed the nation a duty. However, for most, winning the war was not the
primary goal but rather a means to their real end, to be discharged from the Army. Thus,
when soldiers were asked to name the Four Freedoms for which they were ostensibly at
war, only 13 percent could remember as many as three. This low level of interest in the
war's purpose might seem odd today, considering that it is remembered as the one all
Americans believed in. Yet, it could not have been otherwise, given the strength of the
isolationism earlier and the fact that America seemed to have so little at stake as far as
most of its citizens were concerned14.
The costs of the war borne by soldiers went beyond death and physical injury. Anywhere from
10% to one half of all soldiers suffered from some kind of mental health issue after the war.
These were not simply costs incurred during the course of the war but, like blindness or missing
limbs, were injuries that soldiers lived with for a long time. Even those soldiers without a mental
health diagnosis were haunted by the war. Paul Fussell, a member of the 103rd infantry division,
best articulates what lurked behind the domestic experience both of war and reconversion:
There is clearly a conflict between individual memory and 'the big story' as you might put
it which was constructed out of a number of actual and very useful events. One was the
trials at Nuremberg which established the version of the 'good war' which is certainly
true. On the other hand, chipping away at that constantly is this secret version of the war
which is possessed by the actual combat veterans … The problem is that the experience
of the veterans is depressing, pessimistic about human nature. It shows how awful
human beings can be and how they can be brought to enjoy murder and enjoy depriving
other people of their limbs and their lives. Now that's very bad news for human nature
and it conflicts with the optimistic news which is conveyed by the official picture.15
13 “On the Desperate Edge of Now” The Living Dead. Adam Curtis. BBC Two, May 30, 1995
14 O'Neill, William L. A Democracy At War. New York, The Free Press 1993 p325
15 Curtis “On The Desperate Edge of Now” minute 39
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These costs, of course, are real and immeasurable. Many men spent European winters in
foxholes or were starved and tortured in Japanese prison camps. The real horror of the war, in
which the men fighting were not motivated by any particular ideological force, has largely been
whitewashed from the history of the war and deserves the attention Professor Higgs pays to it.
However, when discussing the welfare effects of the war, one must make a distinction
between the experience of combat soldiers and the experience at home. On the home front the
war was a distant affair where men disappeared and usually returned. It is this contact point
where the war made itself felt on the home front and where welfare analysis using economic
aggregates—even limiting analysis to the home front—is at best futile and at worst is obscene. It
is the lot of economists, unfortunately, to risk this obscenity. For example, economists debate
such things as the success of the Nazi's instinctual grasp of Keynesian economic policy in a
vacuum populated only by productivity measures and coal shipments. Professor Higgs’
reminder of the real—ultimately noneconomic—cost of the war is important. However, when
economists debate whether or not welfare increased during the war the only question they can
successfully ask and answer is: did the war increase output and/or income? Was there an
improvement in material wellbeing?
With this in mind, one must parse Dr. Higgs’ welfare argument into two categories, those
aspects of wellbeing that can be measured and those that are more abstract and complex. While
Professor Higgs’ abstract welfare costs are important they are also notable for what is absent:
there is no discussion of the immaterial positive welfare effects of the war which are as
impossible to pin down as the suffering of combat. After all, what were the welfare effects of the
defeat of global fascism? Such a question is more the purview of philosophers and as
economists it seems safer to stay within the confines of less complex questions. Economists can
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count out lashes and mark the time on the cross, but that is far from being able to say anything
interesting about the resurrection of the Holy Ghost.
So, let’s look at our numbers: it has been a long standing critique that national income
and product accounting (NIPA) does not adequately capture welfare even if it has largely
become shorthand for welfare. Flaws in it have often been pointed out and other indexes of
welfare (no more adequate), such as the Genuine Progress Indicator and the Gini coefficient,
have been developed try to capture the determinants of welfare that NIPA misses.
To make his welfare argument Professor Higgs relies largely on tracing Simon Kuznets’
search for a proper definition of a final good. The key founding father of the US NIPA, Kuznets
initially conceived of it as a system in which goods are categorized as final goods based on
whether the good is “welfare enhancing”. It does not seem relevant to the modern economist
exactly what the “purpose” of economic activity is. To a modern economist it fundamentally
does not matter, from a GDP standpoint, whether a society has decided to produce Big Macs or
B-17 bombers. However, for the modern economist National Product is not a welfare
measurement; it is a measure of production and capacity. Higgs, following Kuznets, objects to
the “mechanical” way in which the BEA calculates national product. While there is, as with any
statistical measure, some inescapable level of arbitrary judgments in NIPA, the Kuznets/Higgs
methodology would magnify any such problem by imposing a layer of value judgments over
what constitutes “legitimate” economic activity and what does not. It is a far safer endeavor to
strictly view final goods as the end point of production/purchase instead of categorizing final
goods in terms of their “intent”.
Kuznets, who very much advocated the provision of consumption goods as the basis for
NIPA, frames welfare in terms of a society’s “goal”. However, even he admits that the provision
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of consumer goods is not the only metric by which a society can judge its welfare16. Kuznets
finds himself forced into philosophical proposition that he cannot resolve. The need to
distinguish national output that captures “net” welfare contributions to the economy forces one to
parse out economic activity among several different “use” categories.
However, the need to make NIPA a kind of welfare accounting is the point where
Kuznets gets into trouble—as he acknowledges. Munitions in particular underscore the difficult
philosophical problem for advocates of NIPA as a welfare calculation. The difficulty here is
obvious. Munitions underscore the level or arbitrariness inherent in the welfare conception of
NIPA. Any benefit of munitions is real, but ultimately indirect. As well, many consumer goods
produced in peace time are diverted to war use. A pair of pants produces welfare, whether they
are worn by civilian or a conscript. This philosophical conundrum leads Kuznets a “dual use”
accounting. However, there nothing that limits this arbitrary classification to two uses. In the
limit, this system would become infinitely complex as more uses are considered. Higgs goes so
far as to admit in a footnote that Kuznets himself found defending this conception of national
product untenable17.
Kuznets’s search for a “meaning” to NIPA is understandable. In 1945, at the time
“…Wartime” was written, the American welfare state was in its infancy. WWII confronted
Kuznets with an important instance of government muddling the relationship between welfare
and private consumption. Kuznet’s inability to read the changing economic situation in the face
of such a profound secular shift while NPIA estimates were just beginning to be formulated is
understandable and probably deserves little more than a footnote. For Higgs, however, the
16 Simon Kuznets National Product in Wartime page 26.
17 Higgs, Robert “Wartime Prosperity? A reassessment of the U.S. Economy in the 1940s” The Journal of
Economy History 52(1) page 47.
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consumption-as-welfare conception of NIPA is the lynchpin of his argument18. The goal of
NIPA estimates, however, should not, and cannot be to offer a direct measurement of welfare.
Instead, product accounting can only be what it is, the measure of final goods and services from
which we can attempt to make indirect assessments of welfare. What’s more, if one is to have a
discussion about welfare during a period such as WWII in which product estimates are greatly
distorted then national income should be the metric used.
Professor Higgs is very correct to point out that price controls and quotas have a
distorting effect on National Product. It is extremely difficult to get an accurate national product
estimate during wartime, particularly during a war with such large macroeconomic effects.
Furthermore, it is correct that it becomes impossible to evaluate investment as a discounted
Kuznetzian measure of future welfare when a large portion of investment’s purpose is purely
“disposable”. This ambiguity of course makes it easier to make the “negative welfare” case
since, for the war period, one can then ignore investment all together. This narrows, along
national product grounds, the scope of welfare measurement to simple consumption.
However, there is a way to avoid many of the problems of national product accounting.
Income, as the other side of the NIPA coin, offers an attractive way to think about national
accounting that avoids many of the ambiguities of national product. Firstly, price distortions are
largely minimized when one is trying to measure income versus measuring output. While price
distortions do make dollar values a poor proxy for physical quantity, income is received in dollar
amounts and so no translation from dollar values to physical quantities must take place. For
instance, in the case of relative prices changes, if price controls (or changes in market prices)
18 While the objections Higgs has raised seem overly “philosophical” and lean too hard on the idea that
government spending is simply illegitimate for the purposes discussed here he does make a very valid point along
these lines in chapter 4 of Depression… . As he points out, any explanation of postwar prosperity that
incorporates a significant role for the capital stock built during the war is built on very shaky ground.
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make the price of a loaf of bread $1 one year and $100 the next year, this will certainly cause
problems in trying to assess bakery output, especially if bread is only one of many goods.
However, $1 or $100 dollars is still income for the baker. Likewise, much has been made of the
costs associated with price controls for consumers. Though price controls that keep prices
“unnaturally” low do represent a redistribution from producers to consumers most of the
distortions caused by price controls and quotas are distortions in consumer and producer surplus.
NIPA accounting, however, is not a measure of producer and consumer surplus; it is a measure
of output at current prices. Under a price control regime there remains the problem of
measuring price changes and inflation by using either the Consumer Price Index or the NIPA.
One major distortion to NIPA accounting, both on the production and income side caused by
price controls and quotas that should be noted, is the presence of a black market, which biases
output and income measures downward since it is a range of economic activity that does not get
recorded. It is not clear, however, how dramatic these distortions are. Hugh Rockoff’s Drastic
Measures makes it clear that much black market activity was done “on the books” though it may
not have been recorded at actual prices19. Strictly off the books activity does not seem overly
prevalent, though apparently meat was an exception.
Most important in using disposable income instead of private national product is the role
of savings in disposable income. The welfare effect of savings has been largely ignored or
dismissed20. Professor Higgs goes so far as to dismiss the increase in savings improperly as
19 Rockoff, Hugh. Drastic Measures: A History of Wage and Price Controls in the United States. Cambridge
University Press, New York, 1984.
20 Modern scholarship on home front welfare best summarized by four papers: Robert Higgs’s work is cited above,
Rockoff, Hugh The United States: From Ploughshares to Swords in The Economics of World War II: Six Great powers
in International Comparison edited by Mark Harrison. Cambridge University Press, New York 1998. And Vatter,
Harold. The Material Status of the U. S. Civilian Consume in World War II: The Question of Guns or Butter in The
Sinews of War edited by Geofery T. Mills and Hugh Rockoff. Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa: 1993.
Edelstein, Michael War and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century in The Cambridge Economic History of
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“money illusion”21. It may be that economists are used to simply thinking of savings as deferred
utility which has no role to play in “current period” utility. However, after the decade of the
depression, the security of increased savings alone must have been utility producing. What’s
more, the wartime prosperity mirrored the boom of the 20s but with a more equitable distribution
of income; savings, therefore were more equitably distributed. It seems safe to assume that more
equitably distributed savings means a higher marginal welfare for each aggregate dollar saved
compared with the previous boom.
That most other economic historians have ignored savings as generating welfare may be
in the way savings is conceptualized theoretically. Economists tend to think of savings as
deferring consumption, which is what ultimately produces utility. However, it may make sense
to think of non-myopic agents as gaining utility from accumulating savings. Forward looking
agents can, perhaps, gain utility from the anticipation of purchases. John Blum, whose “carnival
of consumption”22 line Higgs takes out of context suggests:
Full employment and prosperity, for their part, permitted Americans, in spite of wartime
restrictions, to begin to buy many of the necessities and some of the comforts they had
been unable to afford for so long, and to dream about buying others once an end of war
made those again available [emphasis added]23.
the United States edited by Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E Gallman. Of the four only the Vatter article offers
savings data in the consideration of welfare and only in passing.
21 Higgs, Depression,War, and Cold War page 74.
22 John Blum V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II. New York: Harcort Brace
Jovanovich, 1976 p 90. Quoted in Higgs Depression, War and Cold War p 75. At the risk of sounding pedantic the
full sentence reads: “Within the arsenal of democracy, government expenditures made business vastly better than
usual and restored the circumstances for a carnival of consumption, which newly prosperous businessmen and
their friends ordinarily attributed to the blessings of free private enterprise.” It is not quite clear what Blum is
trying to say in this sentence. It seems that it can be read in two ways. Most convincingly it seems Blum has
sacrificed clarity for alliteration and that what he means is a “carnival of investment”, what Hugh Rockoff has
compared to a gold rush (Rockoff 1996). He may also be talking about the prosperity and consumption of the
wealthy which, because of a greater access to resources, was not as curtailed as that of average Americans. At any
rate, it is clear from the rest of Blum's book that he is very aware of the ambiguity that is at the heart of the debate
this paper is concerned with.
23 Blum V was for Victory p. 90
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Savings may also be a better measure of differed or potential consumption than
investment. As was suggested above, investment is a heavily distorted measure of future
consumption during wartime. Since much physical investment in munitions production was
destined to be shut down or reconverted it is easy to dismiss such investment. Furthermore, there
were serious measurement issues. The WWII distortions in investment are significant, leading
Robert Gordon to declare that $45 billion dollars in wartime investment had been “mislaid”24.
Savings, however, is computed more simply as the residual of income minus taxes and
consumption. While this presents some problems, detailed below, it is appealing for its
simplicity. Further, there is no need to distinguish between private savings held in government
securities and in private assets. Savings is simply differed consumption for the individual.
Furthermore, it is a better measure of future consumption in that it is not necessarily tied to the
productive capacity of a resident country. The reconversion from public to private was quick
and relatively painless. Had it not, savers would have had the option of consuming foreign
goods and making foreign investment. In this sense investment does not measure full potential
future welfare as well as savings.
There is a second way in which income is a useful way of discussing the gains from what
can be term the “disposable investment” of the war such as factories only used to build munitions
shut down after the war and barracks and bases abandoned after the war. Measurement issues
aside, investment as only legitimized—as Higgs does—as future consumption is too tight a
straightjacket for the accounting concept. Firms will only seek to purchase or create new
physical capital if the income received makes it worthwhile, regardless of whether the
investment horizon is ten years or ten months. These short term disposable investments were
24 Robert Gordon “$45 Billlion Dollars of Investment has been Mislaid” The American Economic Review
(59) page 221-238
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still income for workers and owners. The physical wealth generated by these projects was short
lived, but it does not mean it is appropriate to assume that wealth was destroyed by their creation
and subsequent abandonment. These investment projects were undertaken under the assumption
that principle and interest would be earned. After munitions projects ran their course the firms
who built them simply moved onto other projects with fatter pockets. Here, then, accumulated
savings offers a clearer picture of the creation of wealth than the accumulation of discarded,
temporary investment.
One final point about disposable income: As a measure of welfare it is different than the
Kuznets net national product (NNP) accounting conception use by Friedman and Schwartz and
Robert Higgs. The Kuznets NNP measure explicitly factors out government spending as a
source of welfare. Disposable income on the other hand only rules out government spending as
welfare enhancing insofar as it is financed by taxation. In the spirit of Jean-Baptiste Say I treat
one man’s savings as another man’s income even if that savings is filtered through the
government. Why one would count government spending financed by borrowing as welfare
enhancing and government spending finances by taxation as not is admittedly somewhat
arbitrary. One leans on the point that the decision to lend to the government is one made more
freely than the decision to pay taxes.
There is also a third factor to take into consideration about the increase in disposable
income during the war: the role of money printing as a source of real economic activity. In
theory, the Freidman and Schwartz deflator in particular claims to eliminate the distortionary
effect of money printing, which should only find its way into prices. If one believes that there
was no net increase in real output generated by money printing during the war because the
increase in the money supply is only reflected in an increase in prices, then the various deflators
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used here estimate with varying accuracy the net effect of the money supply on the economy,
which is strictly through prices.
However, if one believes money can have an effect on the real economy, either inherently
or because the price controls imposed during the war had some effect in untethering prices and
the money supply then real disposable income includes both the increase in income from
government spending financed by borrowing and by printing money.
However, the use of disposable income as opposed to NNP reflects a philosophical
difference in what the government is capable of doing. The NNP assumes that government
cannot add to welfare. The disposable income measure allows for government spending to
directly increase net welfare through borrowing and/or money printing. Measuring WWII
spending with NNP will assume total crowding out, while the disposable income measure
ignores it. It is not obvious, though that crowding out is a serious issue during the war from an
income perspective since it is irrelevant whether a dollar of income is earned from the private
sector or government as is discussed above. In the disposable income case, government income
is simply substituted for private income. Here, then, disposable income is simply a measure of
net income which factors out transfers back to the government which is still treated as thrown
into the sea.
So let’s look at disposable income. In Figure 2.1 we see that an increase in income and
consumption in nominal terms is unambiguous throughout the war. While some of the
subjective assessment of prosperity probably came from what is commonly called money
illusion, the real variables, presented in Figure 2.2 illustrates that there is a very clear increase in
real incomes as well25. Figure 2.2 shows real disposable income presented with two different
deflators: the deflator preferred by Robert Higgs, the Friedman and Schwartz adjusted NNP
25 A discussion on the various deflators used in this paper is left for the appendix.
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deflator and an alternative deflator proposed by Hugh Rockoff26. Both deflators show the slight
decline in aggregate consumption during the war. This flattening out of real disposable income
came after the passing of The Revenue Act of 1942 which imposed a broad based income tax for
the first time. In 1939 income taxes accounted for $2.2 billion of federal revenue, by 1945
income taxes accounted for over $35 billion.27
The results here are consistent with the per capita trend found by Higgs. It should be
mentioned, however, that the per capita adjustment used by Higgs included military personal.
Edelstein28 argues that if one excludes military personnel per capita consumption increases. I
have avoided the controversy of whether per capita figures should be based on total population
or civilian population. Population growth was not significant during this time, so the aggregate
captures the trend adequately. The use of GDP figures, however, does include compensation of
military personal. Edelstein (2000) compares the NNP to GNP figures and finds that the gross
measure show as growth of consumption five percentage points greater from 1930-1939 to 1942-
194529. Again, though, the trend during the war is the same across measures.
Both deflators also show that disposable income continues to increase until 1944, when it
begins to fall. It is interesting to note that disposable income begins to fall in 1945, the same time
that measured consumption begins to increase. The decline in disposable income in 1945 is
consistent with the increase in the unemployment rate from 1.10% in the first quarter of 1945 to
3.66% in the fourth quarter30. The rise in the unemployment rate and the decline in GNP that
begins in the third quarter of 1945 is consistent with the “winding down” of the war after VE day
26Table 1 is also included, showing real income and consumption for several other deflators discussed in the
appendix
27 Brownlee, Elliot W. Federal Taxation in America Cambridge University Press 2004. page 115
28 Friedman & Schwartz, Monetary Trends. Page 107 and Edelstein, War and the American Economy page 399.
29 Edelstein, page 400.
30 Vedder and Gallaway 1997p164-165, table 8.4
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in May of 1945. The two deflators tell very different stories. Using the Friedman and Schwartz
deflator real disposable income jumps up in 1946 by 5.7% although unemployment remains
around 4%. This seems implausible and is likely due to the construction of the F&S deflator
rather than indicative of actual macroeconomic conditions. The Rockoff deflator shows
disposable income falling through 1946 and bouncing back.
There is also another way of assessing the “real” impact of savings on households and to
assess the claim that the increased welfare from savings was due to “money illusion”.
Commonly, money illusion refers to an increase in income or wealth that is offset by increases in
the price level, so that one feels richer while maintaining the same real income. Obviously,
Higgs means something slightly different, though the basic point being implied remains the
same. Higgs argues that consumption did not increase during the war and, as well, that savings
also did not increase in a “real” sense. His focus, as has been discussed has been on investment
as the metric by which to judge real savings. Figure 2.3, on the other hand, offers a simple
illustration of the “real” impact of the war on savings. It shows the ratio of five and ten years of
accumulated saving to current disposable income. The point being made by the graph is clear.
As a percentage of nominal income, accumulated savings was at least twice as high coming out
of the war as it was during any other time afterwards. This is not simply the illusion of greater
wealth. The war represented an unprecedented shock to the financial stock of wealth. It may be
that—as Higgs claims—this was not a shock to physical wealth, but it unambiguously
represented a shock to the stock of wealth for individuals and households. It placed consumers
in a more sound financial position.
This wealth, however, took the form mainly of government bonds. Surely, the increased
borrowing by the government meant having to pay back the debt in the future.
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Obviously, if we start from a position of pure Ricardian equivalence then the savings
produced by the war is clearly not new for those that hold treasuries. Instead, those treasury
bonds simply represent a future tax burden. In which case, a perfectly forward looking rational
agent simply treats his savings as being directly off set. Ignoring the fact that the war itself
clearly produced a structural break and that the WWII postwar era was unlike any other along
virtually every possible economic dimension. What would a backward looking rational agent
forecast as his expected tax burden once the war was over? His main points of reference would
of course be the debt burden after the Civil War and—probably more prominently—the debt
burden after World War I. Surprisingly, had this agent forecast according to previous war
experience he would have predicted a significantly lighter postwar tax burden than was actually
experienced. Figure 2.4 shows indexes for Federal Debt in the three major postwar periods.
There are a couple of things to keep in mind when looking at this graph. First, the relative debt
burden was much higher coming out of WWII. Debt was around 120% of GDP, whereas after
the Civil War and WWI debt peaked at around 35-45% of GDP. Secondly, while there is a clear
“peak” in war debt immediately after the end of the first two conflicts (1866 and 1919
respectively) “war” debt continues to grow after WWII until 1950, which is the point of
reference for the graph. It is not until 1951 when debt levels fall slightly, only to pick up again
in 1952.
That having been said, there is clearly a concerted effort on behalf of the Federal
Government to retire debt after the first two conflicts. The downward trajectory of the post
WWI debt repayment is clearly interrupted by the Great Depression, though there is clear
dedication to retiring the debt before the depression hits. The response after WWII is very
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different, obviously. There is no attempt to repay debt, and in fact, the absolute debt continues to
grow in the post war era.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the changes in both federal government expenditures and the
changes in revenue, respectively. It is clear from these two graphs that government expenditures
in both periods fall to a relative level lower than revenues do after the reference wars31. A
backwards looking agent would assume that after WWII revenue would fall, but not as much as
expenditures and accumulated debt would be paid back that way. Unambiguously, then,
expectations would be for the tax burden to fall but not by as much as “government services”
defined loosely. The reality was actually quite different. Expenditures and revenue both
continued to increase in absolute terms after the WWII debt peak.
The level of debt, revenue, and expenditures is of primary concern in a Ricardian world.
Figures 2.7 shows the postwar tax burden relative to GDP both in actuality and under the
counterfactuals of the two previous wars. Clearly, before WWII the public finance goal was to
gradually (over the span of about ten years) lower taxes to about five percent of GDP. After
WWII, of course, this changes dramatically. Revenue actually increases as a proportion of GDP.
I have included a fourth line in Figures 2.7 that shows government revenue minus military
spending for the post WWII period. This can be taken as a proxy for what would have been the
tax burden had the US followed its pattern of rapid demobilization and shrinking of military
expenditures once a major conflict had subsided. There are two things of note: First, tax
revenue is permanently higher post WWII32 even excluding military spending. Secondly, there
is not a rapid demobilization as seen after the previous two wars. For all intents and purposes,
military spending remains at around 10% of GDP permanently.
31 I have truncated the actual WWII spending series to keep the graph readable, needless to say both series
continue to increase along essentially the same path.
32 It should be pointed out for clarity that this measure of revenue does not include social security transfer taxes.
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So, extrapolating from history would give a sense that while the tax burden would be
heavier than “normal” for about a decade after the war was over it would be lighter than it was
during the war. While worries over taxation and debt to GDP ratios never seem wholly
grounded in rational analysis, it would seem that the rationally backward looking agent would
understand that the debt burden after WWII was large but they could expect that Washington
would move to slowly roll back the tax increases of the war while make provisions for retiring
the war debt. So, it would seem, for the rationally backwards looking agent, there would have
been little anxiety over the repayment of the debt the federal government accrued during the war.
Thusly, they could look forward to spending their incomes on cars and washing machines instead
of paying taxes.
2.3 The Postwar Reconversion
Higgs also presents an alternative explanation for the success of the postwar
reconversion33. This explanation largely parallels that of V&G’s Out of Work but with a
different emphasis. V&G, like Higgs, place the success of the postwar reconversion on the
supply side. For V&G the reconversion was successful because of a decline in real wages after
the war which spurred hiring bringing about the postwar boom. For Higgs the success was due
to a post-Roosevelt/post-New Deal return to “regime certainty” that had a similar effect in
encouraging firms to expand. This in turn produced the investment boom that smoothed the
transition from a war economy back to a private economy.
V&G’s argument centers around a series of regressions run as a counter-factuals.
V&G’s estimate “simple consumption functions” 34 for the pre war 1929-1941 and postwar 1948-
33Higgs Depression, War and Cold War p 101-123 originally printed in Higgs, Robert “From Central Planning to the
Market: The American Transition, 1945-1947.” Journal of Economic History, 59(3) (1999): p600-623.
34 Out of Work, page 166
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1970, the interpretation of which results rest on the assumption that during the 1945-1947 period
the consumption-income relationship of other periods should have held. The analysis is
problematic, however. With lags in the reconversion process it would be impossible to observe
anything but a distortion in the consumption/income ratio over the period 1945-1947 because to
varying degrees consumption goods were still not available. This is a limitation on how quickly
“pent-up” demand could be satisfied. V&G take the decline in consumption as a share of income
as evidence that the success of reconversion could not have been a demand side phenomenon
rather than as evidence of the fact that the adjustment period was not instantaneous.
What V&G ignore is that the pressure of pent-up demand cannot be released until there is
the productive capacity to do so. They cite that savings was still around 11% 35of disposable
income in the first quarter of 1946, although they do not cite where that particular number came
from. Using the 1949 Statistical Supplement to the Survey of Current Business, I get slightly
different numbers. In the first quarter of 1946 savings was 8.6% of disposable income.
However, a year earlier the savings rate was around 22.3% of disposable income36. Had the
savings rates remained the same in 1946, consumption would have been 18.5 billion dollars
lower. The savings rate continued to drop throughout 1945 and 1946. However, because
consumption’s share of income did not rise above “normal” levels for the century until the
second quarter of 1947 (when savings dropped below one half of one percent for the single
quarter) V&G take this as evidence that consumption played no role in reconversion.
The increase in consumption’s share of income was concurrent with the reconversion
process and consumers could only shift from savings to consumption as quickly as the supply
side of the economy was shifted from military to civilian uses. It is very easy to tell a story
35 Ibid page 166
36 US Department of Commerce “1949 Statistical Supplement to the Survey of Current Business” 1949 page
7.
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contrary to V&G’s reading of the data: That consumption’s share of income returned to “normal”
levels in 1947 suggests that reconversion was over and that consumption and savings had
returned to more or less historical proportions, at significantly higher levels than those in 1939.
Consumption’s share of income alone, however, does not tell us anything about what drove the
reconversion process.
More convincingly, what seems to have happened is that, after very low savings rates
during the Great Depression the war offered the chance to replenish the aggregate stock of
wealth. It seems very difficult—assuming the investment dearth story—to claim that investment
was the engine of reconversion given the relative lags of consumption and investment.
Consumers could have easily dipped into their pool of wealth at any moment and may very well
have been driven to buy consumer durables as quickly as possible given the inflation of the war
years and of 1946. Investment, on the other hand, would have required both the assessment of
demand and the building and conversion of factories from wartime uses. No matter how short
the reconversion process, it would have had to be much longer than reaching under the mattress
or writing a check. It seems reasonable to describe the reconversion process as consumers with
the pedal to the floor while business slowly changed gears, only reaching highway speeds in
early 1947. Not, as V&G and Higgs would describe it, the other way around.
It is also possible to object to V&G’s reading of the postwar reconversion on their own
grounds. Essentially V&G argue that workers were willing to take a smaller share of GDP in
wages, what they call the ‘adjusted real wage”37. This adjusted real wage is simply money
income as a proportion of personal income and/or GDP. They use the decline in the adjusted real
wage as driving the success of the postwar adjustment. That is, they posit that it was workers
37 Out of Work 169-172
96
willingness to take a smaller share of output and not an increase in Keynesian aggregate demand
that was at the root of postwar boom.
Table 2.2 extends V&G’s adjusted real wage calculations back to 193538. I have also
added “non wage compensation” which V&G exclude from their calculation but is included in
the source material.39 “Supplements to wages and salaries” as it is labeled in the 1949 Statistical
Supplement are comprised of things such as payments to public and private pension plans and
unemployment insurance. While it is somewhat ambiguous how these things function as income
for workers they unambiguously increased per employee costs, which would change the demand
for labor and business decisions by firms based on the cost of labor all else being equal.
V&G claim that the data overwhelmingly suggests a decline in the real wage after the
war ended relative to the war.40 This proposition alone is not controversial. It is to be expected
that with the influx of workers into the economy that wages should fall and unemployment
would rise. That the declining wages played a central role in the adjustment out of a war
economy is considerably less obvious. V&G’s analysis does not answer a few central questions.
The first is why the lower adjusted real wage did not spur on a stronger recovery during the 30s.
The annual estimates of the adjusted real wage presented in Table 2.2 show that, in only for the
narrowest measure--wages and salaries divided by total personal income--is V&G’s adjusted real
wage lower than it was during the great depression. For all other measures of the adjusted real
wage, compensation is higher after the war than it was during the great depression. Furthermore,
more than the entire adjustment to earned wages and salaries from 1945 to 1946 takes place in
the decline in military wages and salaries paid out. Wages and salaries paid by the military drop
38 V&G’s presentation of the data (their table 8.6) is quarterly and only from 1945-1948. Page 170 of Out of Work
39 See table 2 for source.
40 Out of Work page 168-169
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from $22.6 billion in 1945 to $8 billion in 194641. Total compensation in the whole economy
only falls by $6.1 billion from 1945 to 1946. This implies that private employment was
absorbing many discharged soldiers. Presumably the discharged soldiers were heading into
higher paying jobs. This statistic also sheds some light on the idea of the recession in 1946.
While it is difficult to pin down what happened in 1946, the overall decline in wage
compensation, even ignoring the increased unemployment would have looked much like a
recession to those experiencing the reconversion transition. Finally, during the immediate
postwar era V&G’s unemployment and adjusted real wage model under predicts the
unemployment rate in 1947 and 194842 which suggests that their adjusted real wage implies more
flexibility in the economy than was present.
One insight of Higgs and V&G’s is important. It is rather curious that there was no
aggregate dissaving throughout the reconversion process43. Here Higgs is right in that the
“orthodox story”--that the postwar boom was fueled by a drawing down of liquid savings to
finance consumption--is wrong. His explanation of a “business led” recovery is wanting,
however.
First, and most important, is a technical problem with the way the NIPA treats a very
important part of the postwar boom: it's somewhat curious way of measuring housing.
Effectively, the postwar housing boom is missing from the aggregate consumption data. Since
residential housing is counted in investment the business investment boom much touted by Higgs
is dramatically overstated44. While counting housing in investment spending makes a certain
41 1949 Statistical Supplement, Survey of Current Business page 6
42 Out of Work Figure 3.2 page 36-37
43 For Robert Higgs' breakdown of savings after the war see Higgs, Robert. From Central Planning to the
Market: The American Transition 1945-1947 p. 607-609
44 From Central Planning to the Market… page 609
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amount of logical and accounting sense in the NIPA, for the purposes of identifying the cause of
the postwar boom, housing is dramatically misplaced in the national accounts.
Table 2.3 shows the percentage of GDP devoted to private nonresidential investment, and
residential housing. Two things stand out. First, both investment and residential housing pick up
in 1946. While fixed investment more or less doubles with the end of the war, residential
investment increased fourfold. By 1947 while nominal fixed investment is only a little less than
triple what it was in 1945, residential housing is over seven times what it was in 1945.
Nonresidential investment peaks as a share of GDP in 1948 and then declines slightly for the
following two years. It never reaches the 1929 peak of 10.51%. If nonresidential investment is
taken as a share of “private” GDP45 the 1948 peak of 11.71% surpasses the 1929 peak of
11.56%. However, the share of private GDP taken by non-housing investment declines in 1949
and 1950 as it does in total GDP. On the other hand, residential investment increases steadily
through the end of the decade. By 1950 residential housing comprised more than 42% of total
investment spending--a peak never exceeded in the postwar period46.
Another major problem with the NIPA measurement of housing is that while NIPA does
include a proxy for the costs of owning a house such as its “imputed rent” measure it does not
include the purchase costs, such as down payments, in consumption at the time the houses are
purchased. On the national income side, savings is calculated as a residual and not directly
measured. Since savings is simply what is left over from income after consumption and taxes
have been deducted from total income these purchases costs are implicitly calculated in savings.
This leads to a distortion in what people feel they are saving and how it is registered in the NIPA
45 Private GDP is simply GDP less federal, state and local government spending. I present this measure here
to keep the argument on both Higgs’s and V&G’s terms.
46 In fact, according to the BEA national accounts estimates, outside of the 40s and 50s boom residential
housing was only greater than 36% of total private investment spending in three years: 1963, 2004 and 2005. The
average share of residential housing as a share of private investment after WWII is around 30%.
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accounts. Furthermore, there was a large portion of home buyers who did not have to pay down
payments at all. VA guaranteed loans, provided for under the GI Bill, required no down
payment.
It may make sense to explain this more formally and concretely. The high savings rates
during the war meant that households built up a large stock of wealth. The traditional Keynesian
story goes that households after the war “spent down” their stock of wealth. This should have
meant that savings rates should have been negative in the immediate postwar era as households
consumed more than their incomes, financing the consumption beyond their incomes out of their
pool of wealth. Higgs, as well as V&G, are right to point out that we saw no such negative
savings rates. What they miss, however, is that a significant portion of household purchases
were made in such a way that did not necessitate the spending down of wealth. There are three
basic scenarios in the purchasing of a house. First is the way a returning serviceman would have
bought a house: with no down payment. The GI, in this scenario is taking on an asset (his new
house) but also a corresponding liability (his mortgage) that directly offsets his asset. In a
second scenario, the household pays cash-in-full for their house. Here, the household is simply
exchanging a liquid asset, say a checking account or cash kept under the mattress, for a less
liquid asset. Finally, the traditional way we think of buying a house is a mixture of the two. A
household’s down payment becomes equity in their new home, while the additional value of the
house above the down payment is offset by the leverage the household has taken on.
A counterfactual is useful: Let’s assume that new residential construction over the
immediate postwar period remained unchanged in volume and value, but with the absence of
financing and as though housing were recorded in NIPA as any other consumer durable. Table
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1.4 shows hypothetical savings rates under this counterfactual which drop even more rapidly
after the war and becomes negative from 1947 through the rest of the decade.
The point here is that the savings rate did not go negative after the war because—from
both an output and income accounting perspective—buying a house is “consumption neutral”.
2.4 Regime Certainty After The War
Higgs’s preferred explanation for the corporate business boom was the return of a more
business friendly environment after the death of FDR and Truman’s subsequent replacement of
the “long haired boys”—the hippie bureaucrats of the New Deal—with more business friendly
men. If, in fact, this brought comfort to the business world, it was a tent in a tornado. Truman,
as a member of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, helped germinate an original—
stronger—version of what eventually became the Full Employment Act of 1946. As well,
Truman unveiled his 21 point program in his first postwar speech to congress. This speech
included, among other things, an endorsement of the original Full Employment Act bill, an
extension and increase in the minimum wage and the extension of wartime price controls. In
part these price controls were asked for because a tax cut passed in late 1945 had been expected
to increase inflationary pressure and increase the federal budget deficit. Compounding the
problem, the fed had been rendered powerless to curb inflation because it continued to be
committed to supporting treasury prices and low interest rates47.
The decontrolling of prices was a long and messy process lasting through November of
1946. First, wages were decontrolled in August of 1945 but profits were not until January 1946.
More fundamentally, the original Emergency Price Control Act was set to expire at the end of
June 1946. Debate over the issues concerning the renewal of the bill such as which industries
47 This brief summary comes from Campagna, Anothony U.S. National Economic Policy 1917-1985.Prager. New
York, NY. 1987
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should be granted an exemption lasted until June 28th when Truman vetoed the bill. The
Emergency Price Control Act expired and prices floated freely. A new bill was put forth that
was signed into law on July 25th which would have ended price control by the end of June 1947.
With the new bill some industries were exempt and others were not. In October, Truman
announced a speeding up of the end of controls and in mid-November had eliminated all price
controls except for rent, sugar and rice48. How this squares with Higgs’s regime certainty theory
is unclear since the price at which goods can be sold must be most business' primary concern.
While the Executive Branch maybe have become more business friendly, democracy itself had
not.
What’s more, 1946 saw labor disruptions on a scale never seen before or since. General
Motors, for instance, found itself mired in a 113 day strike—from November 1945 to March
1946--of 200,000 workers49. Labor unrest had been building throughout the war, but it reached
its peak in 1946. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show strike activity and its costs to business over the
reconversion period in two different ways. Finally, what is perhaps the signature “business
friendly” legislation of the reconversion period, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, was passed over
Truman’s veto. If anything, it was the republican majority —a first since 1928—and its coalition
with southern democrats that should be viewed as instituting the kind of regime certainty that
Higgs is suggesting business would be comfortable with. However, the new house and senate
did not convene until early 1947.
2.5 Conclusion
While the “revisionist” economic historians have made important contributions to the
discussion of both welfare during WWII and the causes of the postwar boom their alternate
48Rockoff (1984) . p98-108
49Campagna p204.
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explanations and characterizations of the 1940s do not adequately capture the dynamics of the
time. In summary, supply side explanations do not hold up, both because of a mis-measuring of
the postwar investment boom and a mischaracterization of the source of the postwar boom.
Furthermore, the pent-up demand explanation is not convincingly disproved since both Higgs
and Vedder and Gallaway fail to demonstrate what the transmission mechanism is from the
supply side to increased aggregate demand.
A more nuanced view of NIPA seems to come down on the side of both increased
“welfare”, as measured by income accounting during the war and the “pent-up demand”
explanation of the postwar boom. The orthodox story however, needs to be adjusted somewhat.
It is not that consumers ate up war savings but that there was a change in both the supply and
demand for financing household purchases. It was that the increase of savings meant an
increased availability of loans, most importantly, the availability of mortgages.
It is also important to note that government also played an important role in the postwar
reconversion even if one discounts basic Keynesian mechanisms. Most relevant to the argument
in this paper is the role government played in the housing market. Mortgages exploded after the
war. The amount of mortgages under $20,000 exploded from $4.6 billion in 1944 to $16.1
billion in 1950. In 1950 34% of mortgages were insured through the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (VA). Government
insurance and guarantees peaked as a percentage of new mortgages in 1947 when they covered
36% of mortgages50. What’s more, the FHA--a New Deal creation--essentially allowed for the
creation of a more widespread mortgage market by demonstrating the viability of thesem
506th Annual Report Housing and Home Finance Agency 1953Table 10
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mortgages51. For better or worse, the modern mortgage market found a use for the pool of
savings to satisfy the pent-up demand for homes and families that the war had created and it was
directed there largely by government policy.
51 Quigley, John M. Federal Credit and Insurance Programs: Housing “Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review”
July/August 2006
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2A Appendix A: A short note on WWII deflators
It may be useful to summarize the results and methodologies of the various WWII
deflators. The need for the deflators arises from the problem price controls, shortages, and black
markets posed for gaging the actual “quantity” of output and/or consumption. The deflators are
of two types, either a substitute for the BEA’s GNP deflator or as a substitute for the BLS’s CPI.
The deflators are listed in Table 2A.2. The consequent estimates of real total and real “private”
output are included in Tables 2A.3 and 2A.4. The Friedman and Schwartz (F&S) deflator is
based on Simon Kuznets’s measure of Net National Product (NNP). This is somewhat
problematic, since most modern authors use Gross National Product when discussing the war.
That distortion aside, their alternate WWII deflator is very thoughtfully constructed. In a
nutshell, F&S construct (log) trends of output and the implicit price deflator for 1914-194252.
They then calculate the responses of the implicit price deflator to deviations of output from trend.
They use this to construct an “adjustment factor” used to predict the price level response to the
(very large) deviations of output from trend during the war.
The F&S deflator produces a curious result for the year 1946. According to their deflator
inflation in 1946 was around 1.0%. They argue that the official price increase in 1946 is largely
due to the lifting of price controls during that year and the “unveiling of price controls that had
52 F&S do test to see if postwar data (1947-1965) is of any use in constructing a baseline for the war years. They
find that the 1914-1942 period provides a better fit. This is not surprising since for 1948 on F&S are using BEA data
that has been awkwardly adjusted to conform to the Kuznets series.
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occurred earlier”53. That is, consumers were already paying the 1946 market price, but they were
paying it in terms of black market costs broadly defined and other inefficiencies created by
government controls. By lifting price controls in 1946 the Truman administration was simply
shifting the way in which these market prices were articulated. This does not seem entirely
plausible. Both the inflation of 194754 and the fact that in 1946 personal consumption increased
from 70.5% to 81%55 of disposable income suggest that postwar demand pressure itself was
playing an inflationary role. Given a slackening but not elimination of shortages and controls the
jump in consumption suggests that the “first movers” who could produce new or more goods for
the market had significant pricing power.
Other price deflators include the deflator constructed by Simon Kuznets. His deflator is
simply the implicit (unadjusted for the war years) deflator from his estimates of net national
product (1869-1947). It is included here because the F&S deflator is based on Kuznets’s
calculations. As mentioned before most modern work that discussed adjustment to output
deflators focus on GNP but take the (NNP based) F&S deflator as the baseline adjustment to the
official data. Consequently, the F&S deflator is the same as the Kuznets deflator for the
“unadjusted years” (all years except 1942-1946). Again, it is important to bear in mind that the
Kuznets priced deflator (and, again, the F&S deflator) is a deflator of net as opposed to gross
national product. However, despite this problem, following F&S and Mills and Rockoff I treat
the Kuznets NNP deflator as the baseline for all unadjusted years in both Table 2.1 of the main
53 Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1963: p 558.
54 The CPI increased by over 14% December 1946 to December 1947
55 Vatter, Harold. The Material Status of the U. S. Civilian Consume in World War II: The Question of Guns or Butter
in The Sinews of War edited by Geofery T. Mills and Hugh Rockoff. Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa: 1993.
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text and the relevant appendix tables. Table 2A.1 shows Kuznets NNP measure56 against the
measures of national income and gross domestic product found in the Historical Statistics of the
United States, Millennial Edition.
V&G57 regress the official GNP deflator for the years 1916-1941 on M2, and measures of
interest rates, railroad volume, and employment. They then extrapolate their trend through 1948.
Mills and Rockoff58 estimate the a GNP deflator using the relationship between the price level
and a combination of aggregate income and wages reasoning that inflationary pressure is more
linked to wages (buying power) than it is to output.
There are several flaws with these deflators. First, it is not clear that using a GNP
deflator captures cost of living, particularly in the wartime economy where so much of output is
absorbed by munitions. Furthermore, the natural channels of income to prices are distorted. In
normal times, any income and/or money supply increases that do not go into consumption,
adding pressure to prices of consumption goods, go into private investment in the form of
savings and put pressure on the prices of investment goods. During the war consumption was
curtailed and much of excess savings went directly to the government to be spent on munitions.
In the munitions industry, there were not only (more easily enforced) price controls, but prices
were coming down as the industry became more productive. However, the most serious problem
with these various deflators is that they all implicitly assume that price controls had no effect.
F&S and V&G assume that the prewar relationship between the money supply and income held
56 As reported in Freidman and Schwartz’s Monetary Trends in the United States and the United Kingdom
57 Vedder and Galloway (1993) p 155.
58 Mills, Geofrey and Hugh Rockoff. “Compliance with Price Controls in the United States and the United Kingdom
During World War II” Journal of Economic History 47.1 (1987) p 197-213
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throughout the war. Price controls, however, are instituted precisely to break down the
relationship between money and income59.
Rockoff and Rockoff and Mills offer a smattering of evidence that suggest that between
a quarter and a third of Americans had contact with the black market during the war60. This is
likely to overstate the extent of the black market since not all transactions carried out by these
people were black market transactions. Scarcity and quality deterioration were most likely more
widespread, but it seems unlikely that all goods in all markets suffered from these problems.
With these objections in mind, a more preferable way to approach the deflator issue is
though the CPI. The CPI dispenses entirely with the distortions caused by including munitions
in GNP, though that is also true when using the NNP. As well, a consumption deflator is more
appropriate to the debate about welfare and consumption during the war. Harold Vatter61 and
Hugh Rockoff62 offer alternative deflators based on the CPI. Vatter simply assumes that the true
CPI measured price level in 1945 was the price level of 1947 and then smooths out the price
increases across years. Hugh Rockoff, has constructed an alternate CPI deflator based on the
findings of the wartime Mitchell Committee, which attempted to calculate the amount by which
the official CPI was understating inflation.
There are some limitations to using the Mitchell Committee findings. First the committee
only looked at prices in 1942 and 1943. As well, the distortions were purposefully understated
since the committee thought that labor should have to bear some of the costs of the war and so it
was careful in how it constructed the index that would be the basis for wage increases63. As
59 Rockoff (1984)
60 Ibid. p163-174; Rockoff and Mills (1987) p199
61 Vatter (1993)
62 Rockoff, Hugh (1978). Indirect Price Increases and Real Wages During World War II. Explorations in Economic
History. Vol 15 p407-420
63 Rockoff (1984) p169
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well, the committee avoided issues of uptrading (the disappearance of low cost goods), and
certain kinds of quality deterioration and shortages. Rockoff adjusts his measure of inflation
accordingly. The Rockoff deflator is included in Figure 2.2 alongside the F&S deflator because
it offers the most distinct alternative adjustment of nominal income. The Rockoff measure is an
attractive “microeconomic” alternative to the “macroeconomic” method of F&S.
Tables 2A.1 and 2A.2 have been added for reference. Table 2A.1 shows real GDP64 as
measured by the several deflators mentioned above. Table 2A.2 shows private GDP (C+I+NX).
It should be pointed out that the Rockoff and Vatter deflators are somewhat less suited as
deflators of GDP since they are based on the CPI and are intended as consumption deflators.
64 Historical Statstics of the United States, Table Ca74
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Residential
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Savings Rate % of
GDP
1940 101.3 3.5 4.5 4.44% 1 0.99%
1941 126.7 4.1 11.7 9.23% 7.6 6.00%
1942 161.8 2.2 29 17.92% 26.8 16.56%
1943 198.4 1.4 34.9 17.59% 33.5 16.89%
1944 219.7 1.4 39 17.75% 37.6 17.11%
1945 223 1.7 31.4 14.08% 29.7 13.32%
1946 222.3 7.8 16.3 7.33% 8.5 3.82%
1947 244.4 12.1 8.1 3.31% -4 -1.64%
1948 269.6 15.6 14.1 5.23% -1.5 -0.56%
1949 267.7 14.6 10 3.74% -4.6 -1.72%
1950 294.3 20.5 15.2 5.16% -5.3 -1.80%
Source: Historical Statistics of the US, Millennial Edition. Series Ca74, Ca99 Ca73
Table 2.4: Savings Rates Adjusted For Residential Investment As Consumption
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Table 2A.1: Alternative Measures of Income/Output 1937-1950
Year NNP* National Income** GDP***
1937 75.070 74 91.9
1938 68.793 67.4 86.1
1939 73.848 72.9 92
1940 81.843 81.1 101.3
1941 98.958 104.3 126.7
1942 129.275 137.6 161.8
1943 157.521 171.4 198.4
1944 171.503 184.3 219.7
1945 172.983 183.3 223
1946 160.465 182.3 222.3
1947 179.049 198.6 244.4
1948 198.360 223.3 269.6
1949 196.072 216.7 267.7
1950 217.891 241 294.3
GDP: Hist Stats Ca74
NNP: F&S TABLE 4.2; National Income: Historical Stats Ca20;
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Year
CPI
(unadjusted)
BEA GDP
Deflator
(unadjusted)
BEA PCE
Deflator
(unadjusted)
Kuznets
Deflator
F&S
Deflator
Rockoff
CPI
V&G
Deflator
M&R
Deflator Vatter CPI
1937 103.6 103.2 103.3 101.3 103.60
1938 101.4 101.3 101.0 100.8 101.44
1939 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.01
1940 100.7 100.9 100.8 101.1 100.73
1941 105.8 107.4 107.1 109.1 105.96
1942 117.3 116.3 120.4 123.4 120.44 117.9 123.4 117.34
1943 124.5 122.8 131.5 134.5 139.6 135.27 130.6 137.7 130.24
1944 126.6 125.8 139.0 138.5 150.0 145.85 143.7 145.6 144.54
1945 129.5 129.0 144.6 142.6 156.6 155.48 159.4 149.8 160.35
1946 140.3 143.8 154.7 152.8 158.0 169.10 169.8 155.3 177.98
1947 160.4 159.8 170.4 170.8 170.8 174.18 176.3 --
1948 173.4 168.9 180.0 182.0 183.97 180.7 --
1949 171.2 168.8 178.6 179.6 -- --
1950 173.4 170.1 180.8 183.1 -- --
Table 2A.2: Various Deflators and Price Indicies 1937-1948. 1939=100
Source: See Text and Table A1. CPI: Historical Stats Melenial Edition. Series Cc1. BEA data from Table 1.1.4.
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1937
71.81
90.77
90.77
90.77
90.77
90.77
88.70
1938
68.32
-4.85%
85.46
-5.85%
85.46
-5.85%
85.46
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85.46
-5.85%
85.46
-5.85%
84.87
-4.32%
1939
73.50
7.58%
92.00
7.65%
92.00
7.65%
92.00
7.65%
92.00
7.65%
92.00
7.65%
91.99
8.39%
1940
78.18
6.37%
100.17
8.88%
100.17
8.88%
100.17
8.88%
100.17
8.88%
100.17
8.88%
100.57
9.32%
1941
89.73
14.78%
116.11
15.90%
116.11
15.90%
116.11
15.90%
116.11
15.90%
116.11
15.90%
119.57
18.89%
1942
107.08
19.33%
131.14
12.95%
131.14
12.95%
131.14
12.95%
137.29
18.24%
134.34
15.70%
137.88
15.32%
1943
125.36
17.07%
142.09
8.35%
147.51
12.48%
144.11
9.88%
151.89
10.64%
146.67
9.18%
152.34
10.48%
1944
133.74
6.69%
146.47
3.08%
158.63
7.54%
150.87
4.69%
152.87
0.65%
150.63
2.70%
152.00
-0.22%
1945
134.71
0.72%
142.38
-2.79%
156.35
-1.43%
148.91
-1.29%
139.87
-8.50%
143.43
-4.78%
139.07
-8.51%
1946
125.47
-6.86%
140.70
-1.18%
145.53
-6.92%
143.19
-3.85%
130.92
-6.40%
131.46
-8.34%
124.90
-10.19%
1947
121.09
-3.49%
143.13
1.73%
143.13
-1.65%
143.13
-0.04%
138.59
5.86%
140.31
6.73%
--
--
1948
125.90
3.98%
148.13
3.49%
148.13
3.49%
148.13
3.49%
149.19
7.65%
146.55
4.44%
--
--
Total44-47
-9.46%
-2.28%
-9.77%
-5.13%
-9.34%
-6.85%
--
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1937
75.94
78.02
78.02
78.02
78.02
78.02
76.25
1938
71.59
-5.73%
71.76
-8.03%
71.76
-8.03%
71.76
-8.03%
71.76
-8.03%
71.76
-8.03%
71.27
-6.53%
1939
77.30
7.97%
77.30
7.72%
77.30
7.72%
77.30
7.72%
77.30
7.72%
77.30
7.72%
77.30
8.45%
1940
85.20
10.22%
85.24
10.27%
85.24
10.27%
85.24
10.27%
85.24
10.27%
85.24
10.27%
85.58
10.72%
1941
92.70
8.80%
91.73
7.61%
91.73
7.61%
91.73
7.61%
91.73
7.61%
91.73
7.61%
94.47
10.39%
1942
85.01
-8.30%
80.24
-12.52%
80.24
-12.52%
80.24
-12.52%
84.00
-8.42%
82.20
-10.39%
84.37
-10.69%
1943
84.22
-0.92%
74.06
-7.71%
76.88
-4.19%
75.10
-6.40%
79.16
-5.76%
76.44
-7.00%
79.39
-5.89%
1944
90.86
7.88%
76.13
2.81%
82.45
7.26%
78.42
4.42%
79.46
0.38%
78.30
2.43%
79.01
-0.48%
1945
100.61
10.73%
82.87
8.85%
91.01
10.37%
86.68
10.53%
81.41
2.46%
83.48
6.62%
80.95
2.45%
1946
126.37
25.61%
115.44
39.30%
119.41
31.21%
117.49
35.55%
107.42
31.94%
107.87
29.21%
102.48
26.61%
1947
130.09
2.94%
121.87
5.57%
121.87
2.06%
121.87
3.73%
118.01
9.85%
119.47
10.76%
--
--
1948
135.49
4.15%
125.77
3.20%
125.77
3.20%
125.77
3.20%
126.67
7.34%
124.42
4.14%
--
--
Total44-47
43.18%
60.08%
47.81%
55.41%
48.51%
52.59%
--
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3. The Effects of Military Spending During World War Two on
the Balance Sheet of Commercial Banks in the Immediate Post
War Period 1945-1955.
Abstract: Using banking data which covers state level Commercial Bank balance sheets this
paper explores the impact of war spending on selected assets of the commercial banking system.
I find that there is a—both economic and statistically—significant negative effect of war
spending on total assets, mortgage lending, and commercial, industrial and agricultural loans
made by commercial banks throughout the war and until 1949. War spending has the opposite—
but still significant—effect on commercial banking lending from 1950 to 1955. In per capita
terms, the effect is much smaller, but the directional effects are essentially the same. I also find
that war spending had no effect on agricultural lending, either through farm mortgage lending by
commercial banks or through the Farm Credit Administration.
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3.1 Introduction
Given what a huge economic event that World War II was, it is peculiar that the
immediate postwar period, known as reconversion, remains largely unexplored territory.
However, given that it represents a period that is too short for reasonable time series estimation,
as well, it is a period perched at that point just before the explosion of systematic data gathering
which could yield the necessary time series, cross sections and panels, its “frontier-like” quality
becomes more understandable. The whole endeavor has the feel of searching for the lost city of
Atlantis. The modern researcher, tantalized by tales of an extraordinary and unique moment in
time is unfortunately left with agonizingly little evidence. What scant evidence does exist
implies that the war may not have had any effect in the economy at all (Cullen and Fishback
(2006), Higgs (2006). Further exacerbating these challenges, in the era of modern econometrics,
interest has centered on investigating the effect of monetary policy. The war however was a
fiscal event largely ignored by the generation of economics who came of age during the Great
Inflation. The debate thus remains in a kind of suspension in which we are arguing about
whether the island is in the Atlantic Ocean or the Mediterranean Sea, far adrift from even the
beginning of serious archeological work to uncover what is of real interest. Of course, what
makes the discussion of reconversion so much more frustrating is that it does not come to us
through the fog of 2,500 years of myth, but rather happened within living memory. This paper is
an attempt to get us closer to an understanding of the role WWII played in the golden age of the
American economy. Using banking data culled from the underutilized Federal Reserve’s “All
Bank Statistics,” which covers state level Commercial Bank balance sheet for the period 1896-
1955, I explore the impact of war spending on selected assets of the commercial banking system.
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I argue that, contrary to accepted ideas about this period, for the full population of the
continental 48 states and the District Of Columbia there exists a—both economically and
statistically—significant negative effect of war spending on total assets, mortgage lending and
commercial, industrial and agricultural loans made by commercial banks throughout the war
until 1949. War spending then has the opposite—but still significant—effect on commercial
banking lending in the five following years, from 1950 to 1955. In per capita terms, the effect is
much smaller, but the directional effects are essentially the same. I also find that war spending
had no effect on agricultural lending, either through farm mortgage lending by commercial banks
or through the Farm Credit Administration (FCA). Some results are different if Michigan and
New York—the two main outliers—are excluded. Removing New York from the population
leads to a clear net increase in total and per capita bank assets after 1944. Removing either New
York of Michigan has significant effects on mortgage and business lending per capita.
Excluding either state results in no association of war spending with mortgage and business
lending. However, it is extremely difficult to extract anything from the per capita data in
general, so it is not clear what to make of the fact that Michigan and New York are driving the
per capita results.
Some clarification of what “reconversion” means is useful here. Reconversion usually
applies to the immediate postwar period, usually wedged in between the end of the war—VJ day
was on August 15, 1945—and the 1948/49 recession, which began in November of 1948. The
main question that has confounded researchers about reconversion is why did the transition from
a wartime economy to a peacetime economy proceed so smoothly? Output fell by only a small
amount in 1946, and real private GDP (GDP less government spending) increased by more than
30 percent. While this is part of what is explored here, I ask a slightly different question. What
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does the period narrowly defined as reconversion look like put into the wider context of the
immediate postwar?
The pre-1950 results in general are difficult to unpack because of the myriad of
confounding issues inherent in trying to parse out the effect of war spending on the economy. In
particular, the relationship of bank assets and war spending per capita highlight the problems
with trying to interoperate the wartime/postwar aggregate data. While problems with measuring
the price level are present in this paper65, the real problem of interpreting the results comes from
the massive migration of workers and soldiers during the war and then the corresponding
massive in-migration after the war. These population shifts last through the end of the 1940s.
While population increases rapidly through the end of the 40s, asset acquisition stalls
after 1946. However it then once again rapidly picks up after the 1948/49 recession. This is
consistent with the narrative of the post war put forth by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz
(1963), who point out that after the war the increase in both the money stock and velocity—of
which the assets analyzed in this paper are the other side of the bank balance sheet coin—is very
slow. It is not easy to explain this slowdown of the money supply/asset accumulation, but the
relationship I established in this study suggests that perhaps investment during the war produced
the conditions for reconversion. Bank lending to businesses can be seen as a reasonable proxy
for business investment which was financed in more or less equal parts by retained profits,
securities issues and bank borrowing until 1948.
It may seem instinctive to cut off a discussion of the impact of WWII on the economy by
1950, when the US enters into another conflict that must have had major economic effect.
However, I extend my analysis as far as the data will allow to establish a clearer picture of the
dynamics of the postwar period relative to the “clear” sustained boom of the 1950s. This then
65 See the appendix to chapter II of this dissertation.
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adds the confounding effect of the Korean War which cost a fair amount of money in its own
right and also marks the beginning of the Cold War (Edelstein 2000). I remain agnostic on the
effect of the Korean War here. It is not entirely clear how to interpret its effect on the data since
it was primarily financed through an increase in taxation, and while all states faced essentially
the same federal tax burden during the Korean War, the effect of war spending would have not
been spread evenly across them. Still, an important component of the tax was an increase in the
excess profits tax, aimed at war industries. On balance, it is a reasonable interpretation to think
of the pattern of the associated effect of war spending on bank assets from 1950 is indicative of
the Korean War rejuvenating the military industrial complex that had been mothballed at the end
of WWII. However, the fact that the pattern persists through 1954 and 1955, after spending on
the Korean War dissipated and though the elevated peacetime Cold War spending remained, is
consistent with a nationwide boom, of which the residual effect of WWII can be thought of as a
component . It should be noted that Ramey and Shapiro (1998) show some evidence that the
Korean War had a large negative effect on residential investment at the national level, though it
does not show up here at all.
On balance the results presented below should be approached with caution. as the data is
imperfect and the historical period under consideration far from quietly lending itself to simple
interpretation. I would argue, however, that the results do paint a picture of a delayed postwar
boom, in which the smoothness and strength of reconversion was enough to stabilize the
economy, but not enough to produce a real boom. If this narrative is accepted, then military
spending does play an important—though delayed—role in broader postwar boom.
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3.2 Literature Review
As stated earlier, the relevant literature is scant, reflecting the scarcity of data. Terms of
the modern discussion about reconversion have been almost singlehandedly established by the
economic historian Robert Higgs. He argues convincingly that what he calls the orthodox
version of reconversion does not have any basis in the data (Higgs 2006). The orthodox
version—what I would call the “popular version”—holds that reconversion was so painless
because the rush of “pent up demand” powered by liquid savings helped push the economy
forward. However, as Higgs details, there is no discernable spending down of liquid assets by
households and, in fact, following Freidman and Schwartz (1963), he notes that households
continued to accrue liquid assets during the postwar period. Higgs argues instead that business
investment fueled the postwar boom. This investment was driven by a modest liquidation of
government assets, the raising of funds in capital markets, and an increase in profits due to a
decrease in taxes after the war. His point about selling off bonds is an important objection to
some of the conclusions I reach below, but Higgs fails to make a convincing causal argument
that profits drove output instead of vice versa.
It should be pointed out briefly for completeness that Higgs contrasts his narrative of
business confidence driving investment, which in turn drove the success of reconversion, with
Vedder and Galloway’s explanation for the smooth post war transition. Vedder and Galloway
(1997) claim that the postwar boom can be explained by the fact that workers were willing to
work for lower wages. I have pointed out elsewhere the flaws in this argument66. Briefly,
Vedder and Galloway claim it was a decline in the share of output to labor—what they call the
real wage—that encouraged firms to hire and expand during reconversion.
66 Chapter II of this dissertation.
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Cullen and Fishback (2006) make a very convincing case that there is no discernable
effect of war spending on retail sales. Their paper is also the first attempt at measuring the effect
of war spending econometrically. They use cross sectional data that covers war spending at the
county level (the same data used here at the state level) as well as a host of county level
economic, demographic, and political variables. However, they are only able measure the
change in retail sales from 1939 to 1948 and from 1939 to 1954. In both cases they find
essentially no effect of war spending on retail sales. They interpret this result as broadly
supporting Higgs’s claim that war spending was largely irrelevant to the private economy. They
also point out that since much war spending was carried out by large, capital-intensive firms one
would expect to see a very small effect of war spending on consumption. There are grounds to
be concerned about their estimate, however. Most notably is the issue with spillover effects
between counties, which they acknowledge. My paper can be seen—in part—as an attempt to
reduce spillover bias by increasing in the size of the unit of observation, though this obviously
comes at a cost of degrees of freedom.
It is also not obvious that retail sales are the best measure of the increase in economic
activity. Here, Cullen and Fishback make the point that population changes seem to serve as a
reasonable proxy for changes in retail sales. In this case we might be seeing the consumption
compliment of the phenomenon that Higgs as well as Friedman and Schwartz (F&S) discuss at
length. F&S as well as Higgs point out that the savings rate seems to hold constant from around
1947 to the end of the decade. The evidence appears to be pointing to the fact that households
did not change their consumption behavior very much relative their behavior prewar. F&S
attribute this large willingness to save and thus the seeming lack of willingness to consume to the
expectation of another depression. If household consumption the liquidation of savings are not
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really a clear driving force behind economic activity in the late 1940s then it makes sense to look
at what is happening to the composition of savings. As well, commercial bank balance sheet
data also allows us to examine residential investment, which is a form of household savings.
C&F run a battery of regressions on a variety of different dependent variables. Most
relevant to the current study, they find a significant, though small, decrease in bank deposits in
from 1936 to 1949 associated with war spending at the country level. As well, they find a fairly
large and significant increase in E bond—a savings bond issued to finance the war targeted at
household savers—sales for the period between 1940 and 1944, but the effect becomes
somewhat ambiguous when the time period is expanded to 1949. Lastly, they find a small but
positive effect on the growth of housing values from 1940 to 1950 associated with war spending.
However, they also find a negative and significant—though small—effect on home ownership
rates associated with county level war spending.
One other paper on reconversion is worth noting. Taylor, Basu, and McLean (2011) show
that exports played a major role in postwar economy. They point out that exports accounted for
about 4 percent of GDP in the period 1945-1947 and they calculate that employment from
exports can account for as much as half of the increase in employment over that period. Their
argument is detailed in that they compute input/output estimates for dozens of industries. This is
quite compelling and suggests a clear channel for economic growth independent of war
spending. Exports to Europe as the driving force of the initial postwar prosperity should be
considered a realistic alternative hypothesis to the hypothesis that WWII war spending was
responsible. As well, it can be treated as an alternative hypothesis to the Higgsian “business
confidence”/supply side argument.
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3.3 Data
The main dataset used in this paper comes from the Federal Reserve Board Of Governors
“All Bank Statistics” available in the St Louis Fed’s FRASER archive. “All Bank Statistics”
contains total balance sheet data for commercial banks in each state. Commercial banks include
both state and nationally chartered commercial banks as well as mutual savings banks and
unincorporated banks. “All Bank Statistics” covers the period from 1896 to 1955, though this
paper primarily deals with the period 1939 to 1955. Geographically, “All Bank Statistics” covers
all states and territories as well as the District of Columbia. Because of limitations with the war
spending data used this paper uses the data from the continental 48 states as well as the District
Of Columbia, which is treated as a separate state and is included in the South Atlantic census
division. The annual totals are totals as of June 30th of each year. For the purpose of this study I
concentrate on total assets, commercial, industrial, and agricultural loans (recorded in “All
Bank…” as a single asset category), farm mortgages, residential mortgages, and government
liabilities held.
War spending data is taken from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research’s (ISCPR’s) “Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States,
1790-2002“study number 02896. Originally this data was compiled in the Census Bureau’s “
1947 County Data book”. War Spending includes total supply and facilities contracts of $50,000
and above issued between June 1940 and September 1945. The data is recorded in the state in
which the primary contract was awarded. Firms issued the prime contract were responsible for
organizing subcontracting so that may lead to some leakage of spending out of each state.
However, in general spillover effects are likely to be less of an issue with state levels data than
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with the county level data used by C&F. At any rate, C&F are unconcerned about the possible
bias even at the county level.
Economic data from 1939 used as control variables also comes from the ISCPR data.
This includes the value of farm production in each state as well as retail sales in each state. The
total value of manufacturing is included, as well the output of mineral industries. Data for
mining output in 1939 is reported as missing for the District Of Columbia. It is assumed that
there was no mining in the capital and the missing values are replaced with zeros.
Voting data comes from the “Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial
Edition”. It is a simple ratio of votes in the 1940 presidential election for the democratic ticket
(Roosevelt/Wallace) to votes cast for their Republican challengers (Willkie/McNary). Finally,
population data comes from the Census Bureau’s “Intercensal Estimates of the Total Resident
Population of States” which includes armed forces residing in each state. Data was also
collected for total assets and total mortgage lending of savings and loan banks (S&Ls) and
outstanding loans by the Federal Land Banks and the Farm Credit Administration (FCA). Total
lending by the FCA includes Federal Land Bank lending as well as Federal Intermediate Credit,
Production Credit and district banks for farm cooperative. Both S&L and FCA data comes from
the Department of Commerce’s “Statistical Abstract of the United States” for various years.
S&L data is missing for 1940 and FCA data is missing for 1944, both missing years are assumed
to be the average of the preceding and following years.
Figure 3.1 shows a scatter plot of per capita assets in 1945 and per capita war spending
for each state. In general, it suggests a weak relationship between war spending and assets per
capita in 1945, though there are some clear outliers discussed below. Figure 3.2 depicts
Commercial, Industrial and Agricultural loans (CIA loans) as well as residential loans for the
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whole US. This graph makes two points. First, the ratio of CIA loans to residential mortgages
increases from about parity in 1939 to a peak in 1947 of about $1.70 of CIA loans for every
dollar of mortgage lending. This ratio then begins to shrink steadily from its peak in 1947
through 1955. Residential mortgage are also clearly less sensitive to business cycles than CIA
lending. As the graph makes clear, residential lending marches stridently upwards whereas CIA
lending clearly flatlines around the 1948/49 and 1953/54 recessions.
Figure 3.3 compares the increase of mortgage lending by commercial banks and savings
and loans. They share a similar pattern.
3.4 Regression Specification
To test the effects of spending during WWII on the balance sheet of commercial banks I
take three basic approaches to estimating the effect of war spending on the assets of commercial
banks . First, as a baseline I estimate a “naïve” regression of asset variables for each individual
year using only the controls.
The naïve specification is as such:
(1) BANKit = β1WARSPENDi +  β2Xi + εi
where BANK is the bank assets of interest. This includes total assets, residential
mortgages, commercial, industrial, and agricultural loans, as well as treasury bonds.
WARSPENDi is the total war spending in state i. The dependent variable is the change in
BANK from 1939 to year t. Regressions are run for each individual year from 1940 to 1955.
For per capital data Xi includes mining output, manufacturing output, retail sales, and farm
income in 1939. Xi also includes the ratio of democratic to republican votes in 1940 and total
bank assets in 1939. For regressions that are not adjusted for population, Xi is essentially the
same but the total bank assets variable has been dropped because of colinearity issues. This
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approach is somewhat different than the C&F approach take, in which they use a wide set of
covariates, taking full advantage of the data set. I do not follow this approach because—
particularly with the naïve regression—there are very few observations. There are obviously
only 49 observations in the case of the naïve regression for each year. There are also only 833
observations in the fixed effects specifications detailed below. In this instance, parsimony is
warranted. There is also the danger of over-fitting the model. Variables indicating the main
economic sectors, a simple political indicator and a control for the size of the state’s balance
sheet capture the relevant observables. R squared for the regressions are large as it is, though,
again, this may suggest an issue with over-fitting.
The two other specifications I run assume fixed effects at either the state level or the
census division level. The more credible of the two fixed effects specifications assumes state
level and year fixed effects. However, since the variable of interest WARSPEND is a single
observation for each state and thus time invariant, the only information generated by the model is
the interaction effect between the year dummies and WARSPEND. As an alternative, I assume
fixed effects at the regional (census division) level. It is harder to argue for fixed effects at the
Census division level even if the narrow Census Divisions do divide the country into relatively
homogenous regions. However, the interaction effects for both the regional and state fixed
effects models are very similar. This is encouraging, but if the true fixed effect model is one of
fixed effects at the state level then the estimate of the mean effect of WARSPEND is likely to be
biased.
The specification that assumes fixed effects at the state level is as such:
(2) BANKit = δtDt*WARSPENDi +  δ1Dt  + δ2Di +  εit
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where Dt and Di are dummy variables indicating year and state respectively. This
specification makes use of fixed effects to control for the unobserved variation present in
specification 1. As well, time dummies are included to capture changes over time. While this
solves the problems of unobserved and omitted variable bias inherent in the naive regression the
fixed effects absorbs the main variable of interest—WARPSEND—because WARSPEND is
time invariant as it is a single observation per state of total spending during the war. Because of
this, we are only left with the interaction effect between the time dummy and WARSPEND
without the mean effect.
To fully comprehend the issue, a brief reminder of what the interaction effect is. Take
the following generic representation:
(3) y = β 1x1 + β 2x2 + β 3x1*x2 + ε 
The effect of x1 on y is thus:
(4) Dy/Dx1= β 1 + β 3x2
The sum of the effect of x1 on y is both the mean effect of B1 and the interaction effect
determined in part by x2. The difficulty with specification 2 is that the fixed effects are at the
same level as the observations. WARSPEND has not been omitted but rather the mean effect is
submerged in the fixed effect along with all of the controls mentioned about. Only the
interaction is recoverable. In this context, having only information about the interaction effect
allows for uncovering the evolution of the effect of WARSPEND on BANK, but not the mean.
If the mean were zero, this would not be problem, but all available evidence—discussed below—
suggests that the mean effect of WARSPEND on BANK over the period 1940 to 1955 is both
economically and statistically significant and negative.
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The most credible level for the unobserved variation that fixed effects is meant to deal
with is clearly the state level. Economic and political institutions vary most clearly at the state
level. However, the fact that state level fixed effects absorb half of the relationship of interest
begs for another approach. With this in mind specification 3, with fixed effects at the census
region level is as such:
(5) BANKit =  β1WARSPENDi  +  β2Xi  + δtDt*WARSPENDi +  δ1Dt  + δ2Dc +  +  εit
where Dc is a matrix of dummy variables indicating that state i is in one of the nine
Census divisions.  This allows for the estimate of a mean effect (β1). It is unlikely that the
regional intercepts fully capture heterogeneity at the state level; however, the regression contains
a lot more information.. In both fixed effects specifications, standard errors are likely to be
biased due to serial correlation. The standard errors reported are clustered by state in an attempt
to deal with this, but the estimates of the standard errors should be approached in caution.
3.5 Results:
Tables 3.1 through 3.10 show the results from the naïve regression. Tables 3.1-3.5 are
state totals, unadjusted for population while Tables 3.6-3.10 are adjusted for population. Despite
the fact that the results may be affected by omitted variables bias, the naïve regression gives us a
baseline to compare the more sophisticated regression specifications. Several patterns emerge in
the naïve regressions that are reinforced by the other specifications. First, there is a clear and
negative mean effect of total war spending on assets. Second, the population adjusted effects are
much smaller than the unadjusted effects. This is in line with C&F who find, with respect to
retail sales, extensive but not intensive effects. Third, the main asset category driving total assets
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is the accumulation of government liabilities. Though the magnitude is different, the same
pattern of selling off treasuries is apparent in the other specifications.
With respect to the more credible fixed effects regressions the naïve regression overstates
the change of CIA loans relative to the fixed effects regression and understates the change in
residential mortgages. The economically—if not statistically—insignificant effect of war
spending on farm mortgages holds through all specifications.
Table 3.11 shows the results from the state fixed effects specification. The 1940 year
dummy has been dropped so that the changes shown in the tables are the cumulative changes in
bank assets since 1940. By 1951 a dollar of total war spending from 1941-1945 is associated
with an increase in overall assets of about 48 cents, of which 6.8 cents are mortgage loans, 9.8
cents are CIA loans, and around 21 cents are in the form of federal government liabilities. From
1950-1955, there is a clear decline in the holding of government securities associated with WWII
spending and more mortgage loans than CIA loans have been made. Missing, obviously, from
this discussion is the mean effect. The naïve regressions points to a strong negative correlation
of war spending on the balance sheet of commercial banks.
As Table 3.12 shows, interaction effects do not change very much under regional fixed
effects. This is encouraging, and is reinforced by the fact that the mean effect is similar—very
roughly speaking—under the regional fixed effects specification as it is under the naïve
regression with the same exogenous control variables. The more complete picture with both
mean and interaction suggests that for most of this period war spending is associated with the
accumulation of fewer assets by banks. Looking at the progression through time, the negative
net effect seems to be on the verge of being wiped out by 1946, but the end of the war seems to
reverse that. It is not until 1950 that war spending is associated with a net positive change in
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assets, though this change is small at less than 2 cents for every dollar of war spending. The
decline in assets between 1946 and 1950 parallels the decline in government investment. After
1950 there is not a clear directional pattern in the holding of federal liabilities.
War spending is not associated with net positive lending until 1951. Residential
mortgages also show a long lag, with the annual interaction effect not over powering the mean
effect until 1950. In 1950 mortgages also start to increase faster than business loans. It is not
obvious that this translates into a clear statement about the rapidity of residential investment
versus business investment, a question dealt with at length in other essays of this dissertation.
The ambiguity stems from the fact that both housing and mortgages were increasing as a share of
total investment and commercial banks were increasing the share of their balance sheets
dedicated to mortgages.
There are also some challenges with interpreting how to think about the correlation
between war spending and bank assets. In particular, both war spending and bank assets are in
nominal terms. Given the massive inflation experienced during the war one cannot assume a
trivial difference between nominal and real effects. Unfortunately, the lack of inflation data at
the state level means it is not possible to control for price increases over this time period. Even if
the data were available it would suffer from the well-studied defects of official price level
measurement during the war (Freidman and Schwartz (1982), Rockoff(1984)). One crude way
of thinking about this is that between 1940 and 1950, according to the BLS, prices at the national
level increased by a little over 72%. Assets at the national level increased over this period by
225% with CIA loans as well as mortgage loans by commercial banks increasing by somewhat
more. Roughly speaking then, one can assume the real effect of war spending is about two
thirds that of nominal spending. This is likely to be a lower bound, since war spending is
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obviously likely to be positively correlated with state level inflation given both the increase in
the demand for local goods and services as well as increases in the cost of living due to migration
into production centers. This dynamic is most notably reflected in the cost of housing, which
was in notoriously short supply. Nonetheless, this crude inflation calculations does give one
some idea of the difference in nominal and real effects.
Turning to population adjusted figures in Tables 3.13 and 3.14.While one can speak of an
“extensive effect”, per capita assets show a much smaller “intensive” effect. However, the
effects are not nonexistent for the full sample case. As discussed below the removal of some
outliers has a large effect on the per capita results. The estimates of the state fixed effects and
the regional fixed effects are more different for the population adjusted figures than for
regressions involving unadjusted data and the results tend to be less significant. Again, we see a
strong effect around 1946, and then a decline in assets per capita until 1950 when we see a net
increase in assets associated with war spending, though this net increase is very small, around 3.5
cents per person in 1950 Residential mortgages increase and there is a net positive association—
again very slightly—after 1950.
Tables 3.15 and 3.16 show the regional fixed effects regressions of some alternative
financial intermediaries: Land Banks, total lending by various lenders under the FCA, and the
total assets and mortgage holdings of S&Ls. These auxiliary regressions back up the results
found by looking at commercial bank balance sheets. For the unadjusted data, the relationship
between war spending and mortgages held by S&Ls is roughly similar to that on commercial
bank balance sheets, both in terms of magnitude and timing. The per capita data shows a smaller
change in mortgages on the balance sheet of S&Ls but the pattern is roughly the same as that of
commercial banks per capita mortgage lending. The lack of relationship between war spending
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and farm mortgages is confirmed by the FCA data, though there is some slight evidence that
FCA lending is negatively associated with war spending. The interaction effect suggests that
there was an increase in farm lending associated with war spending in the immediate aftermath
of the war, but the net effect remains negative and very small, less than one cent per person.
To summarize, the results above suggest that there is a fairly strong negative association
between total war spending and the assets of commercial banks during the period we typically
think of as reconversion, from 1946 to 1948 or perhaps to 1950. The effect is still negative,
though smaller, when looking at per capita assets and war spending. This brings up an
interesting curiosity about the period as well as one of myriad of problems with trying to dig out
the effect of war spending using cross sectional or panel data. Figure 3.4 is a scatter plot
showing the relationship between total assets and population for the state of New Hampshire
1933-1955. New Hampshire is the median state with respect to war spending per capita and the
pattern here is typical for many if not most states. While the growth of both assets and
population is much lower from 1933 to 1938 than after 1950 there is a clear interruption in what
one might think of as a “normal” positive relationship between assets and population. This has
two phases. The first is during WWII itself, in which we see a rapid increase in assets against a
backdrop of a falling or stagnant civilian population. After the war, population increases rapidly
but assets remain stagnant until 1950. It is informative to contrast this with North Dakota, which
had both the lowest total and per capita war spending of all the states. Figure 3.5 shows a similar
wartime pattern, but then shows an opposite post war pattern. Assets and population show a
rapid growth until 1950 and then stagnation of both asset and population growth after 1950. The
pattern is similar for residential mortgages and CIA loans. Figure 3.7 shows asset and
population growth for the entire U.S. Broadly speaking the pattern for the US is the same as
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New Hampshire. It is difficult to account for this in the diminished effect of war spending on per
capita bank assets. There are those who enlisted or were drafted who migrated out of the state
during the war and then back home again. As well, there are also those that moved from state to
state to take advantage of the different economic opportunities across states. These individuals
would skew any measure of economic activity.
3.6 Robustness
Figure 3.1 suggests outliers may be somewhat of a problem. Systematically dropping
each state reveals that there is a substantial change in results if one drops New York City and
Michigan. As may be suspected from looking at Figure 3.167 dropping each variable
individually moves estimates in opposite directions. Dropping Michigan increases the estimated
relationship between war spending and assets while dropping New York lowers it. This is
reasonably predictable. Michigan was probably the single most important centers of
industrialization at the time. General Motors—headquartered in the state—for instance, received
about 8% of all war spending (Higgs 2006). It is also well known that automobile production
shut down during the war, suggesting that crowding out effect of war spending was dramatic in
Michigan. Consequently, one expects the impact of war spending to be muted in Michigan. One
might also rightfully expect that New York, as the central node in the American financial system,
would exhibit an outside effect on assets relative to war spending. Table 3.17 and 3.18 show the
regional fixed effects estimate with both states dropped individually and together. Results from
Table 3.12 and 3.14 for the full population are included for ease of reference. While dropping
Michigan in particular has an effect on the magnitude of the relationship between war spending
67 It also looks as though Connecticut would also have an effect on the estimates. However, dropping Connecticut
does not seem to have a very dramatic effect, particularly for interaction effects for years after the war is over.
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and total assets, it is important to note that there does not seem to be much of a change in basic
relationship described above for the full population.
The population adjusted numbers show a more dramatic change. Dropping either
Michigan or New York eliminates the effect of war spending on CIA loans. Dropping each state
individually does not have a tremendous effect on the relationship of per capita war spending and
per capita mortgage lending. However, dropping both states eliminates the effect. Importantly,
in per capita terms it seems that much of the effect of war spending on commercial bank lending
seems to be centered on these two states, in a per capita sense.
While tables of these regressions are not included, tests were done to see if dropping
specific control variables have an effect on estimates. There is not much of an effect and
certainly nothing that would challenge the results. The proportion of the variance explained
jumps up significantly when one goes from a single control to including two controls, though it
does not matter which two control variables. The variance explained increased as more controls
are added, up to the complete set of controls, but the R squared does not increase by very much
and the coefficient estimates of the controls do not change very dramatically when more than
two control variables are included.
3.7 Discussion
I am tempted to generalize the results here to try to unpack a generalized multiplier effect
while fully acknowledging any generalization needs to be taken with a grain of salt. The
generalized multipliers are reported in Tables 3.19. The estimation procedure is very simple. For
assets I take the ratio of assets to GDP and multiply it by the net (the mean effect plus the yearly
interaction effect) coefficients on war spending. This is somewhat crude. The accumulation of
assets was not uniform across the economy during the war, but rather the accumulation of almost
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exclusively government debt. So, total assets of commercial banks do not reflect a typical
relationship between economic expansion and bank balance sheets. I do something similar for
residential mortgages, though I use the ratio of commercial bank mortgages to residential
investment. When using the results as a measure of business investment I would remind the
reader that CIA loans convolute business loans and agricultural loans. Though they are included
it is important to bear in mind that treating values before 1945 or 1946 as an estimate of a
multiplier is invalid. The war spending had not been entirely spent until 1945 so it is impossible
to argue these are multipliers. However, it is interesting and useful to get some sense of
crowding out during the war. It is important to point out that these results are different than
C&F’s results. Whereas C&F find both an economically and statistically insignificant
relationship between war spending and retail sales here I find both an economically and
statistically significant relationship between war spending and business lending and residential
mortgages. The cumulative effect is negative before 1950 and positive afterwards. Insofar as it
is possible to generalize to the nonbank economy, evidence suggests significant crowding out by
war spending before 1950 and then an extremely rapid increase in economic activity after 1950
associated with spending during WWII.
A more straightforward way to gage the overall effect of war spending on bank balance
sheets is to look at the percentage of relevant economic activity bank lending represents. Table
3.20 offers a breakdown of the financing of business investment spending. Until about 1948
bank borrowing was roughly proportional to investment spending financed by both capital
market borrowing and investment financed by retained profits. There is a very clear shift away
from bank lending during the 1948-1949 recession in favor of retained profits. The substitution
away from bank borrowing is also evidenced during 1953. Table 3.21 shows the sources of
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mortgage lending from 1945 to 1955. Commercial bank lending accounted for about 17% of
total mortgage lending through this period. In the immediate postwar period the share of annual
mortgage lending from commercial banks increases until about 1951 when it starts to decline.
Also of note, savings and loans made about 35% of mortgage loans from 1945 to 1955. The
estimates presented in this paper then can be thought of as representative of the behavior of about
50% of the mortgage market over this ten year period.
In interpreting the results it is useful to go over the history of the brief period between
1946 and 1950. The discussion of the rapidity of the shift from a war economy to a private
economy has tended to distort our understanding of what happened to aggregate output during
this time. In short, aggregate output does not begin to increase from wartime levels until 1950.
This pattern of stagnation in aggregate output after the war is largely reflected in the results
presented here. However, it is important to acknowledge that the results differ significantly from
what these four years felt like to households. If one is to argue that the war was experienced as a
boom by households, as I have elsewhere,68 then certainly the immediate postwar was more so a
boom. The dissipation of military procurement and the lifting of controls and rationing opened
up more output for consumption by households and investment to satisfy household needs.
However, if one is interested in evaluating the effect of the war on output question
becomes what happened to aggregate output, not the welfare concerns that have been the
preoccupation elsewhere. The story of aggregate output is one of relative stagnation. The end of
the 1940s represents a kind of stall in the transition of the war to the postwar and implies that the
“reconversion” period should probably be thought of as encompassing the entire end of the
decade. The assumption of the smoothness of the transition period has been most forcefully
68 In chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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advanced by Robert Higgs69. However, his assertion that the transition was seamless rests on his
choice of deflators. I have reproduced table 2A.3 from Chapter 2 as Table 3.22 to make this
clear. The Freidman and Schwartz (F&S) deflator by far shows the smallest drop in output from
1944 to 1947. The other deflators show significantly larger declines in real output. No other
deflator shows a smaller than 5% decline in output. The reason for this is that the F&S deflator
is unsurprisingly the deflator most likely to refuse to acknowledge the possibility that there could
be an untethering of changes in the money supply and prices and assumes that the same
relationship between the money supply and prices that held before and after the war were
applicable to the war itself. This potential “overestimate” of sublimated wartime inflation has
the effect of underestimating the inflation during the postwar and thusly overestimating real
GDP. The most directly comparable alternative deflators, that of Rockoff and Mills (1987) and
Vedder and Galloway(1997), both take into account more nuanced approaches to demand
conditions during the war. Correspondingly, they show a steeper decline in output as the war
wound down.
Since this paper is primarily concerned with the balance sheet of commercial banks, I
lean heavily on both Friedman and Schwartz’s (F&S) “Monetary History of the United States
1967-1960” and the first volume of Alan Meltzer’s “History of the Federal Reserve”. Table 3.23
is a quarterly representation of the quantity theory of money that both works focus on. I have
used the quarterly average of the CPI as the measure of the price level. With that in mind,
estimates of the price level should be approached cautiously until sometime around mid-1947.
69 Higgs, Depression War and Cold War (2006)
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The measure of the money supply comes from appendix A of F&S. I have used their definition
of M2 because it is a measure that attempts to remain consistent through the entire period70.
Table 3.23 captures the most striking aspects of the period. First is the relative stagnation
in aggregate output during the end of the decade. The military drawdown recession of 46 to 47
is followed somewhat closely by another recession lasting about a year in 1948 to 1949. Also of
interest is that the 1949 recession brought with one of the few deflations in the U.S. after WWII.
Both Meltzer and F&S emphasis the low money growth over this period. The low money
growth is primarily an indication of the Fed’s passive role during this period. The main function
of the Fed, as it was during the war, was to maintain interest rates on government securities.
After the war was over the Fed continued this practice because Truman71 was preoccupied with
personal losses he experienced after the First World War when interest rates on government
securities were allowed to rise (and thus, their prices were allowed to fall). Given this passivity,
which lasted until the 1951 accord and to an extent for several years afterwards, the main force
of monetary expansion was federal debt. However, until the outbreak of the Korean War the
federal government was more or less running a surplus and, relative to the debt outstanding,
retiring a small amount of debt.
One fiscal/monetary event worth a discussion is the simultaneous cancelation of federal
debt and federal government deposits in the commercial banking system. In 1946, the federal
government had an excess of banking deposits because it had borrowed too much with the
Victory Loan program. The result, was a significant decline in government deposits in
70 However, there is still a minor discontinuity between 1946 and 1948. However, according to F&S this only
amounts to around .01% difference in the measures.
71 This is not the whole story, though it is amusing how many times Meltzer details Truman bringing up his WWI
loses in meetings with Fed officials, which suggests no other possible role for monetary policy was being considered
even at the highest level of the administration. As Meltzer details, in large part it was the administrations single
minded overreach on this issue that gave the Fed the leverage to force the treasury into accepting the 1951 accord.
150
commercial banks, which falls form $24.38 billion in 1945 to $1.36 billion in 1947. Figure 3.7
shows the decline in assets from 1946 to 1947 by state excluding New York State72. There is
clearly a correlation between the divestment of government deposits and states with the most war
spending73. This makes sense, given the federal government would have the most use for
deposits in states with a lot of government funded activity. Figure 3.8 shows total change in
deposits from 1946 to 194774, the effect on the withdrawal of government deposits is less
obvious. This withdrawal of deposits and corresponding decline on the asset side of the balance
sheet has a clear effect on the results presented here, since the decline in deposits and
correspondingly of assets is striking. This debt canceling operation remains the most dramatic
monetary policy event in the interlude between the wars. There was some minor tweaking of
interest rates and some fiddling with reserve requirements, and there were also controls placed
on consumer credit,75 but by and large, the main driving force of monetary policy was the need
to finance federal borrowing. After 1946, there was no need for federal borrowing. Meltzer
emphasizes the passivity of the Federal Reserve of this time and the way in which monetary
policy was primarily driven by the concerns of the Treasury. If monetary policy was passive
and/or neutral to private economic activity, it makes sense that by and large the money supply
stayed flat through the end of the 1940s. Firstly, looking at Table 3.23 real aggregate output was
lower in 1948 than it was in 1944 and then the economy went into recession. There was,
however, a persistent increase in the price level until the deflation of 1949, but this very clearly
is easily accommodated by a velocity that was well below “potential velocity”.
72 This is done to make the graph readable. New York is very far to the Southeast of the rest of the variables. New
York experienced an outflow of government deposits totaling $4billion between 1946 and 1947.
73 Correspondingly, this is also consistent with the F&S claim that deposits moved to country banks page 575
74 New York is also dropped here for similar reasons as in figure 7. The state experienced a decline in total deposits
of $2.88 billion dollars.
75 Meltzer dismisses the controls as ineffective and easily gotten around by alternative arrangements, he mentions
specifically the use of mortgage financing specifically to finance consumer durables.
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A counterpart of the relatively small rise in the money stock during the period
from 1946 to 1948 was the relatively small rise in velocity. As we have seen, velocity
fell by more than a third between 1942 and 1946. The rise from 1946 to 1948 offset less
than a quarter of this decline, leaving velocity in 1948 at less than three-quarters its level
in 1942 and at only seven-eighths its level in 1939, which itself was low by historical
standards … To put the matter in terms of liquid asset holdings: in 1939, the year the war
broke out in Europe, the public held … liquid assets [that] amounted to over 13 months
income. By 1946 … the broader total of liquid assets [amounted] to 21 months income.
In the next two years, the public—despite its pent up demand for goods unavailable
earlier and despite vigorous economic expansion—reduced those balances only
moderately … to 18 months’ income (F&S, page 581).
F&S go on to attribute this to the expectations of households of a renewed depression and to
budget deficits. Their interpretation of the data here differs from mine in that I claim that overall
real output either stagnated or fell slightly over this period. While it does remain unexplained
why inflation was not worse, much of the “puzzle” of the postwar demand for liquid assets is
explained if one considers that first household did not need to sell of their liquid assets in order
to acquire long term liabilities such as housing. Secondly, and more importantly, if one
attributes the postwar inflation, which on an annualized basis does not fall below 8% until the
1948-49 recession, to contemporary demand pressure instead of to the “pent up” inflation of the
war it is quite clear that households were spending vigorously and there is necessarily some limit
on the amount of goods that can be acquired within a given span of time, irrespective of how
much a household holds in savings76. Again, given that liquid assets –in particular treasury
bonds—were not liquidated in order to satisfy these demand pressures then there was no
mechanism to increase the money supply, which was being driven by changes in the demand for
treasury bonds. Thus, these changes in prices were accommodated by increased velocity.
76 I am setting aside other issues, such as the fact that the Great Depression probably permanently lowered the
rate of time preference for the generation that lived through it, which is to say they would be more apt to act as
though a depression was immanent than other generations all else being equal. As well, there is no reason to
assume that the household’s preference for liquid balances is a constant proportion of income as is implied in the
quote above. However, these issues rest on issues of the war and permanent income, which is too large a topic to
take on here.
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However, the build-up of assets was so enormous during the war that even the relatively rapid
changes in nominal GDP from 1945 to 1949 was not enough to reach the point where the buffer
of velocity had been exhausted and there was pressure on the money supply.
Higgs explanation is most prominent: business investment was largely unanchored from
war spending on economic activity. War investment was largely “wasted” and—in a sense—
firms had to start over from the beginning after the war and this did not benefit from war
spending (Higgs 2006). However, this explanation fails to account for increased investment also
does not show up in an increase in the money supply. It may simply be that Higgs is overstating
how useless wartime investment was to the post war. He even suggests himself that the most
attractive wartime contracts were those that had clear civilian uses (Higgs 2006). One way of
assessing this is to look at National Product data. It is clear from Table 3.24 that changes in the
change of inventories are driving changes in nonresidential investment in the post war, not
changes in investment in structures and equipment. However, if we think of investment as
additions to the capital stock, inventories account for about 8% of the accumulated capital stock
between 1945 and 1950. Is this a significant portion? That question brings us back to the key
issue in trying to understand business investment after the war. These numbers are for gross
investment, without knowing what net additions to the capital stock were and without knowing
what was driving the need for replacing the capital stock—obsolescence driven by age or
economic irrelevance—we can’t pursue this any further. However, indirectly, the evidence in
this paper suggests that war spending can be linked to lower business borrowing. That in turn
suggests that lower business borrowing by firms for an additional dollar of war spending may be
due to the fact that the war had produced the necessary capital stock to make the transition to a
peacetime economy. If the conversion from a wartime to a peacetime economy did not
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necessitate major retooling and construction that would explain the low growth in inflation, the
negative relationship between war spending and business borrowing in the short term, and the
ease with which the economy made the transition. That ease becomes even more astounding
when we consider the headwinds of a decommissioning that was badly planned because the war
was ended “too soon” by the atomic bomb and the explosion of pent up labor disputes in the
immediate post war period.
Such reasoning does not completely dislodge Higgs’s argument.. As he argues, the
increase in investment could have been financed from firms cash holdings and raising funds on
capital markets. However, as Table 3.20 shows, credit market borrowing was roughly equivalent
to bank borrowing and retained profits before 1948. Clearly, retained earnings are the largest
portion of investment after 1948. The point remains, however, that cash and capital market
funding is consistent with low growth in the money supply, since raising money in the capital
markets by definition does not involve the creation of banking assets and liabilities or the need to
maintain treasury bond rates.
Another explanation for the negative relationship between war spending and economic
activity is suggest by C&F, who point out that the dichotomy between counties who received
war spending and those who did not is one of an industrial/agricultural divide. As well, The
results from Taylor, Basu and McLean (2011) show that agriculture and food production were
sectors with the two largest increases in employment, though this is largely due to the fact that
their manufacturing data is dispersed among many separate industries. However, the evidence
presented here shows that, at most, the relationship between farm lending is vaguely negative.
More credibly there doesn’t seem to be any relationship between war spending and agricultural
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lending. It is possible, though unlikely, that the response to high grain prices due to shortages in
war-devastated Europe was financed entirely out of cash holding by small farmers.
In the shadow of the Great Recession and with natural experiments such precious
commodities, WWII is of unusual academic importance. The last generation of economists—
through the prism of the Great Inflation of the 70s—found in the Great Depression the
quintessential example of the pathologies of monetary policy (Freidman and Schwartz 1963,
Bernanke 1995 are the two most obvious examples) and, less justifiably, evidence for the
centrality of monetary policy (Romer (1992), for instance) in economic management. The
massive spending shock of the war and the success of the postwar transition is of central
importance in trying to parse out the effect of government spending shocks on the economy,
despite the myriad of problems associated with trying to study this period. This paper
contributes to the effort to map the period’s longitude and latitude, though not it’s topography.
Hopefully at some point we will be able to get to the real debate about the role of economic
policy and answer the important questions surrounding the war’s role in ending the Depression,
and the extent to which fiscal policy and economic management in general—particularly
management outside of monetary policy—is capable of achieving.
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84.172
-213.676
-672.760
-1474.347
-2361.211
-2618.112
-3202.371
-4010.452
(-0.17)
(-0.16)
(-0.12)
(-0.08)
(-0.07)
(-0.04)
(-0.05)
(0.10)
(0.04)
(-0.09)
(-0.22)
(-0.35)
(-0.48)
(-0.45)
(-0.46)
(-0.47)
_co
ns
-6435.795
-8931.940
-12795.368
-14619.017
-15658.543
-18274.865
-18353.386
-35460.651
-45454.903
-46166.224
-40092.345
-34510.460
-1035.232
-21763.202
-13061.883
-5244.808
(-0.59)
(-0.82)
(-1.25)
(-1.48)
(-1.47)
(-1.56)
(-1.44)
(-1.92)
(-1.80)
(-1.55)
(-1.08)
(-0.67)
(-0.02)
(-0.31)
(-0.15)
(-0.05)
N
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
adj.R
-sq
0.754
0.781
0.789
0.725
0.602
0.501
0.624
0.790
0.838
0.867
0.885
0.891
0.888
0.896
0.893
0.890
Table
3.2:
C
oefficients
from
"naïve"
regression.
D
ependentvariable:R
esidentialM
ortgages
held
by
com
ericalbanks.
tstatisticsin
parentheses
*p<0.05
**
p<0.01
***
p<0.001
165
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
w
arto
tal
-0.000*
-0.000***
-0.001***
-0.001***
-0.001***
-0.002***
-0.002***
-0.001*
-0.001
-0.001*
-0.001*
-0.001*
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001*
-0.001
(-2.20)
(-3.99)
(-5.10)
(-5.21)
(-4.72)
(-4.56)
(-3.62)
(-2.66)
(-1.89)
(-2.21)
(-2.43)
(-2.04)
(-1.96)
(-1.84)
(-2.02)
(-1.92)
m
an1939
0.001***
0.003***
0.005***
0.009***
0.010***
0.013***
0.013***
0.012***
0.011***
0.012***
0.014***
0.014***
0.014***
0.014***
0.015***
0.016***
(4.52)
(7.21)
(8.27)
(7.51)
(6.90)
(6.68)
(6.14)
(5.11)
(4.58)
(4.92)
(5.07)
(4.73)
(4.74)
(4.57)
(4.75)
(4.51)
retail1939
-0.002***
-0.004***
-0.005***
-0.008***
-0.009***
-0.012***
-0.013***
-0.011***
-0.012***
-0.012***
-0.013***
-0.014***
-0.014***
-0.014**
-0.014**
-0.014**
(-4.42)
(-6.18)
(-6.54)
(-5.25)
(-5.02)
(-4.85)
(-4.71)
(-3.84)
(-3.72)
(-3.80)
(-3.83)
(-3.68)
(-3.70)
(-3.43)
(-3.47)
(-3.22)
farm
1939
0.003**
0.006**
0.004
-0.001
-0.000
0.003
0.015
0.020*
0.028**
0.029**
0.034**
0.044***
0.049***
0.048***
0.050***
0.063***
(2.75)
(3.25)
(1.78)
(-0.17)
(-0.01)
(0.43)
(1.75)
(2.19)
(2.86)
(2.91)
(3.25)
(3.89)
(4.20)
(3.98)
(4.02)
(4.54)
m
ine1939
0.001
-0.001
-0.006
-0.019*
-0.022*
-0.031*
-0.030
-0.016
-0.003
0.000
-0.005
0.003
-0.001
0.002
0.002
-0.002
(0.31)
(-0.28)
(-1.46)
(-2.28)
(-2.17)
(-2.28)
(-1.91)
(-0.97)
(-0.18)
(0.01)
(-0.24)
(0.16)
(-0.02)
(0.07)
(0.10)
(-0.07)
vo
te40
-14.919
-17.663
-22.688
-33.551
-30.619
-40.510
-35.878
-24.977
-11.926
-18.090
-22.540
-13.310
6.789
27.091
32.671
45.131
(-0.90)
(-0.68)
(-0.64)
(-0.50)
(-0.37)
(-0.38)
(-0.29)
(-0.19)
(-0.08)
(-0.12)
(-0.15)
(-0.08)
(0.04)
(0.15)
(0.18)
(0.22)
_co
ns
279.333
385.619
652.446
1314.820
1643.459
2343.222
2983.026
3500.604*
3396.952
3608.589
4048.088*
3795.631
3651.449
3922.630
4323.075
4780.144
(1.38)
(1.21)
(1.51)
(1.59)
(1.63)
(1.78)
(1.94)
(2.13)
(1.93)
(2.02)
(2.13)
(1.87)
(1.76)
(1.81)
(1.93)
(1.93)
N
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
adj.R
-sq
0.316
0.529
0.602
0.590
0.554
0.522
0.417
0.316
0.337
0.377
0.393
0.435
0.460
0.460
0.477
0.504
tstatisticsin
parentheses
*
p<0.05
**
p<0.01
***
p<0.001
Table
3.3:
C
oefficients
from
"naïve"
regression.
D
ependentvariable:Farm
M
ortgages
held
by
C
om
m
ericalB
anks.
166
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
w
arto
tal
-0.007***
-0.003
-0.024***
-0.010***
-0.011**
-0.007
-0.018**
-0.025**
-0.045***
-0.035**
-0.044***
-0.073***
-0.083***
-0.090***
-0.155**
-0.082***
(-5.65)
(-1.36)
(-6.22)
(-3.70)
(-3.09)
(-1.95)
(-3.19)
(-2.98)
(-3.77)
(-3.35)
(-3.98)
(-4.21)
(-4.03)
(-3.92)
(-2.97)
(-3.83)
m
an1939
0.015*
0.026*
0.009
-0.010
-0.019
-0.043*
-0.066*
-0.132**
-0.154*
-0.159**
-0.116*
-0.189*
-0.216*
-0.245*
0.031
-0.270*
(2.48)
(2.33)
(0.49)
(-0.72)
(-1.08)
(-2.29)
(-2.30)
(-3.09)
(-2.57)
(-3.01)
(-2.10)
(-2.18)
(-2.10)
(-2.14)
(0.12)
(-2.50)
retail1939
0.059***
0.019
0.308***
0.167***
0.223***
0.226***
0.451***
0.778***
1.091***
0.943***
0.930***
1.566***
1.785***
1.991***
1.560***
1.951***
(7.72)
(1.31)
(12.52)
(9.48)
(9.67)
(9.48)
(12.34)
(14.21)
(14.22)
(13.93)
(13.11)
(14.11)
(13.55)
(13.53)
(4.66)
(14.11)
farm
1939
-0.063*
0.062
-0.384***
-0.166**
-0.210**
-0.114
-0.386**
-0.583**
-0.880***
-0.509*
-0.458*
-1.147**
-1.360**
-1.586**
2.920**
-1.217**
(-2.67)
(1.41)
(-5.09)
(-3.06)
(-2.96)
(-1.57)
(-3.45)
(-3.47)
(-3.74)
(-2.45)
(-2.10)
(-3.37)
(-3.36)
(-3.51)
(2.85)
(-2.87)
m
ine1939
-0.216***
0.118
-0.760***
-0.463***
-0.611***
-0.610***
-0.952***
-1.155***
-1.724***
-1.333**
-1.449***
-2.424***
-2.712***
-3.099***
-4.697*
-2.858***
(-4.97)
(1.47)
(-5.47)
(-4.65)
(-4.69)
(-4.54)
(-4.62)
(-3.74)
(-3.99)
(-3.49)
(-3.62)
(-3.87)
(-3.65)
(-3.74)
(-2.49)
(-3.67)
vo
te40
-417.031
-418.391
-630.014
-222.766
108.333
383.953
-131.364
-473.103
-804.122
-512.950
-923.827
-1505.968
-1492.894
-1345.253
-10265.117
-1208.351
(-1.21)
(-0.65)
(-0.57)
(-0.28)
(0.10)
(0.36)
(-0.08)
(-0.19)
(-0.23)
(-0.17)
(-0.29)
(-0.30)
(-0.25)
(-0.20)
(-0.68)
(-0.19)
_co
ns
-3541.724
-8445.178
-18599.024
-18100.630
-25902.111*
-27894.778*
-37345.063
-75886.356*
-93605.535*
-92277.397*
-84635.867*
-134421.752*
-159792.725*
-179237.941*
-349272.260
-170644.402*
(-0.84)
(-1.08)
(-1.37)
(-1.86)
(-2.04)
(-2.13)
(-1.86)
(-2.52)
(-2.22)
(-2.48)
(-2.17)
(-2.20)
(-2.21)
(-2.22)
(-1.90)
(-2.25)
N
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
adj.R
-sq
0.859
0.724
0.913
0.839
0.850
0.830
0.895
0.923
0.922
0.919
0.913
0.923
0.917
0.916
0.676
0.924
tstatisticsin
parentheses
*p<0.05
**
p<0.01
***p<0.001
Table
3.4:
C
oeff.from
"naïve"
regression.
D
ependentvariable:C
om
erical,Industrialand
A
griculturalloans
by
C
om
ericalB
anks.
167
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
w
arto
tal
-0.019***
-0.057***
-0.074***
-0.150***
-0.179***
-0.199***
-0.155***
-0.156***
-0.114***
-0.120***
-0.105***
-0.067***
-0.035*
-0.002
-0.017
(-3.62)
(-4.23)
(-4.86)
(-4.62)
(-4.30)
(-4.35)
(-3.72)
(-4.48)
(-4.37)
(-4.82)
(-4.18)
(-3.81)
(-2.29)
(-0.11)
(-0.86)
m
an1939
-0.024
0.002
0.057
-0.016
-0.098
-0.186
-0.387
-0.127
-0.092
0.013
-0.033
0.034
-0.025
-0.005
-0.133
(-0.92)
(0.03)
(0.74)
(-0.10)
(-0.47)
(-0.81)
(-1.85)
(-0.73)
(-0.70)
(0.10)
(-0.27)
(0.38)
(-0.32)
(-0.06)
(-1.37)
retail1939
0.284***
0.751***
1.010***
2.691***
3.684***
4.549***
4.466***
3.527***
2.876***
2.716***
2.772***
1.978***
1.828***
1.327***
1.920***
(8.36)
(8.69)
(10.27)
(12.88)
(13.72)
(15.50)
(16.66)
(15.71)
(17.09)
(16.89)
(17.23)
(17.41)
(18.61)
(13.99)
(15.48)
farm
1939
-0.457***
-1.250***
-1.619***
-3.510***
-4.617***
-5.501***
-4.807***
-3.766***
-2.785***
-2.865***
-2.726***
-1.670***
-1.087***
-0.094
-0.763
(-4.39)
(-4.72)
(-5.37)
(-5.47)
(-5.60)
(-6.11)
(-5.85)
(-5.47)
(-5.40)
(-5.81)
(-5.53)
(-4.79)
(-3.61)
(-0.32)
(-2.01)
m
ine1939
-0.837***
-2.289***
-2.847***
-5.845***
-7.324***
-8.206***
-7.007***
-6.653***
-5.187***
-5.323***
-5.011***
-3.614***
-3.245***
-2.267***
-3.271***
(-4.38)
(-4.70)
(-5.14)
(-4.96)
(-4.84)
(-4.96)
(-4.64)
(-5.26)
(-5.47)
(-5.87)
(-5.53)
(-5.64)
(-5.86)
(-4.24)
(-4.68)
vo
te40
-236.551
-1084.102
-2004.542
-4835.767
-6992.583
-8252.028
-7004.944
-7001.929
-5980.954
-6022.873
-6019.122
-4414.626
-3788.095
-3755.481
-4532.917
(-0.16)
(-0.28)
(-0.45)
(-0.52)
(-0.58)
(-0.63)
(-0.58)
(-0.70)
(-0.79)
(-0.84)
(-0.83)
(-0.87)
(-0.86)
(-0.88)
(-0.81)
_co
ns
-9878.206
-19231.788
-9579.164
-63892.226
-88020.765
-103020.766
-101525.102
-38359.670
-33635.963
-19547.641
-58296.816
-25502.261
-22403.624
-13381.099
-72221.851
(-0.53)
(-0.41)
(-0.18)
(-0.56)
(-0.60)
(-0.64)
(-0.69)
(-0.31)
(-0.36)
(-0.22)
(-0.66)
(-0.41)
(-0.42)
(-0.26)
(-1.06)
N
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
adj.R
-sq
0.749
0.808
0.885
0.927
0.937
0.951
0.956
0.954
0.964
0.966
0.968
0.974
0.979
0.974
0.970
tstatisticsin
parentheses
*p<0.05
**
p<0.01
***p<0.001
Table
3.5:
C
oefficients
from
"naïve"
regression.
D
ependentvariable:FederalG
overnm
entLibabilites
held
by
C
om
m
ericalB
anks.
168
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
w
arto
tal
0.00354
0.00515
0.0108
0.0266
0.0381
0.0327
0.0476
0.0415
0.0418
0.0355
0.0455
0.0482
0.0382
0.0561
0.0507
0.0195
(0.56)
(0.60)
(0.85)
(1.43)
(1.42)
(1.05)
(1.69)
(1.64)
(1.61)
(1.34)
(1.56)
(1.60)
(1.11)
(1.53)
(1.42)
(0.18)
m
an1939
-0.0672*
-0.0293
-0.0647
-0.0354
-0.0859
-0.0914
-0.335*
-0.274*
-0.306*
-0.299*
-0.352*
-0.359*
-0.348
-0.387*
-0.455*
-0.540
(-2.06)
(-0.66)
(-0.98)
(-0.37)
(-0.62)
(-0.56)
(-2.30)
(-2.09)
(-2.27)
(-2.19)
(-2.32)
(-2.29)
(-1.94)
(-2.04)
(-2.46)
(-0.97)
retail1939
-0.0950
-0.165
-0.185
-0.174
-0.167
0.0106
0.320
0.515
0.701*
0.687*
0.860*
0.889*
0.750
0.808
1.044*
0.775
(-1.35)
(-1.72)
(-1.30)
(-0.84)
(-0.56)
(0.03)
(1.02)
(1.83)
(2.42)
(2.33)
(2.64)
(2.63)
(1.94)
(1.97)
(2.62)
(0.64)
farm
1939
0.0736
0.214
0.423*
0.881**
1.265**
1.182**
1.273**
1.446***
1.254**
1.184**
0.823*
0.787
0.967
1.037*
0.833
-0.263
(0.84)
(1.79)
(2.39)
(3.41)
(3.40)
(2.72)
(3.25)
(4.11)
(3.47)
(3.23)
(2.03)
(1.87)
(2.01)
(2.03)
(1.68)
(-0.18)
m
ine1939
0.0578
0.0345
0.0798
-0.0712
-0.220
-0.113
0.104
-0.0688
-0.187
-0.275
-0.480
-0.456
-0.0991
-0.0552
-0.294
2.497
(0.50)
(0.22)
(0.34)
(-0.21)
(-0.45)
(-0.20)
(0.20)
(-0.15)
(-0.39)
(-0.57)
(-0.90)
(-0.82)
(-0.16)
(-0.08)
(-0.45)
(1.26)
assets39
0.133***
0.211***
0.205***
0.368***
0.568***
0.710***
0.609***
0.446***
0.358***
0.351***
0.397***
0.457***
0.533***
0.448***
0.482***
0.516
(7.12)
(8.27)
(5.41)
(6.65)
(7.13)
(7.64)
(7.26)
(5.93)
(4.62)
(4.47)
(4.57)
(5.08)
(5.18)
(4.10)
(4.54)
(1.61)
vo
te40
0.161
0.112
-0.467
-1.203
-1.755
-2.102
-1.923
-1.733
-1.919
-2.006
-2.135
-1.901
-1.632
-1.866
-2.312
-5.860
(0.30)
(0.15)
(-0.43)
(-0.75)
(-0.76)
(-0.78)
(-0.79)
(-0.79)
(-0.86)
(-0.88)
(-0.85)
(-0.73)
(-0.55)
(-0.59)
(-0.75)
(-0.63)
_co
ns
11.01
17.26
49.65
78.11
112.1
163.0
193.9*
140.2*
153.7*
156.0*
151.0
150.5
198.6*
214.9*
226.5*
487.0
(0.66)
(0.76)
(1.47)
(1.58)
(1.58)
(1.96)
(2.59)
(2.09)
(2.22)
(2.22)
(1.95)
(1.87)
(2.16)
(2.20)
(2.39)
(1.70)
N
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
adj.R
-sq
0.602
0.707
0.448
0.671
0.709
0.756
0.745
0.730
0.686
0.665
0.679
0.707
0.664
0.594
0.664
0.107
tstatisticsin
parentheses
*
p<0.05
**
p<0.01
***
p<0.001
T
able
3.6:
C
oefficients
from
"naïve"
regression.
D
ependentV
ariable:Per
C
apita
TotalA
ssets
ofC
om
ericalB
anks
169
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
w
artotal
0.000
0.000
-0.001
-0.003
-0.006
-0.006
-0.006
-0.002
-0.001
-0.001
-0.003
-0.002
-0.007
-0.001
-0.002
-0.005
(0.05)
(0.02)
(-0.44)
(-1.13)
(-1.50)
(-1.35)
(-1.19)
(-0.38)
(-0.12)
(-0.15)
(-0.46)
(-0.33)
(-0.94)
(-0.18)
(-0.18)
(-0.35)
m
an1939
-0.005
-0.004
0.005
0.015
0.025
0.026
0.024
0.008
-0.005
-0.002
0.008
0.012
0.042
0.021
0.026
0.042
(-0.72)
(-0.37)
(0.38)
(1.02)
(1.27)
(1.10)
(0.94)
(0.23)
(-0.13)
(-0.05)
(0.22)
(0.30)
(1.06)
(0.48)
(0.60)
(0.52)
retail1939
-0.021
-0.016
-0.020
-0.020
-0.025
-0.022
-0.010
0.038
0.087
0.091
0.113
0.101
0.109
0.091
0.082
0.016
(-1.31)
(-0.68)
(-0.71)
(-0.61)
(-0.59)
(-0.44)
(-0.18)
(0.54)
(1.04)
(1.08)
(1.38)
(1.19)
(1.27)
(0.98)
(0.86)
(0.09)
farm
1939
0.030
0.040
0.053
0.066
0.080
0.092
0.078
0.034
-0.011
-0.002
-0.017
0.025
0.031
0.066
0.083
0.035
(1.47)
(1.34)
(1.53)
(1.65)
(1.52)
(1.45)
(1.12)
(0.38)
(-0.11)
(-0.02)
(-0.16)
(0.23)
(0.29)
(0.57)
(0.70)
(0.16)
m
ine1939
0.047
0.073
0.083
0.065
0.062
0.091
0.122
0.188
0.220
0.202
0.184
0.216
0.166
0.216
0.200
0.510
(1.76)
(1.87)
(1.81)
(1.23)
(0.89)
(1.09)
(1.34)
(1.62)
(1.60)
(1.47)
(1.37)
(1.56)
(1.18)
(1.42)
(1.28)
(1.79)
assets39
0.023***
0.023***
0.022**
0.016
0.013
0.009
0.003
0.005
0.018
0.039
0.067**
0.123***
0.141***
0.178***
0.212***
0.265***
(5.18)
(3.67)
(2.91)
(1.92)
(1.15)
(0.70)
(0.18)
(0.27)
(0.80)
(1.75)
(3.05)
(5.46)
(6.15)
(7.18)
(8.34)
(5.72)
vo
te40
0.072
0.078
0.051
0.033
-0.016
-0.018
-0.107
-0.141
-0.123
-0.069
-0.003
0.116
0.134
0.188
0.290
0.036
(0.57)
(0.42)
(0.24)
(0.13)
(-0.05)
(-0.05)
(-0.25)
(-0.26)
(-0.19)
(-0.11)
(-0.01)
(0.18)
(0.20)
(0.26)
(0.39)
(0.03)
_cons
-1.574
-3.193
-3.681
-4.280
-3.019
-3.500
1.150
1.473
-2.171
-7.406
-14.148
-25.908
-33.205
-37.562
-44.209
-27.110
(-0.40)
(-0.56)
(-0.55)
(-0.56)
(-0.30)
(-0.29)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(-0.11)
(-0.37)
(-0.72)
(-1.29)
(-1.62)
(-1.70)
(-1.95)
(-0.66)
N
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
adj.R
-sq
0.390
0.241
0.149
0.053
0.010
0.004
0.003
-0.011
0.081
0.215
0.453
0.678
0.740
0.774
0.817
0.648
tstatisticsin
parentheses
*
p<0.05
**
p<0.01
***
p<0.001
T
able
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1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
w
artotal
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.001
-0.000
-0.001
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.002
(-0.70)
(-0.54)
(-1.00)
(-1.13)
(-0.83)
(-0.82)
(-0.62)
(-0.36)
(-0.66)
(-0.76)
(-0.83)
(-1.12)
(-1.13)
(-1.27)
(-1.61)
(-1.76)
m
an1939
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.004
0.003
0.004
0.004
0.006
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.008
0.007
(1.49)
(1.44)
(1.71)
(1.88)
(1.50)
(1.49)
(1.23)
(0.88)
(1.06)
(1.27)
(1.43)
(1.64)
(1.63)
(1.65)
(1.87)
(1.62)
retail1939
-0.001
-0.002
-0.002
-0.000
-0.001
-0.001
-0.003
-0.005
-0.006
-0.008
-0.009
-0.010
-0.011
-0.012
-0.013
-0.012
(-0.65)
(-0.70)
(-0.42)
(-0.06)
(-0.14)
(-0.13)
(-0.40)
(-0.69)
(-0.80)
(-1.00)
(-1.11)
(-1.13)
(-1.25)
(-1.28)
(-1.41)
(-1.29)
farm
1939
0.001
0.002
0.002
-0.001
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.005
0.006
0.006
0.011
0.013
0.012
0.011
0.011
0.009
(0.99)
(0.69)
(0.41)
(-0.15)
(-0.29)
(0.00)
(0.21)
(0.62)
(0.64)
(0.65)
(1.05)
(1.26)
(1.11)
(0.91)
(1.00)
(0.74)
m
ine1939
-0.000
0.001
-0.001
0.002
0.007
0.009
0.012
0.020
0.016
0.015
0.012
0.007
-0.003
-0.004
-0.011
-0.009
(-0.13)
(0.33)
(-0.10)
(0.21)
(0.61)
(0.76)
(1.11)
(1.75)
(1.34)
(1.22)
(0.91)
(0.46)
(-0.21)
(-0.26)
(-0.75)
(-0.60)
assets39
0.000
-0.000
-0.001
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.002
(0.07)
(-0.56)
(-0.68)
(-1.21)
(-1.14)
(-1.23)
(-1.39)
(-1.00)
(-0.75)
(-0.61)
(-0.46)
(-0.41)
(-0.39)
(-0.39)
(-0.55)
(-0.88)
vo
te40
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
0.004
0.005
0.004
-0.009
-0.020
-0.028
-0.030
-0.030
-0.038
-0.039
-0.037
-0.047
-0.065
(-0.55)
(-0.20)
(-0.10)
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.07)
(-0.17)
(-0.39)
(-0.50)
(-0.51)
(-0.47)
(-0.57)
(-0.56)
(-0.52)
(-0.67)
(-0.88)
_cons
0.062
0.121
-0.191
-0.838
-0.540
-0.434
1.163
2.483
3.380
3.678*
3.760
4.357*
5.139*
5.796*
6.608**
8.464***
(0.24)
(0.19)
(-0.22)
(-0.66)
(-0.34)
(-0.26)
(0.71)
(1.52)
(1.97)
(2.03)
(1.91)
(2.13)
(2.42)
(2.62)
(3.08)
(3.71)
N
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
adj.R
-sq
-0.070
-0.075
-0.068
-0.047
-0.064
-0.050
0.011
0.054
0.005
-0.008
-0.006
0.011
0.012
0.013
0.091
0.121
tstatisticsin
parentheses
*
p<0.05
**
p<0.01
***
p<0.001
T
able
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1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
w
artotal
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.001
-0.000
-0.001
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.002
(-0.70)
(-0.54)
(-1.00)
(-1.13)
(-0.83)
(-0.82)
(-0.62)
(-0.36)
(-0.66)
(-0.76)
(-0.83)
(-1.12)
(-1.13)
(-1.27)
(-1.61)
(-1.76)
m
an1939
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.004
0.003
0.004
0.004
0.006
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.008
0.007
(1.49)
(1.44)
(1.71)
(1.88)
(1.50)
(1.49)
(1.23)
(0.88)
(1.06)
(1.27)
(1.43)
(1.64)
(1.63)
(1.65)
(1.87)
(1.62)
retail1939
-0.001
-0.002
-0.002
-0.000
-0.001
-0.001
-0.003
-0.005
-0.006
-0.008
-0.009
-0.010
-0.011
-0.012
-0.013
-0.012
(-0.65)
(-0.70)
(-0.42)
(-0.06)
(-0.14)
(-0.13)
(-0.40)
(-0.69)
(-0.80)
(-1.00)
(-1.11)
(-1.13)
(-1.25)
(-1.28)
(-1.41)
(-1.29)
farm
1939
0.001
0.002
0.002
-0.001
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.005
0.006
0.006
0.011
0.013
0.012
0.011
0.011
0.009
(0.99)
(0.69)
(0.41)
(-0.15)
(-0.29)
(0.00)
(0.21)
(0.62)
(0.64)
(0.65)
(1.05)
(1.26)
(1.11)
(0.91)
(1.00)
(0.74)
m
ine1939
-0.000
0.001
-0.001
0.002
0.007
0.009
0.012
0.020
0.016
0.015
0.012
0.007
-0.003
-0.004
-0.011
-0.009
(-0.13)
(0.33)
(-0.10)
(0.21)
(0.61)
(0.76)
(1.11)
(1.75)
(1.34)
(1.22)
(0.91)
(0.46)
(-0.21)
(-0.26)
(-0.75)
(-0.60)
assets39
0.000
-0.000
-0.001
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.002
(0.07)
(-0.56)
(-0.68)
(-1.21)
(-1.14)
(-1.23)
(-1.39)
(-1.00)
(-0.75)
(-0.61)
(-0.46)
(-0.41)
(-0.39)
(-0.39)
(-0.55)
(-0.88)
vo
te40
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
0.004
0.005
0.004
-0.009
-0.020
-0.028
-0.030
-0.030
-0.038
-0.039
-0.037
-0.047
-0.065
(-0.55)
(-0.20)
(-0.10)
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.07)
(-0.17)
(-0.39)
(-0.50)
(-0.51)
(-0.47)
(-0.57)
(-0.56)
(-0.52)
(-0.67)
(-0.88)
_cons
0.062
0.121
-0.191
-0.838
-0.540
-0.434
1.163
2.483
3.380
3.678*
3.760
4.357*
5.139*
5.796*
6.608**
8.464***
(0.24)
(0.19)
(-0.22)
(-0.66)
(-0.34)
(-0.26)
(0.71)
(1.52)
(1.97)
(2.03)
(1.91)
(2.13)
(2.42)
(2.62)
(3.08)
(3.71)
N
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
adj.R
-sq
-0.070
-0.075
-0.068
-0.047
-0.064
-0.050
0.011
0.054
0.005
-0.008
-0.006
0.011
0.012
0.013
0.091
0.121
tstatisticsin
parentheses
*
p<0.05
**
p<0.01
***
p<0.001
T
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1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
w
artotal
-0.001
-0.002
-0.004
-0.002
-0.002
-0.001
0.001
0.002
-0.000
0.001
-0.002
-0.002
0.002
-0.001
-0.020
-0.008
(-0.58)
(-1.15)
(-1.49)
(-0.62)
(-0.46)
(-0.23)
(0.18)
(0.29)
(-0.03)
(0.13)
(-0.28)
(-0.22)
(0.21)
(-0.11)
(-0.26)
(-0.33)
m
an1939
0.003
0.010
0.009
0.009
0.002
-0.011
-0.027
-0.057
-0.064
-0.067
-0.053
-0.072
-0.094
-0.082
0.236
-0.124
(0.63)
(1.10)
(0.74)
(0.50)
(0.11)
(-0.50)
(-1.13)
(-1.75)
(-1.69)
(-2.01)
(-1.52)
(-1.36)
(-1.60)
(-1.34)
(0.59)
(-1.00)
retail1939
0.012
0.041*
-0.041
-0.036
-0.055
-0.061
-0.054
-0.008
-0.027
-0.050
-0.032
-0.046
-0.087
-0.109
-0.523
-0.042
(1.19)
(2.08)
(-1.49)
(-0.93)
(-1.25)
(-1.31)
(-1.05)
(-0.12)
(-0.33)
(-0.70)
(-0.43)
(-0.41)
(-0.69)
(-0.83)
(-0.61)
(-0.16)
farm
1939
0.019
-0.003
0.072*
0.131*
0.052
0.057
0.037
0.043
0.112
0.270**
0.246*
0.286*
0.402*
0.388*
3.406**
0.129
(1.49)
(-0.13)
(2.10)
(2.70)
(0.95)
(0.99)
(0.58)
(0.50)
(1.10)
(3.04)
(2.65)
(2.02)
(2.56)
(2.36)
(3.20)
(0.39)
m
ine1939
-0.000
-0.017
0.029
0.025
0.075
0.080
0.167
0.159
0.097
-0.026
-0.089
-0.073
-0.035
-0.056
-0.823
0.389
(-0.01)
(-0.55)
(0.64)
(0.39)
(1.04)
(1.04)
(1.99)
(1.39)
(0.73)
(-0.22)
(-0.72)
(-0.39)
(-0.17)
(-0.26)
(-0.59)
(0.89)
assets39
0.009**
0.005
0.056***
0.028*
0.035**
0.034**
0.057***
0.086***
0.121***
0.103***
0.103***
0.177***
0.207***
0.225***
0.340
0.185*
(3.09)
(0.88)
(7.71)
(2.67)
(3.01)
(2.71)
(4.19)
(4.62)
(5.58)
(5.42)
(5.17)
(5.85)
(6.15)
(6.37)
(1.49)
(2.59)
vo
te40
-0.034
-0.194
-0.033
0.055
0.085
0.092
-0.033
-0.254
-0.339
-0.386
-0.507
-0.570
-0.523
-0.465
0.726
-1.126
(-0.42)
(-1.29)
(-0.16)
(0.18)
(0.25)
(0.26)
(-0.08)
(-0.47)
(-0.54)
(-0.70)
(-0.88)
(-0.65)
(-0.54)
(-0.45)
(0.11)
(-0.54)
_cons
-5.274*
-2.524
-1.873
-8.503
3.680
12.401
16.021
23.004
31.919
35.577*
34.298
40.144
39.915
46.747
-131.506
101.591
(-2.12)
(-0.54)
(-0.29)
(-0.92)
(0.35)
(1.12)
(1.31)
(1.38)
(1.65)
(2.09)
(1.93)
(1.48)
(1.33)
(1.49)
(-0.65)
(1.59)
N
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
adj.R
-sq
0.458
0.357
0.679
0.141
0.082
0.035
0.295
0.427
0.512
0.495
0.492
0.546
0.553
0.567
0.143
0.125
T
able
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1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
w
artotal
0.002
0.003
0.009
0.022
0.028
0.029
0.037*
0.018
0.021
0.020
0.026
0.023
0.024
0.025
0.024
0.017
(0.78)
(0.58)
(1.62)
(1.65)
(1.73)
(1.72)
(2.19)
(1.04)
(1.13)
(1.04)
(1.36)
(1.22)
(1.33)
(1.44)
(1.41)
(0.52)
m
an1939
-0.020
-0.014
-0.000
-0.047
-0.029
-0.008
-0.164
-0.036
-0.040
-0.031
-0.081
-0.102
-0.107
-0.100
-0.130
-0.143
(-1.67)
(-0.52)
(-0.00)
(-0.68)
(-0.34)
(-0.09)
(-1.85)
(-0.40)
(-0.41)
(-0.31)
(-0.83)
(-1.06)
(-1.16)
(-1.09)
(-1.46)
(-0.83)
retail1939
-0.093***
-0.189**
-0.203**
-0.143
-0.061
0.121
0.383
0.292
0.368
0.327
0.480*
0.537*
0.680**
0.651**
0.632**
0.522
(-3.56)
(-3.33)
(-3.23)
(-0.96)
(-0.34)
(0.63)
(2.00)
(1.48)
(1.75)
(1.52)
(2.26)
(2.59)
(3.42)
(3.28)
(3.29)
(1.41)
farm
1939
0.099**
0.200**
0.230**
0.381*
0.729**
0.671**
0.805**
1.057***
0.933***
0.715*
0.489
0.318
0.241
0.356
0.340
0.072
(3.05)
(2.83)
(2.94)
(2.06)
(3.25)
(2.83)
(3.38)
(4.31)
(3.57)
(2.67)
(1.85)
(1.23)
(0.98)
(1.44)
(1.42)
(0.16)
m
ine1939
0.029
0.127
0.057
0.102
-0.056
0.012
0.078
-0.169
-0.271
-0.222
-0.184
-0.268
-0.217
-0.261
-0.037
0.709
(0.68)
(1.36)
(0.55)
(0.42)
(-0.19)
(0.04)
(0.25)
(-0.52)
(-0.79)
(-0.63)
(-0.53)
(-0.79)
(-0.66)
(-0.80)
(-0.12)
(1.17)
assets39
0.056***
0.144***
0.204***
0.468***
0.626***
0.729***
0.604***
0.471***
0.342***
0.312***
0.328***
0.223***
0.135*
0.059
0.110*
0.068
(8.01)
(9.53)
(12.17)
(11.81)
(13.03)
(14.37)
(11.84)
(8.96)
(6.11)
(5.42)
(5.78)
(4.04)
(2.55)
(1.12)
(2.15)
(0.69)
vo
te40
0.134
0.282
0.065
-0.463
-0.817
-1.098
-0.816
-0.569
-0.577
-0.742
-0.534
-0.500
-0.525
-0.960
-0.922
-2.078
(0.66)
(0.64)
(0.13)
(-0.40)
(-0.59)
(-0.75)
(-0.55)
(-0.37)
(-0.36)
(-0.45)
(-0.33)
(-0.31)
(-0.34)
(-0.63)
(-0.62)
(-0.73)
_cons
1.570
-3.252
5.377
31.908
22.270
36.166
44.440
10.450
10.370
23.945
4.178
10.830
22.428
38.126
36.621
120.640
(0.25)
(-0.24)
(0.36)
(0.90)
(0.52)
(0.80)
(0.98)
(0.22)
(0.21)
(0.47)
(0.08)
(0.22)
(0.47)
(0.81)
(0.80)
(1.37)
N
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
adj.R
-sq
0.575
0.712
0.854
0.875
0.904
0.929
0.902
0.845
0.757
0.710
0.756
0.662
0.617
0.511
0.577
0.139
tstatisticsin
parentheses
*
p<0.05
**
p<0.01
***
p<0.001
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Table 3.11: Coefficients from State Fixed Effects Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Assets
Residential
Mortgages Farm Mortgages
Comerical
Industrial and
Agricultural Loans
Government
Liabilities
wtot40X_1941 0.042** 0.002*** -0.000 0.003 0.028
(2.75) (3.80) (-0.33) (1.07) (1.63)
wtot40X_1942 0.045*** 0.002 -0.000 0.015 0.059*
(5.34) (1.67) (-0.88) (1.94) (2.23)
wtot40X_1943 0.161*** 0.001 -0.000 0.005 0.197*
(3.89) (0.26) (-1.06) (1.73) (2.52)
wtot40X_1944 0.270** -0.001 -0.000 0.009* 0.284*
(3.28) (-0.34) (-1.13) (2.11) (2.65)
wtot40X_1945 0.376** -0.001 -0.000 0.009* 0.365**
(3.19) (-0.48) (-1.02) (2.16) (2.78)
wtot40X_1946 0.401** 0.002 -0.000 0.023* 0.357**
(3.26) (0.75) (-0.40) (2.16) (2.90)
wtot40X_1947 0.366*** 0.014* 0.000 0.047* 0.287**
(3.59) (2.61) (0.43) (2.43) (2.87)
wtot40X_1948 0.379*** 0.026** 0.000 0.066* 0.252**
(3.79) (3.41) (1.13) (2.27) (3.18)
wtot40X_1949 0.389*** 0.035** 0.000 0.056* 0.246**
(3.61) (3.49) (1.22) (2.32) (3.21)
wtot40X_1950 0.430*** 0.049** 0.000 0.057* 0.262**
(3.79) (3.13) (1.19) (2.29) (3.41)
wtot40X_1951 0.481*** 0.069* 0.001 0.098* 0.209***
(3.65) (2.67) (1.73) (2.26) (3.99)
wtot40X_1952 0.542** 0.077* 0.001 0.112* 0.210***
(3.45) (2.38) (1.97) (2.24) (4.52)
wtot40X_1953 0.565*** 0.097* 0.001* 0.126* 0.185***
(3.73) (2.40) (2.27) (2.24) (5.83)
wtot40X_1954 0.625** 0.113* 0.001* 0.108* 0.219***
(3.46) (2.30) (2.30) (2.10) (4.64)
wtot40X_1955 0.679** 0.138* 0.001** 0.126* 0.212***
(3.44) (2.22) (2.69) (2.34) (5.71)
yd40_1941 -14465.008 100.771 155.453 9499.531 -40603.694
(-0.41) (0.10) (0.97) (1.68) (-1.04)
yd40_1942 54417.386** 686.132 -35.097 -15956.067 -33248.820
(2.74) (0.26) (-0.13) (-0.91) (-0.56)
yd40_1943 83493.873 2648.601 -484.666 -11834.580 -55850.005
(0.87) (0.58) (-0.84) (-1.69) (-0.32)
yd40_1944 71642.379 4176.120 -292.483 -16329.257 -59473.226
(0.38) (0.73) (-0.43) (-1.54) (-0.25)
yd40_1945 99883.991 5292.447 306.644 -7884.515 -37369.829
(0.37) (0.78) (0.36) (-0.80) (-0.13)
yd40_1946 180563.551 9004.649 2103.322* -15652.423 40251.065
(0.64) (1.30) (2.20) (-0.64) (0.14)
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Table 3.11 Continued…
yd40_1947 228871.859 5044.691 3744.857*** -24182.882 68448.272
(0.98) (0.46) (3.82) (-0.55) (0.30)
yd40_1948 245986.357 -2977.834 4768.157*** -29876.389 96095.543
(1.07) (-0.19) (4.43) (-0.46) (0.53)
yd40_1949 220473.386 -14121.377 5140.585*** -6058.005 75861.217
(0.89) (-0.66) (4.41) (-0.11) (0.43)
yd40_1950 219489.375 -24632.451 6007.649*** 4495.067 66554.003
(0.84) (-0.71) (4.65) (0.08) (0.38)
yd40_1951 189740.136 -47861.674 6990.705*** -28924.129 106651.312
(0.63) (-0.82) (4.88) (-0.30) (0.89)
yd40_1952 187861.704 -52011.890 7321.079*** -44048.836 152141.106
(0.52) (-0.71) (4.85) (-0.39) (1.41)
yd40_1953 211599.823 -77964.677 7760.970*** -59276.199 199130.468*
(0.61) (-0.85) (4.92) (-0.47) (2.65)
yd40_1954 200679.521 -97890.924 8410.558*** 152974.285 144095.337
(0.48) (-0.88) (5.04) (0.76) (1.33)
yd40_1955 192038.667 -123571.286 10241.126*** -12906.138 169309.663
(0.43) (-0.88) (5.31) (-0.11) (1.93)
_cons 123578.878 17975.571 325.143 16562.714 18898.163
(0.56) (0.59) (0.34) (0.32) (0.14)
N 784 784 784 784 784
adj. R-sq 0.744 0.489 0.632 0.443 0.633
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table 3.12: Coefficients from Regional Fixed Effects Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Assets
Residential
Mortgages Farm Mortgages
Comerical
Industrial and
Agricultural Loans
Government
Liabilit ies
wtot40X_1941 0.043** 0.002*** -0.000 0.003 0.028
(2.74) (3.78) (-0.33) (1.05) (1.62)
wtot40X_1942 0.045*** 0.002 -0.000 0.015 0.059*
(5.32) (1.66) (-0.87) (1.92) (2.22)
wtot40X_1943 0.161*** 0.001 -0.000 0.005 0.197*
(3.86) (0.26) (-1.05) (1.72) (2.50)
wtot40X_1944 0.271** -0.001 -0.000 0.009* 0.285*
(3.26) (-0.35) (-1.12) (2.09) (2.63)
wtot40X_1945 0.377** -0.001 -0.000 0.009* 0.366**
(3.16) (-0.49) (-1.01) (2.14) (2.77)
wtot40X_1946 0.402** 0.002 -0.000 0.023* 0.358**
(3.24) (0.73) (-0.41) (2.15) (2.88)
wtot40X_1947 0.366*** 0.014* 0.000 0.047* 0.288**
(3.56) (2.59) (0.40) (2.42) (2.85)
wtot40X_1948 0.380*** 0.026** 0.000 0.066* 0.253**
(3.76) (3.39) (1.09) (2.26) (3.16)
wtot40X_1949 0.390*** 0.035** 0.000 0.057* 0.247**
(3.58) (3.47) (1.17) (2.30) (3.19)
wtot40X_1950 0.431*** 0.049** 0.000 0.057* 0.263**
(3.76) (3.11) (1.14) (2.27) (3.39)
wtot40X_1951 0.482*** 0.069* 0.001 0.098* 0.209***
(3.62) (2.65) (1.67) (2.25) (3.97)
wtot40X_1952 0.544** 0.077* 0.001 0.112* 0.211***
(3.43) (2.37) (1.90) (2.23) (4.49)
wtot40X_1953 0.567*** 0.097* 0.001* 0.126* 0.185***
(3.71) (2.38) (2.21) (2.23) (5.78)
wtot40X_1954 0.627** 0.113* 0.001* 0.108* 0.220***
(3.43) (2.29) (2.23) (2.07) (4.61)
wtot40X_1955 0.681** 0.139* 0.001* 0.126* 0.212***
(3.42) (2.21) (2.61) (2.33) (5.66)
wartotal -0.415** -0.033 -0.001** -0.090* -0.281**
(-3.01) (-1.42) (-2.69) (-2.66) (-3.40)
yd40_1941 -16822.063 5.079 161.579 9636.477 -42109.316
(-0.46) (0.01) (0.97) (1.65) (-1.05)
yd40_1942 52196.049* 620.566 -34.762 -16630.179 -35637.090
(2.55) (0.23) (-0.12) (-0.92) (-0.58)
yd40_1943 78391.649 2652.494 -499.368 -11961.668 -64725.388
(0.79) (0.56) (-0.84) (-1.65) (-0.36)
yd40_1944 63292.782 4372.867 -301.681 -16628.131 -70967.883
(0.33) (0.74) (-0.43) (-1.52) (-0.28)
yd40_1945 86157.295 5598.978 316.034 -8065.065 -52298.515
(0.31) (0.80) (0.36) (-0.79) (-0.17)
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yd40_1946 167084.765 9404.882 2170.301* -16412.397 25918.304
(0.58) (1.31) (2.20) (-0.65) (0.09)
yd40_1947 217388.535 4970.582 3864.637*** -26266.076 58127.400
(0.90) (0.44) (3.83) (-0.58) (0.25)
yd40_1948 234905.133 -3811.584 4919.421*** -32590.699 88192.395
(0.99) (-0.24) (4.45) (-0.48) (0.47)
yd40_1949 209433.999 -15309.674 5304.448*** -7880.061 68442.977
(0.82) (-0.69) (4.43) (-0.14) (0.38)
yd40_1950 205566.916 -26675.409 6197.147*** 2718.254 57172.307
(0.76) (-0.75) (4.67) (0.05) (0.32)
yd40_1951 173039.524 -50729.562 7211.939*** -32611.232 98966.269
(0.56) (-0.84) (4.91) (-0.32) (0.80)
yd40_1952 168893.547 -55165.062 7550.223*** -48001.469 144424.292
(0.45) (-0.73) (4.88) (-0.41) (1.30)
yd40_1953 193605.863 -81893.717 8007.422*** -64008.454 194039.258*
(0.54) (-0.87) (4.95) (-0.49) (2.50)
yd40_1954 180970.350 -102662.056 8675.724*** 154393.387 137088.970
(0.42) (-0.90) (5.08) (0.74) (1.22)
yd40_1955 169523.203 -129303.789 10518.052*** -18110.284 163658.630
(0.36) (-0.89) (5.31) (-0.14) (1.81)
mine1939 -7.334*** -1.338** -0.002 -1.728*** -4.493***
(-4.01) (-3.39) (-0.17) (-3.51) (-4.11)
man1939 -0.844* -0.252** 0.008* -0.120 -0.276
(-2.21) (-2.89) (2.11) (-1.29) (-1.45)
farm1939 -3.783** -0.989** 0.005 -0.418 -3.096***
(-3.12) (-2.77) (0.50) (-1.08) (-3.75)
retail1939 4.702*** 0.724*** -0.005 0.883*** 2.597***
(9.25) (6.09) (-1.90) (6.24) (9.05)
vote40 -6275.348 -804.535 -91.516* -821.458 -3820.999
(-1.37) (-0.62) (-2.18) (-0.74) (-1.47)
_cons -244475.972 44313.009 1386.301 -80694.663 -2268.983
(-0.77) (0.78) (0.94) (-1.00) (-0.01)
N 768 768 768 768 768
adj. R-sq 0.867 0.603 0.508 0.621 0.824
Table 3.12 Continued…
t statist ics in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table 3.13: Per Capita Coefficients. State Fixed Effects Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Assets
Residential
Mortgages Farm Mortgages
Comerical
Industrial and
Agricultural Loans
Government
Liabilit ies
wtot40X_1941 0.013** 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.008**
(3.09) (0.07) (-0.18) (1.20) (3.37)
wtot40X_1942 0.007 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.025***
(1.25) (-0.32) (-0.27) (0.90) (4.61)
wtot40X_1943 0.041*** -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 0.065***
(3.83) (-1.01) (-0.07) (-1.42) (4.44)
wtot40X_1944 0.065*** -0.003 -0.000 -0.001 0.092***
(3.65) (-1.44) (-0.14) (-0.71) (4.39)
wtot40X_1945 0.086** -0.005 -0.000 -0.003 0.118***
(3.41) (-1.55) (-0.48) (-1.88) (4.24)
wtot40X_1946 0.051* -0.005 -0.000 -0.000 0.086**
(2.16) (-1.33) (-1.05) (-0.18) (3.33)
wtot40X_1947 0.035 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.062**
(1.60) (-0.37) (-1.41) (0.30) (2.76)
wtot40X_1948 0.029 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.052*
(1.36) (0.46) (-1.50) (0.25) (2.53)
wtot40X_1949 0.025 0.005 -0.000 -0.005 0.052**
(1.20) (1.33) (-1.38) (-1.22) (2.71)
wtot40X_1950 0.048* 0.010* -0.000 -0.003 0.062**
(2.32) (2.42) (-1.45) (-0.87) (3.49)
wtot40X_1951 0.059* 0.017** -0.001 0.002 0.047**
(2.65) (3.22) (-1.66) (0.34) (2.69)
wtot40X_1952 0.050* 0.020*** -0.000 0.003 0.041*
(2.05) (3.60) (-1.51) (0.38) (2.52)
wtot40X_1953 0.050* 0.026*** -0.001 0.003 0.030
(2.18) (3.73) (-1.65) (0.44) (1.99)
wtot40X_1954 0.053* 0.031*** -0.001 -0.032 0.030*
(2.06) (3.90) (-1.96) (-0.98) (2.14)
wtot40X_1955 0.019 0.034** -0.001* -0.009 0.015
(0.42) (3.30) (-2.64) (-0.94) (0.93)
yd40_1941 24.543*** 2.099** -0.053 6.553*** 4.797*
(6.16) (2.88) (-0.28) (5.89) (2.34)
yd40_1942 66.820*** 3.108* -0.293 7.148*** 25.028***
(10.19) (2.39) (-1.16) (4.04) (4.81)
yd40_1943 181.465*** 3.563 -0.816* 2.273 136.795***
(11.05) (1.81) (-2.21) (0.71) (7.95)
yd40_1944 291.287*** 4.990 -0.764 3.017 220.045***
(11.06) (1.71) (-1.63) (1.20) (8.29)
yd40_1945 414.697*** 6.804 -0.354 8.754** 304.051***
(12.18) (1.84) (-0.77) (3.22) (8.69)
yd40_1946 492.814*** 12.082** 0.811 17.193*** 353.538***
(13.67) (2.75) (1.78) (5.26) (9.81)
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Table 3.13 Continued…
yd40_1947 479.029*** 20.789*** 2.149*** 38.611*** 303.266***
(12.62) (3.81) (4.81) (7.87) (8.87)
yd40_1948 493.214*** 28.018*** 2.840*** 54.662*** 277.226***
(12.48) (4.48) (6.61) (9.54) (8.33)
yd40_1949 479.943*** 29.559*** 2.812*** 61.241*** 250.385***
(12.18) (4.71) (6.13) (11.51) (7.98)
yd40_1950 478.439*** 34.921*** 3.088*** 61.391*** 246.779***
(12.10) (5.07) (6.03) (10.72) (8.22)
yd40_1951 496.296*** 38.964*** 3.756*** 82.210*** 221.010***
(12.21) (4.79) (7.24) (9.65) (8.13)
yd40_1952 557.638*** 41.359*** 3.740*** 89.016*** 244.015***
(12.72) (4.63) (7.03) (9.45) (8.81)
yd40_1953 573.372*** 43.586*** 4.024*** 93.358*** 244.571***
(13.63) (4.39) (7.14) (9.95) (9.50)
yd40_1954 615.672*** 44.483*** 4.425*** 189.585* 250.883***
(13.47) (4.12) (7.33) (2.22) (9.98)
yd40_1955 743.973*** 60.569*** 5.800*** 133.186*** 280.485***
(6.82) (3.62) (8.71) (5.96) (7.77)
_cons 23.872 2.732 0.106 3.856 -0.759
(1.18) (0.77) (0.37) (0.75) (-0.05)
N 784 784 784 784 784
adj. R-sq 0.766 0.563 0.609 0.222 0.753
t statist ics in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table 3.14: Per Capita Coefficients. Regional Fixed Effects Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Assets Residential
Mortgages
Farm Mortgages
Comerical Industrial
and Agricultural
Loans
Government
Liabilit ies
wtot40X_1941 0.013** -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.008**
(3.04) (-0.07) (-0.18) (1.09) (3.31)
wtot40X_1942 0.006 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.025***
(1.10) (-0.55) (-0.22) (0.81) (4.56)
wtot40X_1943 0.041*** -0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.068***
(3.71) (-1.19) (0.01) (-1.71) (4.52)
wtot40X_1944 0.065*** -0.004 -0.000 -0.002 0.095***
(3.57) (-1.62) (-0.07) (-1.00) (4.44)
wtot40X_1945 0.089** -0.005 -0.000 -0.004* 0.123***
(3.43) (-1.73) (-0.44) (-2.19) (4.32)
wtot40X_1946 0.053* -0.006 -0.000 -0.001 0.091**
(2.18) (-1.50) (-1.09) (-0.33) (3.44)
wtot40X_1947 0.037 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.065**
(1.66) (-0.48) (-1.57) (0.32) (2.85)
wtot40X_1948 0.033 0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.055*
(1.50) (0.42) (-1.72) (0.33) (2.64)
wtot40X_1949 0.029 0.005 -0.000 -0.004 0.056**
(1.40) (1.28) (-1.60) (-1.14) (2.83)
wtot40X_1950 0.056** 0.010* -0.001 -0.003 0.067***
(2.70) (2.43) (-1.67) (-0.72) (3.79)
wtot40X_1951 0.069** 0.017** -0.001 0.003 0.052**
(3.14) (3.20) (-1.93) (0.47) (3.06)
wtot40X_1952 0.061* 0.021*** -0.001 0.003 0.047**
(2.58) (3.59) (-1.77) (0.46) (3.04)
wtot40X_1953 0.059** 0.026*** -0.001 0.004 0.035*
(2.74) (3.71) (-1.92) (0.54) (2.39)
wtot40X_1954 0.063* 0.031*** -0.001* -0.033 0.035*
(2.60) (3.92) (-2.23) (-0.94) (2.65)
wtot40X_1955 0.030 0.035** -0.001** -0.007 0.019
(0.66) (3.28) (-2.80) (-0.71) (1.20)
wartotal -0.033 -0.013* -0.000 -0.008 -0.032
(-1.37) (-2.33) (-0.41) (-1.55) (-1.80)
yd40_1941 24.570*** 2.231** -0.052 6.752*** 5.118*
(5.87) (2.96) (-0.26) (5.86) (2.39)
yd40_1942 68.454*** 3.564** -0.303 7.506*** 24.956***
(10.22) (2.81) (-1.14) (4.13) (4.56)
yd40_1943 183.248*** 4.180* -0.852* 3.302 131.804***
(10.67) (2.14) (-2.20) (1.05) (7.63)
yd40_1944 291.767*** 5.891* -0.798 3.971 213.717***
(10.53) (2.03) (-1.62) (1.63) (7.89)
yd40_1945 408.968*** 7.913* -0.368 9.707*** 293.799***
(11.58) (2.15) (-0.76) (3.63) (8.37)
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yd40_1946 487.915*** 13.425** 0.853 17.922*** 343.161***
(12.98) (3.07) (1.78) (5.35) (9.47)
yd40_1947 473.687*** 21.847*** 2.256*** 38.295*** 295.902***
(11.97) (3.89) (4.94) (7.44) (8.42)
yd40_1948 484.638*** 28.255*** 2.978*** 53.857*** 269.950***
(11.92) (4.31) (6.94) (9.04) (7.90)
yd40_1949 469.572*** 29.650*** 2.949*** 60.842*** 242.827***
(11.71) (4.49) (6.40) (10.90) (7.58)
yd40_1950 462.115*** 34.152*** 3.235*** 60.436*** 235.653***
(12.17) (4.74) (6.27) (10.19) (8.03)
yd40_1951 477.029*** 38.097*** 3.935*** 80.274*** 209.913***
(12.68) (4.48) (7.68) (9.23) (8.08)
yd40_1952 536.116*** 40.235*** 3.913*** 87.670*** 230.996***
(13.36) (4.32) (7.37) (8.95) (8.99)
yd40_1953 553.351*** 42.548*** 4.217*** 91.565*** 234.182***
(14.25) (4.10) (7.54) (9.48) (9.46)
yd40_1954 592.499*** 42.800*** 4.632*** 191.175* 239.357***
(14.35) (3.82) (7.75) (2.12) (10.19)
yd40_1955 720.591*** 59.109** 5.977*** 129.085*** 271.264***
(6.44) (3.38) (8.83) (5.59) (7.39)
mine1939 0.052 0.217* -0.006 0.014 -0.002
(0.20) (2.25) (-0.75) (0.14) (-0.01)
man1939 -0.264* -0.021 0.004 0.026 -0.120
(-2.48) (-0.67) (1.49) (0.50) (-1.25)
farm1939 0.159 0.052 -0.008 0.256 0.256
(0.53) (0.48) (-0.96) (1.18) (0.90)
retail1939 0.381 -0.009 0.007 -0.142 0.284
(1.54) (-0.15) (1.03) (-1.33) (1.76)
vote40 -0.741 0.025 -0.016 0.129 -0.530
(-1.00) (0.17) (-0.97) (0.63) (-1.01)
assets39 0.495*** 0.068*** -0.002 0.132*** 0.329***
(11.30) (3.98) (-0.93) (7.14) (13.39)
_cons -169.940* -7.104 -2.015 -25.332 -156.062***
(-2.40) (-0.54) (-1.36) (-0.91) (-3.59)
N 768 768 768 768 768
adj. R-sq 0.778 0.536 0.399 0.247 0.766
="* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
t statistics in parentheses
Table 3.14 Continued…
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Table 3.15: Coefficients from Regional Fixed Effects Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Federal Credit
Adminsitration
Total Loans
Land Bank Loans
Savings and Loan
Total Assets
Savings and Loan
Mortgages Held
wtot40X_1941 -0.000 -0.000* 0.001 0.001*
(-0.55) (-2.32) (0.79) (2.66)
wtot40X_1942 -0.000 -0.000* 0.001 0.001*
(-1.42) (-2.34) (0.82) (2.25)
wtot40X_1943 -0.001 -0.001* 0.004** 0.001
(-1.88) (-2.10) (2.75) (1.87)
wtot40X_1944 -0.001 -0.001* 0.006** 0.002**
(-1.78) (-2.02) (2.70) (2.83)
wtot40X_1945 -0.001 -0.001 0.012** 0.004***
(-1.78) (-1.97) (3.37) (3.55)
wtot40X_1946 -0.001 -0.001 0.017*** 0.009***
(-1.63) (-1.94) (3.77) (3.68)
wtot40X_1947 -0.001 -0.002 0.023*** 0.017***
(-1.29) (-1.88) (4.05) (4.59)
wtot40X_1948 -0.001 -0.002 0.028*** 0.022***
(-0.98) (-1.84) (4.22) (4.62)
wtot40X_1949 -0.001 -0.002 0.034*** 0.027***
(-0.98) (-1.86) (4.32) (4.58)
wtot40X_1950 -0.001 -0.002 0.053** 0.035***
(-1.12) (-1.88) (3.16) (4.71)
wtot40X_1951 -0.000 -0.001 0.051*** 0.042***
(-0.73) (-1.89) (4.54) (4.74)
wtot40X_1952 -0.000 -0.001 0.065*** 0.054***
(-0.50) (-1.85) (4.47) (4.62)
wtot40X_1953 -0.000 -0.001 0.078*** 0.066***
(-0.43) (-1.80) (4.44) (4.56)
wtot40X_1954 -0.000 -0.001 0.097*** 0.081***
(-0.28) (-1.70) (4.41) (4.42)
wtot40X_1955 0.000 -0.001 0.119*** 0.100***
(0.08) (-1.57) (4.35) (4.36)
wartotal 0.003* 0.001 -0.043 -0.030
(2.29) (0.67) (-1.86) (-1.86)
yd40_1941 -1468.356** -2275.087*** 2180.975* 2359.520**
(-3.21) (-4.80) (2.25) (2.82)
yd40_1942 -5079.914*** -6153.073*** 2803.878 2180.434*
(-4.06) (-5.07) (1.97) (2.59)
yd40_1943 -8486.415** -11952.983*** 4538.558 2096.476
(-3.46) (-4.65) (1.84) (1.76)
yd40_1944 -13970.451*** -16184.224*** 6973.463 1166.772
(-3.92) (-4.45) (1.65) (0.72)
yd40_1945 -18645.628*** -20415.465*** 10232.977 2376.192
(-4.10) (-4.34) (1.46) (0.87)
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yd40_1946 -20692.243*** -23361.944*** 16476.564 12730.064*
(-3.88) (-4.29) (1.71) (2.43)
yd40_1947 -20499.408*** -25438.357*** 22312.616 19196.168*
(-3.52) (-4.18) (1.82) (2.25)
yd40_1948 -19748.213** -26268.528*** 26570.720 23960.329*
(-3.32) (-4.18) (1.79) (2.09)
yd40_1949 -19099.160** -25750.148*** 33011.552 28821.560*
(-3.26) (-4.10) (1.84) (2.04)
yd40_1950 -16043.657** -25374.199*** 34358.501 33883.355
(-2.90) (-4.04) (1.28) (1.88)
yd40_1951 -12248.780* -24426.341*** 50406.376 43210.922
(-2.39) (-3.99) (1.89) (2.00)
yd40_1952 -10573.388* -23340.001*** 64042.488 52559.418
(-2.09) (-3.95) (1.86) (1.88)
yd40_1953 -11492.905* -21743.379*** 86077.842 69960.574
(-2.23) (-3.81) (1.89) (1.97)
yd40_1954 -9988.621 -20528.320*** 107541.571 91871.486*
(-2.01) (-3.68) (2.00) (2.03)
yd40_1955 -4242.577 -17222.080** 135925.620 118231.656*
(-0.92) (-3.37) (2.01) (2.07)
mine1939 0.002 0.000 0.215 0.289
(0.11) (0.00) (0.44) (0.76)
man1939 -0.027** 0.011 0.161 0.093
(-2.96) (1.57) (1.22) (0.96)
farm1939 0.287*** -0.189*** 0.037 0.042
(6.48) (-8.49) (0.10) (0.15)
retail1939 0.019** -0.003 0.192 0.171
(2.75) (-0.62) (0.96) (1.17)
vote40 66.488 176.843 -15.158 32.716
(0.50) (1.19) (-0.01) (0.03)
_cons 12325.356 15431.000** -66856.707 -55482.684
(1.77) (2.89) (-1.49) (-1.72)
N 768 768 768 768
adj. R-sq 0.748 0.596 0.677 0.724
Table 13.15 Continued…
t stat istics in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table 3.16: Per Capita Coefficients. Regional Fixed Effects Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Federal Credit
Adminsitration
Total Loans
Land Bank Loans Savings and Loan
Total Assets
Savings and Loan
Mortgages Held
wtot40X_1941 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(-1.00) (-0.90) (-0.60) (0.23)
wtot40X_1942 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.46) (0.97) (-0.57) (-0.03)
wtot40X_1943 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.000
(1.25) (1.98) (1.25) (0.00)
wtot40X_1944 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001
(1.62) (1.92) (0.70) (1.01)
wtot40X_1945 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002
(1.84) (1.97) (1.34) (1.83)
wtot40X_1946 0.005 0.005* 0.004 0.003
(1.86) (2.04) (1.35) (1.89)
wtot40X_1947 0.005 0.006* 0.006 0.005*
(1.77) (2.07) (1.77) (2.37)
wtot40X_1948 0.005 0.006* 0.007 0.006*
(1.80) (2.06) (1.85) (2.42)
wtot40X_1949 0.005 0.006* 0.008 0.007*
(1.70) (2.03) (1.99) (2.48)
wtot40X_1950 0.004 0.006 0.013* 0.010**
(1.53) (2.00) (2.16) (2.77)
wtot40X_1951 0.003 0.006 0.015* 0.012**
(1.24) (1.92) (2.54) (2.79)
wtot40X_1952 0.003 0.005 0.017* 0.015**
(0.94) (1.87) (2.43) (2.71)
wtot40X_1953 0.003 0.005 -0.006 0.016*
(1.05) (1.76) (-0.23) (2.45)
wtot40X_1954 0.002 0.004 0.021* 0.018*
(0.91) (1.63) (2.22) (2.29)
wtot40X_1955 -0.002 0.003 0.019 0.016
(-0.54) (1.23) (1.44) (1.47)
wartotal -0.000 -0.008* -0.015 -0.017**
(-0.06) (-2.64) (-1.62) (-3.00)
yd40_1941 -0.440 -1.075*** 2.541* 2.068***
(-1.27) (-4.66) (2.61) (4.27)
yd40_1942 -3.492*** -4.117*** 3.727* 2.097**
(-4.35) (-7.14) (2.39) (2.93)
yd40_1943 -7.867*** -9.704*** 3.461* 2.381
(-4.17) (-5.76) (2.09) (1.93)
yd40_1944 -12.064*** -13.289*** 8.898*** 1.661
(-4.15) (-4.81) (3.77) (1.75)
yd40_1945 -16.712*** -17.584*** 14.285*** 3.645**
(-4.07) (-4.39) (4.97) (3.22)
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yd40_1946 -19.893*** -21.327*** 19.639*** 11.057***
(-3.90) (-4.33) (5.54) (6.39)
yd40_1947 -20.007** -23.658*** 24.300*** 18.043***
(-3.50) (-4.21) (6.46) (7.03)
yd40_1948 -19.783** -24.640*** 29.226*** 23.710***
(-3.29) (-4.17) (6.94) (7.60)
yd40_1949 -19.740** -24.625*** 35.424*** 28.680***
(-3.28) (-4.08) (7.40) (7.93)
yd40_1950 -18.045** -24.589*** 43.427*** 34.217***
(-2.99) (-4.03) (6.79) (7.73)
yd40_1951 -14.307* -23.777*** 49.089*** 40.494***
(-2.46) (-3.95) (7.27) (7.50)
yd40_1952 -12.198* -22.697*** 62.601*** 50.573***
(-2.16) (-3.92) (7.50) (7.56)
yd40_1953 -12.705* -21.006*** 142.981* 64.461***
(-2.35) (-3.80) (2.12) (7.75)
yd40_1954 -11.444* -19.620*** 98.160*** 82.142***
(-2.21) (-3.68) (7.86) (7.82)
yd40_1955 0.664 -15.884** 138.085*** 117.436***
(0.07) (-3.14) (5.80) (5.92)
mine1939 0.018 -0.029 -0.470* -0.400**
(0.43) (-0.76) (-2.51) (-3.04)
man1939 -0.019 0.027 0.061 0.057
(-1.44) (1.59) (0.86) (1.22)
farm1939 0.278*** -0.179** -0.434 -0.466**
(5.98) (-3.01) (-1.83) (-3.27)
retail1939 -0.020 0.045 0.283 0.194
(-0.72) (1.41) (1.79) (1.85)
vote40 -0.004 0.135 -0.209 -0.227
(-0.05) (1.25) (-0.54) (-0.80)
assets39 0.002 -0.005 -0.012 -0.009
(0.54) (-1.13) (-0.38) (-0.40)
_cons 19.370* 2.496 -1.823 21.246
(2.27) (0.39) (-0.04) (1.02)
N 768 768 768 768
adj. R-sq 0.425 0.362 0.322 0.642
Table 3.16 Continued…
t statist ics in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table 3.17. Testing for the Importance of Outlier Variables. Not population adjusted.
Full
Population
Michigan
Dropped
New York
Dropped
Both States
Dropped
Full
Population
Michigan
Dropped
New York
Dropped
Both States
Dropped
wtot40X_1941 0.043** 0.049** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002**
(2.74) (2.91) (6.44) (7.49) (3.78) (3.91) (3.07) (3.23)
wtot40X_1942 0.045*** 0.050*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.004*
(5.32) (5.92) (5.52) (5.40) (1.66) (1.47) (2.51) (2.60)
wtot40X_1943 0.161*** 0.186*** 0.119*** 0.138*** 0.001 0.000 0.002* 0.003
(3.86) (4.57) (6.02) (9.06) (0.26) (0.11) (2.05) (1.82)
wtot40X_1944 0.271** 0.317*** 0.184*** 0.216*** -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.002
(3.26) (3.77) (5.59) (8.80) (-0.35) (-0.53) (1.71) (1.19)
wtot40X_1945 0.377** 0.445*** 0.253*** 0.302*** -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(3.16) (3.75) (5.14) (8.74) (-0.49) (-0.74) (1.28) (0.67)
wtot40X_1946 0.402** 0.476*** 0.275*** 0.332*** 0.002 0.001 0.005** 0.005*
(3.24) (3.96) (4.61) (7.31) (0.73) (0.35) (3.13) (2.15)
wtot40X_1947 0.366*** 0.433*** 0.266*** 0.320*** 0.014* 0.014* 0.016* 0.018*
(3.56) (4.51) (4.63) (7.29) (2.59) (2.19) (2.65) (2.32)
wtot40X_1948 0.380*** 0.448*** 0.283*** 0.341*** 0.026** 0.028** 0.025* 0.028*
(3.76) (4.87) (4.65) (7.28) (3.39) (3.25) (2.59) (2.38)
wtot40X_1949 0.390*** 0.459*** 0.283*** 0.339*** 0.035** 0.040*** 0.028* 0.033*
(3.58) (4.50) (4.78) (7.60) (3.47) (3.79) (2.65) (2.54)
wtot40X_1950 0.431*** 0.503*** 0.318*** 0.376*** 0.049** 0.057** 0.034** 0.040**
(3.76) (4.64) (5.12) (7.61) (3.11) (3.51) (2.92) (2.92)
wtot40X_1951 0.482*** 0.563*** 0.348*** 0.412*** 0.069* 0.081** 0.042** 0.049**
(3.62) (4.40) (5.17) (7.78) (2.65) (2.97) (3.21) (3.39)
wtot40X_1952 0.544** 0.638*** 0.383*** 0.455*** 0.077* 0.091* 0.041*** 0.048***
(3.43) (4.14) (4.96) (7.53) (2.37) (2.58) (4.50) (5.41)
wtot40X_1953 0.567*** 0.660*** 0.413*** 0.487*** 0.097* 0.116* 0.053** 0.064***
(3.71) (4.49) (5.21) (7.58) (2.38) (2.67) (3.41) (3.92)
wtot40X_1954 0.627** 0.734*** 0.440*** 0.520*** 0.113* 0.135* 0.059*** 0.071***
(3.43) (4.08) (5.09) (7.47) (2.29) (2.53) (3.63) (4.22)
wtot40X_1955 0.681** 0.796*** 0.477*** 0.563*** 0.139* 0.166* 0.070*** 0.082***
(3.42) (4.06) (4.97) (7.04) (2.21) (2.41) (3.94) (4.60)
wartotal -0.415** -0.542*** -0.220** -0.260*** -0.033 -0.054* 0.002 -0.002
(-3.01) (-4.23) (-3.28) (-4.24) (-1.42) (-2.44) (0.29) (-0.29)
N 768 752 752 736 768 752 752 736
adj. R-sq 0.867 0.896 0.905 0.928 0.603 0.656 0.719 0.749
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
Total Assets Residential Mortgages
t statistics in parentheses
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Full
Population
Michigan
Dropped
New York
Dropped
Both States
Dropped
Full
Population
Michigan
Dropped
New York
Dropped
Both States
Dropped
wtot40X_1941 0.003 0.003 0.006** 0.007*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(1.05) (0.95) (3.38) (4.51) (-0.33) (-0.67) (-0.23) (-0.56)
wtot40X_1942 0.015 0.019* 0.007** 0.008*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(1.92) (2.19) (2.99) (3.90) (-0.87) (-1.22) (-0.77) (-1.16)
wtot40X_1943 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(1.72) (1.79) (1.68) (1.44) (-1.05) (-1.31) (-1.05) (-1.42)
wtot40X_1944 0.009* 0.011* 0.005* 0.005* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(2.09) (2.22) (2.57) (2.35) (-1.12) (-1.31) (-1.05) (-1.31)
wtot40X_1945 0.009* 0.010* 0.005* 0.006 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(2.14) (2.32) (2.04) (1.93) (-1.01) (-1.22) (-0.96) (-1.23)
wtot40X_1946 0.023* 0.028* 0.012** 0.014** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(2.15) (2.44) (2.94) (3.45) (-0.41) (-0.72) (-0.43) (-0.77)
wtot40X_1947 0.047* 0.058** 0.027** 0.035*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(2.42) (2.92) (2.94) (3.93) (0.40) (0.08) (0.22) (-0.11)
wtot40X_1948 0.066* 0.081* 0.035** 0.045*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2.26) (2.68) (3.01) (4.23) (1.09) (0.69) (0.89) (0.49)
wtot40X_1949 0.057* 0.070** 0.031** 0.040*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2.30) (2.79) (2.79) (3.85) (1.17) (0.77) (0.94) (0.53)
wtot40X_1950 0.057* 0.070** 0.031** 0.039*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2.27) (2.70) (3.11) (4.44) (1.14) (0.77) (0.91) (0.53)
wtot40X_1951 0.098* 0.121* 0.052** 0.067*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.25) (2.65) (3.15) (4.49) (1.67) (1.24) (1.37) (0.94)
wtot40X_1952 0.112* 0.138* 0.059** 0.075*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.23) (2.62) (3.15) (4.55) (1.90) (1.47) (1.61) (1.16)
wtot40X_1953 0.126* 0.154* 0.066** 0.083*** 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.23) (2.60) (3.25) (4.52) (2.21) (1.74) (1.85) (1.39)
wtot40X_1954 0.108* 0.133* 0.054* 0.071** 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.07) (2.46) (2.38) (3.13) (2.23) (1.77) (1.86) (1.39)
wtot40X_1955 0.126* 0.154** 0.069** 0.088*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001
(2.33) (2.75) (3.23) (4.49) (2.61) (2.13) (2.18) (1.70)
wartotal -0.090* -0.124*** -0.040** -0.052*** -0.001** -0.002** -0.001* -0.001*
(-2.66) (-3.86) (-2.73) (-3.82) (-2.69) (-3.38) (-2.10) (-2.02)
N 768 752 752 736 752 752 736 768
adj. R-sq 0.621 0.673 0.527 0.555 0.507 0.516 0.511 0.824
t stat istics in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
Comerical Industrial and Agricultural Loans
Table 17 continued…
Farm Mortgages
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Table 3.17 continued…
Full Population Michigan
Dropped
New York
Dropped
Both States
Dropped
wtot40X_1941 0.028 0.034 0.009*** 0.010***
(1.62) (1.71) (4.45) (4.43)
wtot40X_1942 0.059* 0.070* 0.030*** 0.035***
(2.22) (2.38) (5.03) (5.80)
wtot40X_1943 0.197* 0.234** 0.112*** 0.133***
(2.50) (2.77) (5.36) (8.00)
wtot40X_1944 0.285* 0.337** 0.168*** 0.199***
(2.63) (2.93) (5.43) (8.19)
wtot40X_1945 0.366** 0.436** 0.226*** 0.271***
(2.77) (3.17) (5.09) (8.61)
wtot40X_1946 0.358** 0.427** 0.227*** 0.275***
(2.88) (3.39) (4.77) (8.09)
wtot40X_1947 0.288** 0.343** 0.182*** 0.220***
(2.85) (3.32) (5.04) (8.98)
wtot40X_1948 0.253** 0.300*** 0.170*** 0.205***
(3.16) (3.77) (5.18) (9.38)
wtot40X_1949 0.247** 0.292*** 0.167*** 0.201***
(3.19) (3.79) (5.31) (9.28)
wtot40X_1950 0.263** 0.308*** 0.183*** 0.217***
(3.39) (3.98) (5.64) (9.07)
wtot40X_1951 0.209*** 0.242*** 0.157*** 0.182***
(3.97) (4.72) (6.03) (8.77)
wtot40X_1952 0.211*** 0.243*** 0.166*** 0.194***
(4.49) (5.67) (6.13) (9.80)
wtot40X_1953 0.185*** 0.209*** 0.158*** 0.181***
(5.78) (7.67) (6.57) (9.06)
wtot40X_1954 0.220*** 0.251*** 0.174*** 0.201***
(4.61) (5.67) (6.10) (8.40)
wtot40X_1955 0.212*** 0.240*** 0.181*** 0.208***
(5.66) (7.78) (6.07) (8.50)
wartotal -0.281** -0.355*** -0.163*** -0.184***
(-3.40) (-4.40) (-4.48) (-5.37)
N 752 752 736 736
adj. R-sq 0.855 0.900 0.924 0.924
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
Government Liabilities
t statistics in parentheses
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Table 3.18. Testing for the Importance of Outlier Variables. Population Adjusted.
Full
Population
Michigan
Dropped
New York
Dropped
Both States
Dropped
Full
Population
Michigan
Dropped
New York
Dropped
Both States
Dropped
wtot40X_1941 0.013** 0.015** 0.012** 0.013* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(3.04) (2.75) (2.95) (2.60) (-0.13) (-0.07) (-0.15) (-0.18)
wtot40X_1942 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(1.10) (0.82) (0.90) (0.58) (-0.65) (-0.55) (-0.57) (-0.22)
wtot40X_1943 0.041*** 0.044** 0.036*** 0.038*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
(3.71) (3.21) (4.11) (3.54) (-1.53) (-1.19) (-1.17) (0.01)
wtot40X_1944 0.065*** 0.073** 0.056*** 0.062*** -0.005* -0.004 -0.004 -0.000
(3.57) (3.34) (4.15) (3.94) (-2.10) (-1.62) (-1.59) (-0.07)
wtot40X_1945 0.089** 0.105** 0.077*** 0.089*** -0.007* -0.005 -0.005 -0.000
(3.43) (3.45) (4.02) (4.22) (-2.37) (-1.73) (-1.70) (-0.44)
wtot40X_1946 0.053* 0.067* 0.044* 0.055* -0.008* -0.006 -0.005 -0.000
(2.18) (2.37) (2.24) (2.50) (-2.14) (-1.50) (-1.44) (-1.09)
wtot40X_1947 0.037 0.049 0.031 0.041 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(1.66) (1.91) (1.54) (1.81) (-0.83) (-0.48) (-0.43) (-1.57)
wtot40X_1948 0.033 0.043 0.028 0.037 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.000
(1.50) (1.74) (1.37) (1.60) (0.13) (0.42) (0.42) (-1.72)
wtot40X_1949 0.029 0.038 0.025 0.032 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.000
(1.40) (1.60) (1.24) (1.43) (1.02) (1.28) (1.23) (-1.60)
wtot40X_1950 0.056** 0.065* 0.051* 0.058* 0.011* 0.010* 0.009* -0.001
(2.70) (2.67) (2.68) (2.64) (2.14) (2.43) (2.42) (-1.67)
wtot40X_1951 0.069** 0.079** 0.062** 0.070** 0.020** 0.017** 0.016** -0.001
(3.14) (3.13) (3.18) (3.16) (3.02) (3.20) (3.43) (-1.93)
wtot40X_1952 0.061* 0.071* 0.052* 0.060* 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.019*** -0.001
(2.58) (2.69) (2.47) (2.56) (3.66) (3.59) (3.95) (-1.77)
wtot40X_1953 0.059** 0.066* 0.052* 0.056* 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.024*** -0.001
(2.74) (2.59) (2.59) (2.40) (4.04) (3.71) (4.07) (-1.92)
wtot40X_1954 0.063* 0.074* 0.055* 0.063* 0.037*** 0.031*** 0.028*** -0.001*
(2.60) (2.63) (2.56) (2.58) (4.48) (3.92) (4.27) (-2.23)
wtot40X_1955 0.030 0.038 0.020 0.025 0.042*** 0.035** 0.031** -0.001**
(0.66) (0.74) (0.47) (0.52) (3.83) (3.28) (3.30) (-2.80)
wartotal -0.033 -0.042 -0.027 -0.033 -0.017** -0.013* -0.013* -0.000
(-1.37) (-1.57) (-1.26) (-1.43) (-3.30) (-2.33) (-2.56) (-0.41)
N 768 752 752 736 752 768 752 768
adj. R-sq 0.778 0.776 0.764 0.761 0.553 0.536 0.548 0.399
Total Assets Residential Mortgages
t stat istics in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Full
Population
Michigan
Dropped
New York
Dropped
Both States
Dropped
Full
Population
Michigan
Dropped
New York
Dropped
Both States
Dropped
wtot40X_1941 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(-0.23) (-0.41) (-0.19) (-0.42) (1.13) (1.09) (1.24) (1.30)
wtot40X_1942 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(-0.69) (-0.54) (-0.25) (-0.58) (0.87) (0.81) (0.48) (0.55)
wtot40X_1943 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 -0.005**
(-1.50) (-0.39) (-0.03) (-0.44) (-2.22) (-1.71) (-1.99) (-2.75)
wtot40X_1944 -0.005* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003*
(-2.06) (-0.34) (-0.10) (-0.37) (-1.48) (-1.00) (-1.50) (-2.53)
wtot40X_1945 -0.007* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.005** -0.004* -0.004* -0.005***
(-2.33) (-0.73) (-0.46) (-0.74) (-2.80) (-2.19) (-2.68) (-3.93)
wtot40X_1946 -0.007* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(-2.03) (-1.49) (-1.08) (-1.48) (-0.25) (-0.33) (-1.00) (-1.01)
wtot40X_1947 -0.004 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(-0.77) (-1.81) (-1.53) (-1.76) (0.48) (0.32) (-0.06) (0.12)
wtot40X_1948 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.001
(0.13) (-1.96) (-1.66) (-1.88) (0.57) (0.33) (-0.17) (0.15)
wtot40X_1949 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006* -0.005
(0.96) (-1.83) (-1.54) (-1.75) (-0.65) (-1.14) (-2.10) (-1.51)
wtot40X_1950 0.010* -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(2.11) (-1.82) (-1.61) (-1.75) (-0.27) (-0.72) (-1.64) (-1.08)
wtot40X_1951 0.018** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.003 -0.000 0.002
(3.23) (-2.04) (-1.86) (-1.96) (0.73) (0.47) (-0.01) (0.34)
wtot40X_1952 0.022*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.003 -0.000 0.002
(4.14) (-1.81) (-1.70) (-1.73) (0.73) (0.46) (-0.04) (0.32)
wtot40X_1953 0.028*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.002
(4.66) (-1.91) (-1.86) (-1.83) (0.73) (0.54) (0.03) (0.29)
wtot40X_1954 0.033*** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.033 -0.033 -0.036 -0.037
(5.25) (-2.19) (-2.17) (-2.12) (-0.86) (-0.94) (-1.04) (-0.97)
wtot40X_1955 0.037*** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.005 -0.007 -0.011 -0.009
(4.00) (-2.68) (-2.75) (-2.61) (-0.40) (-0.71) (-1.20) (-0.94)
wartotal -0.015** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.010 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007
(-3.40) (-0.03) (-0.46) (-0.01) (-1.67) (-1.55) (-1.31) (-1.39)
N 736 752 752 736 752 768 752 736
adj. R-sq 0.561 0.398 0.409 0.409 0.246 0.247 0.201 0.199
Comerical Industrial and Agricultural Loans Farm Mortgages
Table 3.18 continued…
t stat istics in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Full Population Michigan
Dropped
New York
Dropped
Both States
Dropped
wtot40X_1941 0.008** 0.010** 0.006*** 0.007***
(3.31) (3.32) (4.32) (4.79)
wtot40X_1942 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.026***
(4.56) (5.43) (5.08) (6.87)
wtot40X_1943 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.061*** 0.069***
(4.52) (4.65) (5.67) (6.38)
wtot40X_1944 0.095*** 0.110*** 0.085*** 0.097***
(4.44) (4.75) (5.22) (6.09)
wtot40X_1945 0.123*** 0.146*** 0.111*** 0.131***
(4.32) (5.05) (4.93) (6.51)
wtot40X_1946 0.091** 0.112*** 0.081*** 0.099***
(3.44) (4.27) (3.61) (4.85)
wtot40X_1947 0.065** 0.082*** 0.058** 0.073***
(2.85) (3.71) (2.77) (3.72)
wtot40X_1948 0.055* 0.069** 0.051* 0.063**
(2.64) (3.41) (2.50) (3.23)
wtot40X_1949 0.056** 0.069*** 0.052** 0.063**
(2.83) (3.58) (2.70) (3.40)
wtot40X_1950 0.067*** 0.079*** 0.063*** 0.073***
(3.79) (4.46) (3.75) (4.45)
wtot40X_1951 0.052** 0.060** 0.050** 0.057**
(3.06) (3.27) (2.91) (3.06)
wtot40X_1952 0.047** 0.054** 0.045** 0.052**
(3.04) (3.36) (2.92) (3.18)
wtot40X_1953 0.035* 0.039* 0.035* 0.039*
(2.39) (2.33) (2.36) (2.29)
wtot40X_1954 0.035* 0.039* 0.033* 0.036*
(2.65) (2.55) (2.54) (2.41)
wtot40X_1955 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.020
(1.20) (1.13) (1.17) (1.09)
wartotal -0.032 -0.040* -0.028 -0.035*
(-1.80) (-2.09) (-1.72) (-2.05)
N 768 752 752 736
adj. R-sq 0.766 0.771 0.792 0.796
Government Liabilities
Table 3.18 contined...
t stat ist ics in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Year
Estimated Net
Effect of War
Spending on
Total Assets
Implied
Cumulative
Multipler: GDP
Estimated Net
Effect for War
Spending on
CIA Loans
Implied
Cumulative
Multipler: Fixed
Business
Investment
Estimated Net
Effect Of War
Spending on
Residential
Mortgages
Implied
Cumulative
Multipler:
Residential
Investment
1941 -0.37 -6.21 -0.09 -0.46 -0.031 -0.21
1942 -0.37 -8.75 -0.08 -0.52 -0.031 -0.26
1943 -0.25 -3.34 -0.09 -3.83 -0.032 -0.47
1944 -0.14 -1.72 -0.08 -2.02 -0.034 -0.99
1945 -0.04 -0.43 -0.08 -2.23 -0.034 -1.41
1946 -0.01 -0.16 -0.07 -0.94 -0.031 -0.50
1947 -0.05 -0.79 -0.04 -0.40 -0.019 -0.17
1948 -0.04 -0.65 -0.02 -0.21 -0.007 -0.06
1949 -0.03 -0.53 -0.03 -0.38 0.002 0.02
1950 0.02 0.36 -0.03 -0.44 0.016 0.14
1951 0.07 1.58 0.01 0.08 0.036 0.29
1952 0.13 3.09 0.02 0.23 0.044 0.37
1953 0.15 3.92 0.04 0.40 0.064 0.53
1954 0.21 5.61 0.02 0.23 0.08 0.67
1955 0.27 7.27 0.04 0.47 0.106 0.85
Source: BEA, Table 1.1.5. Author's Calculations from Table 12
Table 3.19: War Spending Multipler Estimates for Various Component of GDP.
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1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Capital expenditures 23.7 23.7 33.3 22.8 34 41.8 35.6 37 32.5
Profits* 7.9 5.6 16.2 17.3 5.3 21.1 22.2 25.5 23.8
Liabilities** 15.8 18.1 17.1 5.5 28.7 20.7 13.4 11.5 8.7
Credit Market Instruments 7.1 8.6 7.4 3 9.2 11.8 8.7 4.8 6.2
Bank Loans and Mortgages 6.2 5.6 2.7 -0.1 6.9 7.7 3.2 0.9 2.2
Corporate Equities 1 1.1 1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.3 1.8 1.6
* Investment financed by profits is calcualted as capital expenditures minus liabilities.
**The selected liabilites shown are not all liabilites. In particular, trade payables and tax liabilites have been excluded.
Source: BoG of the Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds 1945-1954.
Table 3.20: Financing of Investment By Nonfinancial Business 1946-1954 (Billions of $)
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1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1945-1955
T
otal(M
illions
$)
18,591
23,034
28,199
33,279
37,619
45,170
51,711
58,500
66,094
75,677
88,250
69,659
Savings
and
Loan
A
ssociations
27.73%
29.70%
30.05%
29.57%
29.55%
29.04%
28.71%
30.16%
31.77%
33.04%
34.00%
35.67%
Life
Insurance
C
om
panies
12.40%
11.05%
12.40%
14.85%
16.20%
18.77%
20.52%
20.10%
19.96%
20.02%
20.01%
22.04%
M
utualSavings
B
anks
10.19%
8.83%
8.10%
8.52%
8.94%
9.55%
12.24%
14.01%
11.16%
11.90%
12.58%
13.22%
C
om
m
ercialB
anks
14.98%
19.87%
22.35%
22.22%
21.15%
20.99%
17.94%
17.52%
16.68%
16.25%
17.08%
17.64%
H
om
e
O
w
ners'Loan
C
orporation
4.58%
2.76%
1.72%
1.11%
0.61%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
-1.22%
Fannie
M
ae
0.04%
0.03%
0.01%
0.59%
2.14%
2.93%
3.52%
3.78%
3.57%
3.08%
2.77%
3.50%
Individuals
and
O
thers
29.59%
36.46%
25.36%
23.13%
21.40%
18.70%
17.08%
16.14%
15.35%
14.39%
12.43%
7.85%
Source:1957
StatisticalA
bstractofthe
U
nited
States
T
able
3.21:PercentofT
otalM
ortgages
O
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O
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to
Four-Fam
ily
N
onfarm
H
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Y
ear
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Change
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Real
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P
F&
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%
Change
K
uznets
RealGD
P
K
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Change
M
&
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P
M
&
R
%
Change
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P
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%
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Rockoff
RealGD
P
Rogoff%
Change
VatterReal
GD
P
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1937
71.81
90.77
90.77
90.77
90.77
90.77
88.70
1938
68.32
-4.85%
85.46
-5.85%
85.46
-5.85%
85.46
-5.85%
85.46
-5.85%
85.46
-5.85%
84.87
-4.32%
1939
73.50
7.58%
92.00
7.65%
92.00
7.65%
92.00
7.65%
92.00
7.65%
92.00
7.65%
91.99
8.39%
1940
78.18
6.37%
100.17
8.88%
100.17
8.88%
100.17
8.88%
100.17
8.88%
100.17
8.88%
100.57
9.32%
1941
89.73
14.78%
116.11
15.90%
116.11
15.90%
116.11
15.90%
116.11
15.90%
116.11
15.90%
119.57
18.89%
1942
107.08
19.33%
131.14
12.95%
131.14
12.95%
131.14
12.95%
137.29
18.24%
134.34
15.70%
137.88
15.32%
1943
125.36
17.07%
142.09
8.35%
147.51
12.48%
144.11
9.88%
151.89
10.64%
146.67
9.18%
152.34
10.48%
1944
133.74
6.69%
146.47
3.08%
158.63
7.54%
150.87
4.69%
152.87
0.65%
150.63
2.70%
152.00
-0.22%
1945
134.71
0.72%
142.38
-2.79%
156.35
-1.43%
148.91
-1.29%
139.87
-8.50%
143.43
-4.78%
139.07
-8.51%
1946
125.47
-6.86%
140.70
-1.18%
145.53
-6.92%
143.19
-3.85%
130.92
-6.40%
131.46
-8.34%
124.90
-10.19%
1947
121.09
-3.49%
143.13
1.73%
143.13
-1.65%
143.13
-0.04%
138.59
5.86%
140.31
6.73%
--
--
1948
125.90
3.98%
148.13
3.49%
148.13
3.49%
148.13
3.49%
149.19
7.65%
146.55
4.44%
--
--
T
otal44-47
-9.46%
-2.28%
-9.77%
-5.13%
-9.34%
-6.85%
--
T
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3.22:RealGD
P
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BEA
T
able
1.1.4
.
RockoffThe
U
nited
States:From
ploughsharesto
Swords
T
able
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orld
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Real
GDP
%
Change
Real GDP
CPI
Inflatio
n
M2 % Change M2 m2 v
% Change
Velocity of
M2
1945q1 222.60 100.00 120,668.00 1.84
1945q2 223.33 0.33% 100.75 0.75% 124,811.33 3.43% 1.80 -2.28%
1945q3 209.47 -6.21% 101.69 0.93% 128,971.00 3.33% 1.65 -8.39%
1945q4 196.62 -6.13% 101.87 0.18% 132,645.33 2.85% 1.51 -8.57%
1946q1 194.72 -0.97% 102.25 0.37% 133,633.33 0.74% 1.49 -1.33%
1946q2 198.14 1.75% 104.12 1.83% 138,033.33 3.29% 1.49 0.31%
1946q3 195.48 -1.34% 113.11 8.63% 140,366.67 1.69% 1.58 5.39%
1946q4 188.08 -3.79% 119.10 5.30% 141,400.00 0.74% 1.58 0.57%
1947q1 184.31 -2.00% 121.53 2.04% 143,166.67 1.25% 1.56 -1.23%
1947q2 188.04 2.02% 123.22 1.39% 145,333.33 1.51% 1.59 1.90%
1947q3 183.86 -2.22% 126.78 2.89% 146,600.00 0.87% 1.59 -0.27%
1947q4 187.70 2.09% 130.15 2.66% 147,233.33 0.43% 1.66 4.35%
1948q1 187.73 0.02% 132.21 1.58% 147,666.67 0.29% 1.68 1.30%
1948q2 191.74 2.13% 134.46 1.70% 146,833.33 -0.56% 1.76 4.46%
1948q3 191.48 -0.13% 137.46 2.23% 147,033.33 0.14% 1.79 1.96%
1948q4 196.12 2.42% 136.14 -0.96% 146,666.67 -0.25% 1.82 1.70%
1949q1 193.54 -1.32% 134.08 -1.51% 146,066.67 -0.41% 1.78 -2.41%
1949q2 192.34 -0.62% 134.08 0.00% 146,400.00 0.23% 1.76 -0.84%
1949q3 191.84 -0.26% 133.71 -0.28% 146,233.33 -0.11% 1.75 -0.43%
1949q4 191.89 0.03% 133.15 -0.42% 146,000.00 -0.16% 1.75 -0.23%
1950q1 199.99 4.22% 132.21 -0.70% 147,033.33 0.71% 1.80 2.76%
1950q2 206.54 3.28% 133.15 0.71% 149,000.00 1.34% 1.85 2.64%
1950q3 210.81 2.07% 136.33 2.39% 150,133.33 0.76% 1.91 3.72%
1950q4 218.27 3.54% 139.14 2.06% 151,100.00 0.64% 2.01 5.00%
M2 from Friedmand and Schwartz (1963): Monetary History of the United States 1967-1960 , Appendix A.
Table 3.23: MV=PY 1945q1 to 19540q4
Source: GDP: Nominal from 1949 and 1951 Statstical Suppliment--Survey of Current Business, Defalated by CPI. CPI: BLS.
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
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(11)
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1945-(Col
5/8
Change
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Change
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Percentofthe
change
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N
onresidential
investm
ent
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to
changing
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1935
6.70
5.60
1.30
5.40
1.10
1936
8.60
7.50
1.70
6.90
1.50
1.20
0.10
6.67%
1937
12.20
9.50
2.10
10.10
3.20
2.60
1.40
43.75%
1938
7.10
7.70
2.10
5.00
-5.10
-0.60
-3.20
62.75%
1939
9.30
9.10
3.00
6.30
1.30
0.20
0.80
61.54%
1940
13.60
11.20
3.50
10.10
3.80
2.40
2.20
57.89%
1941
18.10
13.80
4.10
14.00
3.90
4.30
1.90
48.72%
1942
10.40
8.50
2.20
8.20
-5.80
1.90
-2.40
41.38%
1943
6.10
6.90
1.40
4.70
-3.50
-0.70
-2.60
74.29%
1944
7.80
8.70
1.40
6.40
1.70
-0.90
-0.20
-11.76%
1945
10.80
12.30
1.70
9.10
9.10
2.70
-1.50
-1.50
-16.48%
-0.60
-22.22%
1946
31.10
25.10
7.80
23.30
32.40
14.20
6.00
4.50
13.89%
7.50
52.82%
1947
35.00
35.50
12.10
22.90
55.30
-0.40
-0.60
3.90
7.05%
-6.60
1650.00%
1948
48.10
42.40
15.60
32.50
87.80
9.60
5.70
9.60
10.93%
6.30
65.63%
1949
36.90
39.60
14.60
22.30
110.10
-10.20
-2.70
6.90
6.27%
-8.40
82.35%
1950
54.10
48.30
20.50
33.60
143.70
11.30
5.80
12.70
8.84%
8.50
75.22%
Source:BEA
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